UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
IRVINE

Traditional Believers and Democratic Citizens. A Contextualized Analysis of the Effects of Religion on Support for Democracy in East Central Europe

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by Bogdan Mihai Radu

Dissertation committee:
Professor Carole J. Uhlaner, Chair
Professor Nina Bandelj
Professor Cecelia Lynch
Professor Rein Taagepera

2007

The dissertation of Bogdan Mihai Radu
is approved and is acceptable in quality and form
for publication on microfilm and in digital formats:



Committee Chair

University of California, Irvine
2007

Dedication

To

My mother in recognition of her brilliant mind, humility and love and

To

Kent as a thank you for patiently supporting me through years of creative uncertainty and

To

Teo for never trusting any source and inquiring into the deep truths of humanity

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my committee chair, professor Carole Uhlaner who patiently guided me through the maze of my own thinking. I would have never succeeded in writing this dissertation without her academic and psychological support.

I would also like to thank my committee member professor Cecelia Lynch for helping me understand the value of methodological diversity, and making me realize how my very own identity as a scholar is a social construction. Thank you for being an inspiration and a role model.

In addition, I would like to thank my committee members professor Nina Bandelj and professor Rein Taagepera for constantly reminding me how strong Eastern European solidarity is. Thank you both for helping me take this project to an end, and thank you for your priceless expertise in the understanding of Eastern European societies.

Finally, I would like to thank the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine and the Center for the Study of Democracy for offering me the opportunity to study at a top research institution.

Last, but not least, I would like to say a big thank you to all my colleagues hat helped me get through the process of finishing up my Ph.D. thesis: Lee Franklin, Brandy Griffin, Lindsay Lupo and Raaj Tiagi.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Bogdan Mihai Radu

bradu@uci.edu
bogdanradu2000@yahoo.com

Education

2007 – Ph. D. in Political Science, University of California, Irvine
2001 – MA (Econ) in Government, University of Manchester, UK
2000 – BA in Political Science, "*Babes-Bolyai*" University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Grants

2006 - *Taiwan Foundation for Democracy*, Visiting Fellowship (Religion, Church and the Creation of Democratic Political Culture in New Democracies. A Comparative Research Proposal.)
2006 - *Taipei Representative Office in Budapest* (course development grant – Introduction to Taiwanese Politics)
2006 – *Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation*, Research Grant (Strengthening Democracy through Professional Associations)
2005 – *Taipei Representative Office in Budapest* (course development grant – Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Taiwan)
2004 – *University of California, Irvine*, Summer Research Fellowship (Religion and Political Participation in Romania)
2003 - *University of California, Irvine*, Summer Research Fellowship (Church and State in Central and Eastern Europe)
2001 – *University of California, Irvine Social Science Fellowship* to pursue a Ph.D. in Politics and Society, University of California, Irvine, CA
2000 – *Open Society Institute/Chevening Fellowship* to pursue an MA degree in Government at the University of Manchester, UK
2000 – *Open Society Institute Scholarship* to attend the ICPSR School of Quantitative Methods, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI
1999 – *IREX/USIA Scholarship in Public Policy* at the University Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA

Publications

2006 – "Consolidation of Democracy in Postcommunist Europe," *Center for the Study of Democracy Paper Series*, University of California, Irvine, September 2006 (with Nina Bandelj)

2006 – "Democratic Deficit and EU Enlargement. A Study of Political Attitudes East and West,"in Chong-Ko Peter Tzou (ed.) *European Constitution and Integration*, Graduate Institute of European Studies and European Union Research Center, Tamkang University, Tamsui: Taiwan

2006 – "Gods and Caesars. The Role of Churches in the Breakdown of Communist Regimes of Central and Eastern Europe, *"Studia Universitaris Babes-Bolyai* , June 2006, Cluj:Romania

2005 – "The Romanian Orthodox Church and European Union Integration: A Conflict of Values," *Studia Universitaris Babes-Bolyai*, June 2005, Cluj: Romania

Papers And Conferences

2006 – *American Sociological Association Conference*, Montreal, Quebec, Canada "Consolidation of Democracy in Postcommunist Europe," (with Nina Bandelj)

2006 - *Babes-Bolyai University Faculty of Political Science Conferenc*e, Cluj, Romania, "Constructions of the Past and Religious Property Restitution. Democracy, Orthodoxy and Nationhood in Romania"

2005 – *Tamkang University EU Conference*, Tamsui, Taiwan, *"*Democratic Deficit and EU Enlargement. A study of political attitudes East and West*"*

2004 - *Western Political Science Association Conference*, Portland OR, USA, "The word of God comes into the voting booth. A comparative study of religious determinants of political participation in Central and Eastern Europe

2000 – *Romanian Conference on Social Science Research Methodology*, "Babes-Bolyai" University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, "The Rational-choice Approach in the Study of the EU Decision-making Processes. Strengths and Weaknesses."

2000 – *Civic Education Project* conference in Sofia, Bulgaria, "Romanian Orthodox Church Opposing European Integration?"

1999 – *International Conference on Public Policy*, University of Warsaw, Kazimiercz nad Wisla, Poland, "Advantages of Local Governance. Increasing Social Capital"

1999 – *International Conference in Political Science, "Babes-Bolyai*" University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, "The Church and Civil Society. A Few Considerations

1998 – International Seminar for the Protection of the Envirnonment, Universite Pantheon-Assas, Paris, France (participant)
1998 – *National Conference in Political Science*, "*Babes-Bolyai*" University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, "The Church and the State in Romania. Monopoly or Free Market System?"

Field Research and Academic Employment

2006 - Associate researcher, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Department of Political Science
2004 - 2006 – Associate lecturer, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Department of Political Science: Introduction to International Relations, Social Science Methodology, Introduction to Taiwanese Politics, Democratization and Civil Society in Taiwan, Academic Writing for Social Sciences
2001 - 2007 - Teaching Assistant, University of California, Irvine (Political Science): *Introduction to Political Science Analysis, Introduction to International Relations, Micropolitics, Civil Liberties, Religion and Media.*
2000 – Survey coordinator for *"Babes-Bolyai"* University, Department of Political Science survey
2000 - 2001 – Analyst for Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung, in the Party Manifesto Project
1999 – Survey operator for CURS Social Opinion Barometer
1999 – Interview operator for CCRIT (Center for Inter-Ethnic Relations)
1998 –Organizer *"Social Cohesion and Cultural Diversity"* – Project funded by the Council of Europe and conducted by the Intercultural Institute in Timisoara, Romania,
1998 – Organizer of the Ecumenical Conference "*People and Religions*", Bucharest, September 1998
1997-1998 – Internships at the Romanian Parliament, Commission of Human Rights, Minorities and Religions

Special Skills

- Excellent writing and speaking English (GRE, Toefl, Speak, IELTS) and French (DELF, DALF)
- Computing abilities Windows (Word, Power Point, Excel, Html), Statistical Packages (SPSS)

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Traditional Believers and Democratic Citizens. A Contextualized Analysis of the Effects of Religion on Support for Democracy in East Central Europe

By

Bogdan Mihai Radu

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine 2007

Professor Carole Uhlaner, Chair

In this research, I explore the relationship between religion and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. My goal is to find out in what ways belonging to a particular denomination and participation in church related activities influence societal support for democracy. Favorable attitudes towards democracy are critical for consolidating democracy, and understanding how religion contributes to their formation is important in establishing the role of religion in democratization. My major argument is the following: understanding the effect of religion and church in the formation of political attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe requires a careful analysis of the historical, political, social and cultural context in which religion acquired its status in society, and that also determined the strength of the relationship between church and state. I argue that the institutional embeddedness of religion and church is critically important when analyzing a church's ability and willingness to accommodate democracy.

Therefore, I explore the effect of religious denomination, religiosity and religious participation on support for democracy in Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

These 14 countries combine different levels of democratic transition and consolidation, display very different configurations of religious composition, and are all members of the former communist block. I use World Value Surveys data in my quantitative analysis.

The findings suggest that there is no denominational effect on pro-democratic attitudes. Orthodox and Muslim believers in Central and Eastern Europe are no more or less supportive of democracy than their Catholic or Protestant counterparts. Instead, I find that the historical relationship between church and state, and the different roles played by religion in society do play a role in a church's ability and willingness to accommodate democracy. Furthermore, I also find based on qualitative research in Romania that the features describing the relationship between church and state are in a permanent interaction with each other. This dynamic interplay of the different contextual features describing the relationship between church and state, limit the applicability of quantitative data and asks for contextualized analyses of the relationship between religion and politics.

Chapter 1

Central and Eastern European Transitions to Democracy – The Unprecedented Change

In the last 20 years religion became more prominent on the political stage. From the religious revival in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism, to the bloodshed in former Yugoslavia, to the fear of Muslim terrorism, the role of religion in today's democratic societies is one of the most debated issues. While the mass media focuses on the most visible and threatening effects of religion, such as terrorism or radical nationalism, there is not much coverage of religion's positive traits. Even in those instances in which religion is praised for its positive societal effects, as is the case with the Catholic Church in Poland during communism, it is mostly with reference to Western Christianity. Consequently, not many people are aware that some Muslim communities are experimenting with democracy with a fair amount of success. It is also less known that Orthodox Churches all over the former Soviet territory became lucrative economic actors, true entrepreneurs, putting their tax free status to good work (either importing and bottling vodka, or distributing holy sparkling water).

It is no surprise that, not only in the mass media, but also in the academia, the mainstream discourse is framed around the compatibility between democracy and Western Christianity. Geographically speaking, most of the consolidated democratic world is Western Christian, either Catholic or Protestant. In Edward Said's language, the West has Orientalized religion, and, any denomination that is not part of Western Christianity is doomed to have a harder time accommodating democracy. Samuel

Huntington is but one of the initiators of this discourse on a necessary Western Christian background for successful democratization.

In this research, I explore the relationship between religion and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. My goal is to find out the ways in which belonging to a particular denomination and participating in church-related activities influence societal support for democracy. Favorable attitudes towards democracy are critical for consolidating democracy, and understanding how religion contributes to their formation is important in establishing the role of religion in democratization. I argue that the very use of the word "compatibility" in the discourse on religion and democracy presupposes a monolithic fixed understanding for both religion and democracy, when, in fact, both are flexible entities, in a process of dynamic interaction. My major argument is the following: understanding the effect of religion and church in the formation of political attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe requires a careful analysis of the historical, political, social and cultural context in which religion acquired its status in society, and that also determines the strength of the relationship between church and state. I argue that the institutional embeddedness of religion and church is critically important when analyzing a church's ability and willingness to accommodate democracy.

The countries under my lens are Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. These 14 countries combine different levels of democratic transition and consolidation, display very different configurations of religious composition, and are all members of the former communist block. Therefore, they offer an adequate setting for my research, allowing for comparisons and contrasts.

Liberal democracy is grounded in the principles of the Enlightenment and of Christian religion. Max Weber traces a relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, and Western societies are consolidated liberal free market societies. Nonetheless, Western Christianity itself is very different nowadays than even one century ago. It is through a process of adjustment to new political contexts and ideas that Western Christianity now welcomes democracy. There are a few defining features of Western Christianity, both Catholic and Protestant that specify the role of religion in consolidated democracies. First, state and church are separate entities, with the latter belonging to the civil society. Second, in consolidated democracies, religion is increasingly privatized. Religion became more a matter of individual introspection, rather than a mobilizing mot de force. Third, most consolidated democracies constitutionally guarantee freedom of religion, and, implicitly, religious pluralism. Summarizing, liberal capitalist democracy created a new stream of Christianity that responds best to substantive and institutional democratic imperatives. Although within the group of Western consolidated democracies religion matters more (USA) or less (Scandinavia), with more pluralistic (USA, UK) or more homogenous (Italy, Sweden) systems, with completely self subsidized religion (USA, UK) or even completely state funded religion (Scandinavia), the three characteristics of the private, separate and pluralistic religion are definitory of Western democratic Christianity.

Consequently, new democracies are, most of the time, "encouraged" to adopt the same model. Religious contexts that do not present these three features are usually attributed a negative influence on the prospects of democratization. In some cases, secularization and religious freedom have been considered sine qua non conditions for

successful democratic consolidation. Nonetheless, I argue that the private, separate and pluralistic religion is a result of adjusting religious dogma and structure to the structures of liberal capitalist democracy. Protestantism fits more naturally into the category of private, competitional and separate religion because of the multiple streams of Protestantism, their historical co-existence and separate functioning from that of the state. Catholicism had difficulties accommodating these three features, mostly because of its Worldwide coverage under one leader and its strict hierarchical structure. However, the so-called Aggiornamento signified the Catholic Church's readiness to change and accommodate progress and liberalism. Eastern Orthodoxy is traditionally in close relationship with the state, especially through autocephaly - a sign of national identity and unity, and, therefore, it does not come close to democratic Christianity. Islam has the hardest time adapting because of its collective aspect, the omnipresence of religion in every day life, and a conflation of the religious and the secular spheres.

I suggest that, when analyzing the effect of religion and church on the formation of attitudes, one needs to take into account both institutional features of the church, and also the context in which these features were acquired. One also needs to look for ways in which religion itself transformed the political, cultural and social context in which it historically evolved. Through the acceptance of the dynamic and historical character of the relationship between church and state, and also of the status of religion in society, one amends the discourse on the compatibility between religion and democracy. Religions are multi-vocal and flexible, as the example of the Catholic Church showed. Therefore, there is no reason to assert a certain compatibility between religion and democracy, since both are flexible interacting concepts. It is more useful, I argue, to understand under which

conditions religion and church can be promoters of democratic values – initiating the inquiry from the perspective of embedded religion and church.

The plan of the dissertation

In this research I combine quantitative and qualitative methods in order to capture the dynamic relationship between state and church and between religion and society. In chapter 2, I discuss the irreversibility of secularization in the modern world, and its relationship to democracy. I build my argument on Jose Casanova's study of public religions in the modern world and I conclude, in agreement with the author, that secularization is not an inevitable occurrence in consolidated democracies, and that religions can have a positive impact on democratization, irrespective of doctrine. I also offer examples of religious states that successfully transitioned to democracy, and bring evidence showing the positive effect of religiosity and church participation in the formation of political attitudes. In chapter 3, I continue my argument by theorizing the importance of attitudes in the process of transition, reflecting the citizenry's acceptance of the new form of government. In the second part of chapter 3, I analyze determinants of political attitudes, and establish the place of religious variables. In chapter 4, I formulate contextual hypotheses that identify structural features describing the relationship between church and state. In chapter 5, I present the results of quantitative data analysis. I construct different statistical models and test the effect of different religious variables on the formation of political attitudes. The overarching finding of this chapter is the incredible variety of mechanisms through which religion and church affect the formation of political attitudes. Such variety confirms the importance of contextual variables, and the fact that their quantification is limited. Therefore, Chapter 6 is a case study on

Romania, in which I qualitatively analyze the interaction between church and state. I argue that this interaction is constructed historically and that it affects the status of the Romanian Orthodox Church after 1989, and its willingness and ability to influence political attitudes. The inclusion of this case study is justified by the strong negative effect that religion and church attendance have on support for democracy in Romania. Additionally, this negative effect is strengthened by post-1989 constructions of national identity. In the conclusion I discuss the importance of contextualizing and situating the analysis of the relationship between religion and democracy, the limitations of this research, and also new directions for research.

The rest of the introduction is devoted to a concise presentation of transitions to democracy that set the background for my entire analysis. I advocate the need to recognize the uniqueness of transitions in Central and Central Europe, and I identify two critical factors that grant the process its uniqueness. First, the transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe implies an unprecedented change in all aspects of society, from politics to economy to lifestyle. Second, and related to the first point, the international framing of the democratization discourse enforced the enormous dimensions of change, by exporting a model of democracy that simultaneously includes procedeural democracy, liberal values and free market economy.

Central and Eastern European Transitions to Democracy - The Challenge of Comparison

Transitions to democracy represent a popular choice of research topic nowadays. While the subject was initially developed in relationship with the new democracies of Southern Europe and Latin America, the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has granted it the prominent status within the discipline. Democratic transition and

consolidation became a priority research area for policy makers, international inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, and numerous civil society actors. The road to democracy seems to be paved with advice from many sources. The only consensus is over the desirability of liberal democracy as a principle, while no particular institutional arrangement is deemed uniquely optimal . In this context, it is necessary to specify the concept of transition, and characterize its Central and Eastern European sub-specie.

Transition represents "major shifts from one stable state of society to another potentially stable state." (Balcerowicz, 2002, p.63) It does not necessarily imply that the arriving point is a consolidated democracy, although most of the discourse seems to disregard this. According to the author quoted above, there are four types of transition to democracy that precede the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, and upon which post-communist democratization was built.

First, the classical transition includes what are now categorized as the advanced capitalist democracies, or the consolidated, traditional democracies – mostly entitled as such because of their advanced age – they undertook their transition in between 1860 and 1920. The age per se is not as important, as the fact that they democratized at a slower historically organic pace and without pressure from outside. In other words, these countries became democratic at their own leisure, while also being the inaugurators of the first democratic institutional arrangements. Second, there are the neo-classical transitions, including democratization processes that occurred in capitalist systems after the Second World War – West Germany, Italy, Japan; then, later, Spain and Portugal in 1970, some parts of Latin America 1970-1980, and South Korea and Taiwan in 1980. Already, with

each of these younger democracies, an outside international factor starts to influence both pace and nature of democratization. The victors of the Second World War are constructing democratic systems in the defeated countries. Rupnik (2002) even draws a comparison between the situation at the end of the Cold War with the situation at the end of the first world war. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the United States started their crusade for freedom and democracy in Latin America, and southern Europe succumbed to the pressure of the European Union. Third, there are market-oriented reforms in non-communist countries, comprising most of the countries mentioned above, although their economic changes seem to have preceded their political changes. Fourth, there are the somewhat isolated Asian post-communist transitions, such as China in the 1970 and Vietnam in the 1980 that did not result in full-fledged democracies. Since democratic transition seems to occur in so many areas of the world, and in so many different ways, comparative research seems to have found an ideal field, although extreme variety may make the selection of cases tedious. Summarizing the experience of these four stages of democratization, one notes the increasing influence of outside democratizing agencies, and the prevalence of either democratization or market economy implementation in one country at one time, and no simultaneous market democracy. This will change with the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore what is it that makes transition in Central and Eastern Europe different?

Balcerowicz (2002) sums up 4 features of transitions in Central and Eastern Europe that are granting it a unique status. First of all, there is an exceptionally large scope of change; not only the political institutions are changing, but also the economic system, the societal values/culture, even defense alliances, integration in supra national

structures (the EU), and state and nation building. Although economic and political liberalization are said to occur simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe, the former is bound to take longer time to settle, since privatization and is effects are more tedious than setting up the founding elections and drawing up a constitution: "mass democracy (or, at least, political pluralism, that is, some degree of legal and political competition) first, and market capitalism later." (2003, p. 64) However, even if the two processes are only partially overlapping, the need to start both at the same makes consolidation more difficult, because of the problems arising from re-creating property rights, shock treatment for the economy, and the need for an active and yet patient citizenry. The latter remark leads to the second feature of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, namely the fact that market oriented reforms have to be introduced under democratic or at least pluralistic political arrangements (in contrast to most other cases of democratization, in which economic liberalization usually precedes democratization, and occurs during periods of authoritarian rule). According to Przeworski (2000), economic reform has an easier time taking place under the rein of an authoritarian regime, since it creates dissatisfaction within the population that, in turn, is more easily manageable by the repression mechanisms available in an authoritarian system. Third, the transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe have been peaceful, with the exception of Romania. This rather smooth change of system is indeed one of the most interesting features of Central and East European transitions, since it is customary for changes of regime to incur more resistance from the defeated part.

Valerie Bunce (2002) theorizes the limits and opportunities for comparative research, with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe and the potential for comparison

with Southern Europe and Latin America. Her analysis is centered on the three most important elements of transition: the decline of the non-democratic regime, its collapse, and the agenda for transition. In terms of the decline of the authoritarian rule, while there are commonalities deriving directly from the nature of authoritarian regimes themselves, she argues that the differences are in fact more salient than the similarities. Moreover, these differences affect the democratic transition and consolidation. While in Latin America and Southern Europe there has been historical alternation between authoritarian and democratic regimes, Central and Eastern Europe have a history of exclusive non-democratic regimes.[1] Also, authoritarianism in Central and Eastern Europe has been more invasive and controlling than in the other two areas. Additionally, even the military was subservient to the communist regimes (as opposed to the important role of the military junta, in other transitions). The social structure in Central and Eastern Europe does not include a bourgeoisie, or a middle class, usually invested with the active pro-democratic role. Therefore, while in Latin America and Southern Europe democracy is more of a come back, in Central and Eastern Europe it is a premiere, after a very long uninterrupted presence of communism.

The differences are even more pronounced in terms of the collapse of the non-democratic regime. While in Latin America and Southern Europe there are mostly political and domestic causes, in Central and Eastern Europe the reasons are primarily economic and international, through the consequences of Gorbachev's leadership. In the former examples, transition occurred as either negotiated pacts between the regime and the opposition, or through public mobilization. In the latter, both these strategies worked simultaneously, with some hybrid results, in which democracy never materialized, or

[1] Inter-war Czech democracy is disregarded because of its short life.

where liberalization is portrayed as an opening of an authoritarian regime, without envisioning the demise of that regime itself. Thus, the collapse of communism does not necessarily equal installation of democracy. In some cases it meant reform within socialism, in order to make the system more economically viable. In most Central and Eastern European countries, it meant "the end of the political hegemony of the communist party." (Bunce, 2002, p. 22) This is particularly important given the resurgence of communist parties as significant players in many post-communist countries.

Finally, in terms of agendas for transition, the differences between Latin America and Southern Europe on the one hand and Central and Eastern Europe on the other loom the largest. While in the former region democracy can be portrayed as making a come back, in the latter it makes its first proper entrance; this difference bring with it the need for enormous change in every aspect of social, political and cultural sectors. The extent of change is more limited, or at least more specified, in Latin America and Southern Europe, while in Central and Eastern Europe

> everything that defines a social system – national identity, social structure, and the state and its relationship to citizens, the economy, and the international system – is a subject for intense negotiation in the postcommunist world. (Bunce, 2002, 23)

And it is because of this more limited scope of change in Latin America or Southern Europe that interests are usually perceived as given, or known, while in Central and Eastern Europe they are fluid and "this is one reason why ethnicity is central to identity in much of the postcommunist world." (Bunce, 2002, p. 23) Bunce's conclusion sums up nicely the incredible scope of change in Central and Eastern Europe – "in post-communism, political institutions seem to be more a consequence than a cause of

political development." (2002, p. 28) Indeed, the political institutions are a result of political development from elsewhere, imported and sometimes adjusted to national contexts, but they are not the results of historical political development – there was no time and history available for this. Therefore, we now turn to the issue of the initial political institutions, and the need to render them functional.

Transitions to democracy are two-folded processes. The first component is institutional – inauguration of democratic political institutions. The relation between the executive and the legislative provides an example of this component. While the executive may preserve the most power of decision-making, a democratically elected legislature consecrates the democratic character of the new regime:

> All governments require an executive to exercise the authority of the state, but representative democracies invest the people with authority, expressed indirectly through a popularly elected legislature usually endowed with at least some degree of responsibility over the executive. (Mishler and Rose, 1994, p. 5)

The second component of transition is the long lasting process of rooting these institutions in the culture of every particular country, thereby creating a civil society and increasing the odds of democratic consolidation. The importance of this component is best explained in contrast to established democratic regimes. In consolidated democracies, public support for the regime is important for its success or performance, but its democratic nature or existence is not in question. Transitional regimes are different in that public evaluations of the regime establish the legitimacy of a democratic government or justify a return to non-democratic regime types: "The critical question for newly democratic legislatures is not whether citizens trust their legislatures, but whether they think the legislatures should be performing at all" (Mishler and Rose, 1994, p. 9).

The "democratized" public thus needs to undertake a process of "democracy learning" in order to familiarize itself with the mechanisms of democratic politics. Mere "adoption" of democratic institutions does not guarantee a "full" democracy (Reisinger, 1997).

The choice of democratic political institutions has been widely debated in the literature on transitions, originating with scholarly work on Latin America. O'Donnell et al. (1986), Linz and Stepan (1978), Mainwarring (1992, 1995). Kitschelt (1999) discuss institutional choices available for transitional countries, and their effect on democratic consolidation: presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, choice of electoral system, bicameralism vs. one chamber parliament, constitutionalism, the size/form of the party system. The spectrum of countries under observation then widened to include East and Central Europe. Munck and Leff (1997) are but two of the scholars that tried to explain post-transitional democracy based on institutional choices made in the transition period. The identity of the agent of change (incumbent elite or opposition) and its strategy (confrontation or accommodation) determine the "quality and quantity" of post-transitional democracy.

The second component of the transition process, the response of the society to the new institutions and their rooting has not received much attention. The reasons for this imbalance are manifold.

First, there is the nature of the research question: a limited number of institutional choices, but an endless variety of outcomes due to the interaction between institutions and the extant political culture. Research tends to be case-oriented and cross-country comparisons are almost impossible to effectuate. Consequently, some countries or regions present more interest for scholars, and are thus over-represented on the academic

agenda. Tucker (2002) surveys the amount of political literature dedicated to Central and Eastern Europe and finds that the vast majority of studies have been devoted to Russia and the former Soviet Union, and three important countries in Central Europe: Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. While it would be interesting to find out what exactly causes this over-representation and its specific content, I only remark that case studies and intra-regional research questions take precedent in face of cross-regional research. This case study suggests the possibility of truly comparative research, and we believe that the research question is the one factor that influences the choice of cases.

Second, there are debates in the literature on the necessity of preexisting democratic political culture. Is democratization building political culture, or is the pre-existing political culture conditioning democratization? However, one assertion is true at any rate: the institutional arrangements do condition and influence the development of political culture. According to Munck and Leff (1997) initial institutional choices, affected by the identity and strategy of the agent of change, determines the extent of democratic support. In other words, people might learn democracy, but they will only be as democratic as the incumbent transitional regimes allowed them to be (Munck and Leff, 1997).

Finally, the time elapsed since the fall of communism is not long enough to allow for properly measuring the "democratic" character of the civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, since some countries are still struggling with quasi-democratic governments.

The outcome of implementing democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is diverse and there is no single explanation for this diversity. Previous experiences with

democracy and an active diaspora are pertinent influencing factors. Historical evolutions and patterns of foreign domination both pre and during communism seem significant as well. Every country in the area has been dominated by, at least one empire, and one needs to differentiate between the culture imposed by the Ottomans, Habsburgs and Russians (Klingemann, unpublished 2001). Communism has been either homegrown –and thus more legitimate - or imposed from the exterior. Eckiert (1996) explains that countries that lived through a culture of publicly and collectively opposing communism, such as Hungary and Poland and Czech Republic are more probable to succeed in democracy, since they have already built a civil society.

While international influences played a part in other democratic transitions, in Central and Eastern Europe, its role is the strongest because of both security concerns (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact) and the very strong effect of European Union integration. Rupnik (2002) draws a distinction between joining NATO and joining the EU. He identifies a paradox in the fast paced NATO integration, and the slow and uncertain EU enlargement. While, the former is explained by strategic goals of the Western European countries and the US, that try to avoid the re-creation of the no man's land in Central Europe, the latter is also more demanding on the candidate countries. NATO is also more value-infused, because of its symbolic liberating and anti Russian role while the EU is mostly construed as an economic institution. From a security point of view, democratization in Central and Eastern Europe can be malign or benign. Malignancy can form a vicious circle in which "international security threats undermine democratization, failed democratization undermines international security." (Pridham,

Herring & Sanford, 1994, p. 4) Besides the ethnic conflict of former Yugoslavia and perils of economic insecurity, democratization in the region can positively affect security:

> can improve environmental security by increasing controls on potential polluters. It can improve economic security by encouraging cooperative and complementary economic policies rather than protectionism, and by reducing perceptions of the need for military spending. It can improve military security through the reassurance and openness that exists between democracies. Ant it can play a particularly important role in increasing societal security through its code of values involving a minimum of respect for the rights of minorities. In turn, security can free the resources and build the confidence, tolerance and trust necessary for democratization. (Pridham et al., 1994, p. 110)

European Union integration functions as a powerful agent for democratization, through the principle of conditionality (Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). Conditions for accession emphasize liberal democracy and market economy, and there are some fairly strict standards that need to be met before a country can be given the green light. Initially, the Central and Eastern European states experienced disspointment in the policies of the EU towards them, since after the initial 1989 enthusiasm, western Europe became a demanding actor, rather than the expected international actor welcoming home its natural ally, Central and Eastern Europe. Grabbe (2006) argues that throughout the process of adopting the acquis communautaire, candidate countries are often put in a position of inferiority that requires them to adapt to unfair outcomes (such as the restricted free circulation of people or the implementation of EU border crossing standards). These countries accept this position because EU accession has been internalized both in political culture and in the policy making of most political parties, and hence rejection would mean the loss of sunk costs and political capital (Grabbe, 2006).

Accepting the uniqueness of transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe suggests the need to carefully examine different mechanisms of negotiating

politics, economy, society and religion in a set of very different countries, but, unwillingly united through their communist past. While communism in Central and Western Europe was subject to Soviet control, transitions to democracy are supervised and designed by the European Union and other international funders. Therefore, most countries in East Central Europe transitioned from one type of foreign imposed regime, to another. Soviet communism and European democracy both influence the success of democratization, and also affect the mechanisms for change adopted in every country. By the same token, religion and church, as a belief system, and its institutionalization, respectively, are also affected by communism and democratization. I argue that communism and democracy have very similar strategies towards religion. While the former used various types of state control in order to diminish the societal importance of the religious sentiment, the latter emphasizes a clear separation between church and state, which also leads to religious privatization, and its transformation into an essentially individual experience. Each church processes these changes differently, and, I suggest that the ways in which religion and church adapt to democratic transition and consolidation are contingent on their historical roles in society, and their capacity to change. Moreover, religions are also multi-vocal, with competing discourses within each denomination (Stepan, 2000).

Therefore, in the next two chapters I review the most important arguments regarding the relationship between religion and democracy. In Chapter 2 I analyze the concept of secularization and argue that secularization is not a sine qua non condition for democratization. Furthermore, I assert the importance of considering the historical and political context in which religion and church exist in predicting their ability and

willingness to accommodate democracy. At the end of Chapter 2 I discuss several ways in which religious variables affect support for democracy and political participation, so that in Chapter 3 I theorize further into the ways in which political attitudes are formed, their relationship with political participation and the role played by religion in influencing both.

Chapter 2

Democracy With or Without Religion

Religion and democracy are in a relationship characterized by ambiguities: "In the 'West' [...] the Christian tradition struggled with a political vision that placed sovereignty in the hands of the people and increasingly treated its institutions as just one amongst a plurality of competing interests." (Anderson, 2006, p. 1) While experiences with democracy in the "East" and "South" have been less consistent and shorter lived than in the "West", "a few Islamic commentators stressed the inherent democratic qualities of their tradition, sometimes said to pre-date the European and North-American development of formal democracy." (Anderson, 2006, p. 1)

The debate on the compatibility between religion and democracy is a multi-faceted issue. Its most controversial facet is the so-called "natural" symbiosis between western Christianity and liberal democracy. Starting off with Max Weber's *Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism* the marriage between Protestantism and capitalism, was gradually extended to include liberal democracy and Catholicism, into what became a deterministic argument – the values embedded within Western Christianity create fertile soil for the flourishing of democracy. Although the Catholic Church was a force of conservatism for centuries, the *Vatican II Council* and the *Aggiornamento,* signaled its formal recognition of religious freedom and pluralism, an its commitment to change. The reform within the Catholic Church was intended make the church respond better to the spiritual needs of modern day society – hence including the values of liberal democracy.

After acute irreversible secularization was proclaimed in the late 1970s, a decade of religious revival followed, and a whole range of hypotheses on inevitable

secularization were disconfirmed (Berger, 2001). According to Casanova (1994), religious revival is not a surprising phenomenon, since secularization - conceptualized as the diminishing role of religion in the postindustrial world - is limited only to some parts of Western Europe. Nonetheless, this did not stop international democratizing agents from attributing secularization a normative feature, constructing it as a pre-condition for successful democratization (Burgess, 1997).

In this chapter I review literature that offers alternative views on the relationship between democracy and religion – views that do not limit the spread of democracy to Western Christianity or only to secular societies. First, I briefly discuss the social construction of religion in the Western world that, I argue, conditions the ways in which religion is analyzed. Second, I define and analyze secularization, emphasizing its conceptual complexity, often ignored by scientists. Jose Casanova, in his book *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994), proposes an approach in which secularization is defined as a historical process that encompasses three different and yet related concepts: differentiation, religious decline and privatization of religion. The author concludes that religion, under certain conditions, can be supportive of democracy. Third I examine the influence that different religions and churches have on the process of democratization in new democratic states. I argue that neither secularization nor Western Christianity are pre-conditions for successful democratization. Instead, I suggest that, beyond denominational differences, the historical relationship between church and state and the political context that surrounds this relationship are important intervening factors in the analysis of the effect of religion and church in the formation of pro-democratic attitudes.

Western Constructions of Religion – Orientalism and the Other

During the process of democratization, countries have two institutional options: either to choose a model already employed in consolidated democracies, or to design their own institutions. When countries chose the latter, most of the time they ended up "re-inventing the wheel" (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989). More often, they selected models that resonated with their cultural and political development (either imitating their former colonizer, or countries considered models of political development)[1]. Once institutions are in place, public acceptance and participation are both necessary for democracy to consolidate. Beyond this institutional change and its acceptance by society, democratic regimes are also subject to external approval – democracy needs to be sanctioned as such by international actors. There is growing literature on the external influences on democratizing countries. For example, the criteria for EU accession affect domestic policies in candidate countries (Schimmelfenig et al., 2006, Grabbe 2006). Adopting the acquis communautaire is equivalent to implementing models of democratic politics established in the traditional member states of the EU.

The international pressure on democratic transitions also has an effect on the status that religion has in new democracies. From this perspective, the West exhibits high rates of secularization (with the exception of United States), religious privatization, pluralism and constitutionally sanctioned freedom of religion. Hence, the Western discourse on religion and democracy is embedded in Western conceptualization of liberal

[1] For example, Romania chose a semi-presidential system, inspired by the role played by the president in France. Throughout history, Romania considered France a model of institutional development, primarily because of Francophone ties.

democracy. Western constructions of Christian religion are the result of the industrial revolution, modernization and democratization at a leisurely pace. [2]

The preeminence of western discourse on religion is spelled out in Talal Asad's (1993) collection of essays gathered in the volume *Genealogies of Religion.* The author offers a perspective on the "West" and its religious alterity, in the language of culture, religion and power. His focus is on the anthropological method that originated in Western Europe and therefore contains "the grain" of cultural imperialism. It is modernity that initiated anthropological studies, as both, a path towards understanding "the others" and of defining itself: "The West defines itself in opposition to all non-Western cultures, by its modern historicity." (p.18)

Modernity, usually preceded and partially caused by economic growth, offers resources for research, and impregnates the study of foreign culture with the stigmata of non-modernity. Rationalization of religion and the separation between state and church in medieval Western Europe led to the contemporary end point at which the West has a specific understanding of religion, power and culture. In this view, religion acquires an optional status.

Asad argues against capitalist-imperialist tendencies identifiable in the anthropological studies. While people are "locable" and thus tied to a certain context, modernity gives the upper-hand to the West that seems more efficient in "localizing" other cultures. The author asserts the impossibility of universally defining religion, because "the definition is itself the historical product of discursive processes" (p. 29).

[2] Here, I make the argument according to which Western societies democratized in much longer times than the democracies of the Third Wave. Besides the timelines of democratization, Western political development also assumes democratization from "within", as opposed to internationally implemented transitions.

Attempts to understand outer worlds are biased by considering the Western modern context as the reference point. Power and rationality, separation of state and church are assumptions undermining any effort to understanding the "others".

This brief excursion into Asad' theorizing brings into discussion the fact that democratization, most often than not, implied secularization, or, at least, a very clear separation between church and state. International democratizing agents disregard the fact that secularization in the "West" was a historical process grounded in specific instances, or that there were Western countries that failed to fully secularize, such as the United States. Religious freedom is part and parcel of the set of freedoms absolutely necessary in order to receive a Freedom House satisfactory score. Nonetheless, it is also one freedom that may have threatening effects on established churches.

Prescriptions for democratization are socially embedded and secularization is part of these prescriptions, either directly (a diminished role for religion) or indirectly, through the implementation of democratic reform (freedom of religion, religious pluralism).

Therefore, in the next section I define and analyze the concept of secularization. Against mainstream democratizing praxis that requires a clear separation between church and state, I argue that religion can play positive roles in the process of democratization.

Secularization in the Modern World – To Do or Not to Do?

Secularization benefited from much attention in the academia. Most of the time, its analysis employed quantitative methods and limited itself to showing worryingly low rates of religious beliefs and participation.

Norris and Inglehart (2004) offer a brief and informative account of the status of secularization theory so far. Using a hierarchical model analogy, they group these theories in two categories. First, there are the demand-side theories, framed along the lines of a deterministic argument. According to these theories, religion will eventually disappear "religious habits will gradually erode, and the public will become indifferent to spiritual appeals." (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 7)

The second category of theories belongs to the so-called supply-side camp and focus "top-down" on religious organizations, emphasizing that the public demand for religion is constant and "any cross-national variations in the vitality of spiritual life are the product of its supply in religious markets." (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 7) These theories argue that dynamic religious spaces, characterized by pluralism and religious competition, lead to increased levels of religious beliefs and participation.

Within the first group of theories, there are at least two sub-categories that need mentioning. First, originating with the prolific Max Weber, there is the rationalist thesis, arguing that religion loses the battle with science. As science can explain in more believable and verifiable terms more of the world's mysteries (going as far as Darwinism), religion loses ground, especially after the Industrial Revolution and the Reformation. Second, there is the functional differentiation theory, first formulated by

Durkheim, for whom the modern state took over many of the social tasks of the church, stripping religion of most of its social mission.

Within the second group of theories, usually associated with authors such as Roger Finke, Rodney Stark, and Lawrence R. Iannaccone, there is agreement that religion forms its own economic system - the so-called religious economy. This system can act either as a market economy, with multiple competing actors, or as a command economy, with one monopoly holder. If a particular religious economy follows the market system, then many religious organizations and churches will actively seek to increase their membership, offer competitive services, and hence increase consumption of religious goods. Correspondingly, religiosity and religious participation can be expected to rise (through a parallel with the free market models that encourage consumerism). If, on the other hand, a system resembles more to a command economy, with one privileged player, religious apathy is to be expected. What these theories have in common is the fact that secularization is understood as a unitary concept, that, once started, snowballs its way irreversibly. This particular understanding limits confines the study of secularization to a static approach, and it also minimizes the importance of the political context in which secularizing tendencies become manifested.

The most theoretically exciting study of secularization comes from Jose Casanova, and his book *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994). Casanova is puzzled by the inconsistencies prevalent in the history of the term. These inconsistencies become apparent with the predicted disappearance of religion in the post-industrial world, and then a complete turn around to religious revival, within the span of only two decades.

He advocates the multifaceted structure of secularization, and formulates a historically grounded definition:

> secularization as a concept refers to the actual historical process whereby this dualist system within "this world" and the sacramental structures of mediation between this world and the other world progressively break down until the entire medieval system of classification disappears. (Casanova, 1994, p. 15)

According to Casanova, there are three different understandings of secularization in the literature: secularization as a result of differentiation of society, secularization as religious decline and finally, secularization brought about by the privatization of religion.

Secularization through differentiation is theoretically rooted in the rivalry between reason and faith, between science and the divine. Noting that the distinction between the religious and the secular spheres only makes sense if perceived from one or the other members of the dichotomy, the secular paradigm becomes a true and worrisome rival of religion when it starts undergoing the modern processes of differentiation, most importantly, the rise of nation states and markets. Four factors are important in the process of differentiation – the Protestant Reformation, the formation of modern states, the rise of capitalism, and the early modern scientific revolutions. These processes slowly start taking away from the realm of church its monopoly over society and eroding its legitimacy. After all, religion and church did have a tight grip on all sectors of human activity, ranging from strictly individual and mystical acts, to societal and political control.[3]

Secularization through religious decline has an almost mythical aura by predicting the disappearance of religion at the end of a period of religious decline. Even at first

[3] It is worth mentioning here Foucault's study of the role of confession in the Catholic Church – understood as an illustration of the church's control over the society.

glance, this theory is not verified, and an obvious counterexample is the sustained vitality of religion in the non-Christian world. Moreover, within the Christian world, it is solely in Western Europe that religious beliefs and levels of participation declined, while in the United States, religious beliefs and levels of church attendance remained constant. Therefore, what needs to be explained is not the high levels of popularity that religion enjoys all over the world, but rather the low levels of religiosity in Western Europe. Casanova argues that the relationship between church and state took dramatically different forms in Western Europe and America respectively:

> What America never had was an absolutist state and its ecclesiastical counterpart, a caesaro-papist state church. [...] It was the caesaro-papist embrace of throne and altar under absolutism that perhaps more than anything else determined the decline of church religion in Europe. (Casanova, 1994, p. 29)

The privatization of religion thesis claims that as modernity advances, so does differentiation among institutional roles and religion becomes a strictly personal, individual and intimate matter. Modern societies do not need to legitimize themselves through the church and so religious experience loses most of its social functions [4]

> modern societies do not need to be organized as "churches," in the Durkheimian sense, that is, as moral communities unified by a commonly shared system of practices and beliefs. Individuals are on their own in their private efforts to patch together the fragments into a subjectively meaningful whole. (Casanova, 1994, p. 37)

The author also warns against a common confusion, namely the collapsing into one category of examples of liberal democratic societies that have privatized religion and normative assertions of privatization. This distinction is particularly important for democratizing societies, which often times are led to believe (by international

[4] Modern secular governments limit their intervention in church matters to the regulation of religious competition, and the interaction between church and state.

democratizing coalitions) that a clear separation between church and state is mandatory in order to democratize successfully.

Secularization understood as differentiation remains "the valid core" of the theory, in the sense that "differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms remains a general modern structural trend." (Casanova, 1994, p. 212) The consequence of this trend, especially in relationship to such institutions as the state and the economy (but also institutions of the society, such as science, education or the arts) is the forced isolation of religion within its own sphere. Correlatively, "established churches are incompatible with modern differentiated states and that the fusion of the religious and the political community is incompatible with the modern principle of citizenship." (Casanova, 1994, p. 213)

The thesis of the decline of religious beliefs and practices does not find empirical support in Casanova's study. Moreover, privatization of religion is not a structural trend, because "religions in the modern world [which] do not need to endanger either modern individual freedoms, or modern differentiated structures." (Casanova, 1994, p. 215) Privatization of religion has both internal and external sources. The internal sources are linked to the rationalization of religion, and the preference for more individual and reflexive forms of religious experience. Externally, privatization is encouraged, if not forced, by the trend of differentiation "which tend(s) to constrain religion into a differentiated, circumscribed, marginalized, and largely 'invisible' religious sphere." (Casanova, 1994, p. 215) More intriguing, Casanova believes that privatization of religion is also mandated ideologically "by liberal categories of thought which permeates

not only political ideologies and constitutional theories but the entire structure of modern Western thought." (Casanova, 1994, p. 215)

Therefore, Casanova sees no privatizing structural trend, although the process itself is encouraged internally, externally, and ideologically. Nonetheless, he argues that privatization is not the necessary consequence of differentiation. Concluding that the decline and privatization of religion are not necessary corrolaries of secularization through differentiation, Casanova coins the concept of religious de-privatization. By arguing against privatizing religion, he implicitly lends support to democratizing countries that are either religious, or choose not to create a clear separation between church and state.

The de-privatization of religion proceeds in four steps. First, originating in Durkheim's idea of religion as social integration, and Weber's idea of religion as salvation, the author shows that religion cannot be limited to either of the two

> religion always transcends any privatistic, autistic reality, serving to integrate the individual into an inter-subjective, public, and communal "world". Simultaneously, however, religion always transcends any particular community cult, serving to free the individual from any particular 'world' and to integrate that same individual into a trans-social, cosmic reality. (Casanova, 1994, p. 216)

Second, while liberals insist that religion must be confined to its own separate and isolated sphere, civic republicans value public religion's contribution to the common good and civic virtue, and see public religion as coextensive with the political or societal community. Third, mostly grounded in Habermasian thought, the experience of transition to democracy creates a possibility through which public religion can enter the space of civil society, without threatening the inner core of liberal vales, or long standing

requirements of modern differentiation. Fourth, building on feminist theory and Seyla Benhabib's theory of proceduralist discursive model of the public sphere, Casanova sees public religion's individual and societal benefits as follows

> The de-privatization of religion has a double signification here in that it simultaneously introduces publicity, that is, inter-subjective norms into the private sphere (analogous to the feminist dictum "the personal is political"), and morality into the public sphere of state and economy (the principle of the "common good" as a normative criterion. (Casanova, 1994, p. 217)

For all these reasons, de-privatization of religion is possible, without menacing the inner core of democracy. Allowing churches back in the public space may also carry advantages for the democratic system per se.

Public religion can mobilize resources in defense of traditional values, against the increasing penetration of states and markets. Church mobilization against abortion is such an example. While it is always possible to see a blunt regress into the fundamentalism of pre-modern religion, the fact that churches can be mobilizing agents, is essentially democratic. Churches can "push" issues into the public sphere, make them salient, and thus force societies to contemplate their own understanding of good and bad, their own normative standards. A second type of de-privatization is seen when public religions enter the public sphere to oppose and criticize states ands markets. Either opposing militarism, or the "economical individualist" paradigm prevalent today, churches constantly remind people of a common good. With the advent of globalization, Casanova notes that transnational churches are also in a privileged position to promote a universal common good that transcends borders. Third, de-privatization of religion can be directly related to critiques of liberal versions of the common good as the mere sum of its parts,

portraying churches as the moral conscience of societies. Through the church, morality becomes an essentially inter-subjective concept – a public concern.

Therefore, it is possible, and in fact probably desirable, to perceive some of today's churches as true agents of democratic change. Public religions, through their interventions are "immanent critiques of particular forms of institutionalization of modernity form a modern normative perspective." (Casanova, 1994, p. 231) Of course not all religions are fit for this task of resetting normative standards, but as long as a particular civil religion has internalized the Enlightenment criticism, it seems that it will serve as true opponent to the differentiated spheres of our societies, forcing them to specify and change their claims over good and bad. Public religions can revitalize modern public sphere. It is true that some religions are not playing this role, and especially non-Western religions will use their difference to construct themselves against the Western model. If Weber was right about Protestantism containing the grain of capitalism, then one must admit that other religions themselves can contain such seed for major social change.

In the context of democratization, public religions can use their influence on the society to amend the democratic model implemented in one country. Most of the time when religion is reported to play a positive role in democracy, the discourse is limited to Western Christianity. Nonetheless, there are authors that evaluate the potential benefits of religion in democratizing non-Christian contexts, and their work forms the discussion in the next section.

Religious States and Democracy – Captivating Possibilities

Although in the West, both religion and church undertook a process of re-adjustment to democratic political life, in the "South" and in the "East", some authors deplore the chasing out of the church from the public sphere "the adoption of political pluralism might serve to undermine the commitment of their people to time-honored religious truths." (Anderson, 2006, p. 1) This is even more important as, in some instances, church and religion were promoters of democracy and played an active part in opposing non-democratic regimes by "offering critiques of authoritarianism, providing support to civil society and mediating between governments and oppositions." (Anderson, 2006, p. 1)

Marc Juergesmeyer (1995) brings a significant contribution to the normative analysis of the relationship between state and church. He notes that there is a conceptual and societal closeness between secular nationalism and religion. He cites Muslim thinkers that affirm the religious nature of Western secular nationalism. Some of them go insofar as to analyze secular nationalism as a disguise of Christianity: "to these Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs it is perfectly obvious: the West's secular nationalism competes in every way with religion as they know it." (Juergensmeyer, 1995, p. 380) Indeed western civilization overlaps with what is known as Christendom. The author calls both religions and nationalism "ideologies of order", because of them belonging to the same genus:

> Both religious and secular nationalistic frameworks of thought are ideologies of order in the following ways: they both conceive of the world around them as a coherent, manageable system; they both suggest that there are levels of meaning beneath the day-to-day world that explain things unseen; they both provide identity for and evoke loyalty form secular communities; and they both provide the authority that gives social and political order a reason for being. In doing so they define how an

> individual should properly act in the world, and they relate persons to the social whole. (Juergensmeyer, 1995, pp. 380-381)

The author observes a resurrection of religions that compete with states in telling what is good or wrong, or even, sometimes, questioning who has the monopoly of violence. Religion can provide a basis for the construction of societal fabric, just as adequately as states and their official nationalisms can: "religion is ready to demonstrate that, like secular nationalism, it can provide a faith in the unitary nature of a society that will authenticate both political rebellion and political rule." (Juergensmeyer, 1995, p. 381) While in the "West" the rise of the nation state led to the rise of secular nationalism that incorporates religion, in the countries undergoing either state formation or regime transition, there is rivalry between secular nationalism and religion. This tension is not unheard of in the "West", but countries in the "South" or the "East" did not have sufficient time at their disposal to peacefully blend "the religious" into "the secular" (Juergensmeyer, 1995, p. 384). In most of these cases, the nation state is a recent accomplishment, most transition democracies having acquired this status when colonial ties were broken, and independence was acquired. The tensions between the religious and the secular sphere are more pronounced in situations where religion had a historically important political role:

> given religious histories that were part of national heritages, religious institutions that were sometimes the nations' most effective systems of communication, and religious leaders who were often more devoted, efficient, and intelligent than government officials, religion could not be ignored. The attempts to accommodate it, however, have not always been successful. (Juergensmeyer, 1995, p. 384)

Juergensmeyer provides a nuanced analysis of the problematic compatibility between religion and political regime. He offers examples of different non-Western

countries, in which religion and politics end up in "happy marriages": "Buddhism in the case of Sri Lanka, for example – has a strong affinity with socialism. [...] the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for instance, guarantees the right of private property." (Juergensmeyer, 1995, p. 388) Of course, there is much disagreement over how much of a role religion should play in every day political life, since "the political role of religion is primarily in formulating national identity and purpose." (Juergensmeyer, 1995, p. 388) The author believes in the possibility of creating a modern religious state that may well fit in with the democratic discourse as pro-democratic movements in the Islamic world proved

> recent movements of Islamic nationalism, however, have been surprisingly particular to individual nation-states and provide a remarkable synthesis of Islamic culture and modern nationalism. (Juergensmeyer, 2005, p. 389)

The main contribution of Juergensmeyer's research consists of the nuanced understanding of the role that religion can play in a democracy. Furthermore, because religion is in many cases associated with national identity, its place in democratic societies cannot be reduced to that of just another member of the civil society.

Similarly, Filali-Ansary (2001) compares democracy or, at least western democracy with "a religious faith or 'mystical ideal.'' (p. 44) By the same token by which political attitudes are not immutable, religious attitudes can also change. Nevertheless, a change in religious attitudes should not be expected along the lines of how Reformation occurred in Europe since "the Reformation is a singular event in history, linked to a particular environment and to specific conditions. It cannot, as some observers suggest nowadays, be 'replicated' in the context of another religion and under twentieth century conditions." (Filali-Ansary, 2001, p. 47) This message should get

across to proponents of secularization and religious pluralistic markets in Central and Eastern Europe, since it is this lack of contextuality of reforms that makes some transitions tedious, and some democratic consolidations hard to attain. Religious attitudes can and do undertake change, within a more universalistic framework derived from modernization and through a process that

> leads the majority of the population to give religious dogmas a symbolic truth-values, and to consider religious narratives contingent, historical manifestations or expressions of the sacred that are amenable to rational understanding and scientific scrutiny. Religious dogmas and narratives no longer define, in a monolithic way, people's ideas about the world and society, nor do they determine the views that that believers are supposed to be guided by in their social and political interactions. This 'disenchantment' may discard the meanings of sacred words and rituals, but it maintains and reinforces" the overall ethical and moral teachings. [...] Faith becomes a matter of individual choice and commitment, not an obligation imposed upon all members of the community. (Filali-Ansary, 2001, p. 47)

Finally, building on Casanova's approach towards public religions as a counterweight to the hegemonic institutions of state and market, Hefner (2001) also analyzes the compatibility of Islam with democracy and civic pluralism. He believes that in the Islamic world, the clash is less between Eastern and Western civilizations, but rather between different types of Muslim politics. He offers examples from all over Islam of efforts to democratize, of strengthening of the civil society, of intellectual opposition, of increased political participation and acceptance of civic pluralism. One question that arises is whether democracy can be acquired without privatizing religion, while many authors believe the opposite – "privatization [of religion], critics insist, is a condition of democratic peace." (Hefner, 2001, p. 498) The author argues that democracy does not necessarily entail religious privatization and he supports the hetero-vocalism of culture, its unfinished character, and its latent features that make it possible for religion to be the

repository of different sets of values at one time. Robert Weller showed in 1998 that democratic vocabulary was present and latent in Chinese indigenous kinship and folk Confucianism. Muslim civilization places emphasis on "public virtue and justice [...] [and thus it] recalls earlier Western traditions of civic republicanism (elements of which run through some variants of Western "communitarianism" today) rather than secular liberalism." (Hefner, 2001, p. 499)

Democracy means today secular liberalism, and more communitarian version of a democratic systems are not part of the discourse on democratization. This situation raises the need to make a distinction between modernity and modernism. Juergensmeyer (1995) explains the difference; modernity is "the acceptance of bureaucratic forms of organization and the acquisition of new technology", while modernism is "embracing the ideology of individualism and a relativist view of moral values." (p. 388) Islamic societies that accommodate a communitarian version of democracy are thus modern without being modernist. Those Islamic societies that include democratic features "insist that society involves more than autonomous individuals and democracy more than markets and the state." (Hefner, 2001, p. 499)

Islamic Indonesia for instance displays cultural pluralism, different types of Islam, and different ways of being a Muslim. After colonization ended, some people believed that Islam did not necessarily need an Islamic state, while others advocated its creation. Whichever the case may be, the existence of controversy and its placement in the public sphere hold optimistic prospects for democracy. In his conclusion, Hefner argues that in Indonesia, although civil society is plural, diverse and vocal, this is not sufficient basis for democracy to be consolidated since civil society fosters democracy only in those

instances in which it can play its oppositional role against the state that, in turn, also needs to be civilized. His evidence of Islamic civil society proves that "there is no civilizational malady peculiar to the Muslim world." (p. 510)

The arguments presented above concur in arguing that religion is a multi-vocal creator of meaning. Also, religion, irrespective of denomination, can be a source of social cohesion. In the process of transition to democracy, this social cohesion is very important for the creation of a civic citizenry. A further complication is created by the fact that some new democracies are also new nation states and democracy can only be implemented provided that a legitimate nation state does exist. Therefore, I argue that, under certain circumstances, religion can thicken the societal fabric, making it more receptive to democratic values. I did not argue that all religions have a democratizing effect. Rather, I showed evidence according to which "democratic" religions can and in fact do exist outside of the Western world. I also discussed examples of democratizing religious states, thus contesting the myth of the necessary combination of secularization and religious privatization, in order for democracy to take hold. The last question that I address in this chapter addresses the ways in which religion and church can influence citizens' attitudes towards democracy in transitioning countries.

Democratizing Religions– Cross-Denominational Evidence

The subject of religious beliefs and their role in democratic politics is somewhat of a neglected topic: "Few authors analyzing the "third wave" give much space to religion, except in discussing countries such as Poland or Brazil where local hierarchies and religious organizations played a role in undermining authoritarian regimes." (Anderson, 2006, p. 192)

One of the reasons that can account for this inadequacy is the impossibility of establishing causal priority. While it is possible for religious beliefs to affect evaluations of the political, it is also possible that the mechanism works the other way around, from socialization within a polity, to types of religious practices and the importance of the religious act. Most consolidated democracies exhibit high rates of separation between church and state, and also high levels of secularization. The salience of religious beliefs and practices is thus affected by secularization and privatization of religion. One other weakness of studies correlating religious and political variables resides in the perils of essentialism: denominations and their participatory aspects are understood as fixed, suspended outside of their social and historical context. Hence, the ways they influence citizens' attitudes towards political or social aspects of their life (if at all) are pre-determined, because religion is a monolith resistance to change (Huntington, 1996). In the following I present Huntington's main argument, and criticize his essentialist approach. By falling into the trap of constructing denominations as a-historical monolithic units, Huntington fails to acknowledge the many ways in which religions did change over time, the Catholic Church serving as just one example. I also complement the discussion of the Huntingtonian thesis, with literature analyzing the role that religion played in very different religious and political contexts and conclude that this role does not have to be predetermined by strict dogma, because of the latter's ability to change. Additionally, based on the literature reviewed, I argue that even the relationship between Protestantism and democracy is not as direct or causal as Huntington makes it be.

The Clash of Civilizations and its followers

In 1996, Samuel P. Huntington wrote the book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. His thesis became famous through its controversial tenets. According to his argument, after the end of the Cold War the world is split between different civilizations circumscribed by the main religions of the world. Culture became the leading differentiating factor between successful democracies and transitional and third world countries: "the post-Cold War world is a world of seven or eight major civilizations. Cultural commonalties and differences shape the interests, antagonisms, and associations of states." (Huntington, 1996, p. 29)

Religion is an important part of culture that is clearly enmeshed in the political realm. Huntington formulates a deterministic and limiting argument according to which particular religions form cultures that cannot be modernized:

> Cultures can change, and the nature of their impact on politics and economics can vary from one period to another. Yet the major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures.[...]Developments in the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are shaped by their civilizational identities. Those with Western Christian heritages are making progress toward economic development and democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political development in the Orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim republics are bleak. (Huntington, 1996, p. 29)

Huntington brings into discussion the revival of religion, especially in the formerly communist/atheist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In countries in which Protestantism is stronger or in which Catholicism had enough time to be privatized and individualized, Huntington sees signs of progress towards democracy. In Orthodox or Muslim countries he sees a much bleaker image.

However, in the last decade, and especially in the context of the war on terrorism, the mainstream approach changed. Nowadays, the unchallenged victor is democracy, whose desirability for any society is placed beyond doubt. Mostly supported by social scientists such as Larry Diamond, these theses persuade the reader that every country has a fair shot at democracy, irrespective of religion, or other pre-existing incompatibilities.

For example, Inglehart and Norris take on the Huntingtonian thesis with a catchy title: The true clash of civilization (2003). They analyze a large cross-national data set and conclude that procedural democracy is something that even citizens in Muslim countries strive for. It is the embracing of liberal values that proves to be more problematic:

> Samuel Huntington was only half right. The cultural fault line that divides the West and the Muslim world is not about democracy but gender. According to a new survey, Muslims and their Western counterparts want democracy, yet they are worlds apart when it comes to attitudes toward divorce, abortion, gender equality and gay rights – which may not bode well for democracy's future in the Middle East." (p. 62)

The authors draw a distinction between different facets of democracy. While procedural democracy, liberal values, and market economy seem to form the golden triad of western success, they are not inseparable, and there are countries that adopt one, two or all three of these elements. The conflation of the three elements of what democracy means today was one of Huntington's ideas liable to much criticism. Even from a methodological ground:

> Huntington argues that "ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] the separation of church and state" often have little resonance outside the West." (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 65)

Nevertheless, the authors are only partially critical of Huntington's approach; they agree with him on the slow and uncertain change of values, towards liberalism in Muslim countries. The "broader syndrome of tolerance, trust, political activism, and emphasis on individual autonomy that constitutes "self-expression values" [...] has a surprisingly strong bearing on the emergence and survival of democratic institutions." (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 67).

Although their evidence indicates that, in the Muslim countries, acceptance of liberal values is limited, support for procedural democracy seems to be widespread. A careful and critical reading of this article makes one question the causal mechanism behind the findings. What does it mean to find support for procedural democracy in non-democratic countries?

Following Huntington, I offer examples of the ways in which religion affect the formation of attitudes in different countries. Although it is commonly assumed that the principles and history of the Reformation are natural allies for capitalism and democracy, most methodological difficulties reside in the fact that any church evolves within a political, cultural and historical context. This context is responsible for the various roles assumed by a church and its willingness and ability to carry them out. In other words, Protestantism can be understood as religious dogma, but also as a proxy indicator of societal values at one particular moment in time. In other words, Protestantism may represent the quintessence of these values, and not necessarily their cause.

Religion and church at work – their effect on political attitudes

One important question is whether religious beliefs can affect or cause political action. For Bruce (2006), the answer is affirmative. The author offers a nuanced interpretation of

the relationship between Protestantism and democracy. The argument is that the Reformation contains within itself the seeds of democracy, because of its revolutionary and oppositional character. However, democracy occurs as an unintended consequence, since the reformation puts in action a whole series of mechanisms of change: "Protestantism has been causally implicated in the development of democratic polities and civil liberties and that in many particulars the causal connection is the unintended consequence." (Bruce, 2006, p. 19). Freston (2006) continues the argument on democracy as an unintended consequence of Protestantism, but, for him, the underlying logic of this process is the presence of several "Protestantisms". Therefore, in Protestant societies, the principle of pluralism came to the fore of public attention early in their evolution, and was internalized faster.

There is also evidence that the relationship between Protestantism and political activity is direct and strong. Even in non-consolidated democracies, Protestants are more politically active. For instance, in Brazil, Pentecostal women are more interested in voting than women of other religions or atheists (Freston, 2006). The author identifies a gap between religious doctrine and political practice, characterized by a multi point causal mechanism:

> there are many intervening factors. Size, social and ethnic composition, position relative to other confessions, internal church structures and conflicts, the sociological 'type' of each group, the degree of legitimacy in relation to national myths, the presence or absence (and nature) of international connections – all these constrain political possibilities and affect behavior. (Freston, 2006, pp. 21-22)

Anthony Gill (2006) also analyzes the attitudes of Protestant confidants in Latin America, a predominantly Catholic homogenous region. He assesses the impact of growing Protestant churches on democratic consolidation and predicts that it is

reasonable to expect evangelicalism to promote democracy, because it emphasizes thriftiness, trustworthiness and personal responsibility

> Protestantism would bolster the prospects of capitalism. And since many have argued a tight link between a proto-capitalist class and democracy, Protestant denominations could potentially form the basis for a democratic civil society. The perceived minority status of Protestants may also predispose them to democracy as a means of protecting their religious civil liberties via greater access to the political arena. (Gill, 2006: 42-43)

Other authors have argued that Protestantism in Latin America is otherworldly, and conducive to political apathy and tacit acceptance of authoritarianism, but Gill's findings point to another direction. The author analyzes the relationship between denominational affiliation and political and economic predispositions using data collected form four countries – Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, in the WVS of 1990. His research design also provides an indirect test for the thesis put forth by the religious economy school – stating that "religiously pluralistic nations tend to exhibit higher amounts of religiosity." (Gill, 2006, p. 43) The findings show no direct denominational effect: Catholic and Protestant believers look similar in terms of religious effects on political attitudes. It is patterns of church attendance that have stronger influence on the formation of political attitudes "which appears to enhance participation in civil society in more religiously pluralistic societies." (Gill, 2006, p. 43) He also finds support for supply-side theories of religious participation, since Brazil and Chile, the two countries with the highest levels of religious pluralism also exhibit the highest degrees of religiosity. Nonetheless, there are limits to such cross-national studies

> What we can learn from this cross-national variation is that future studies of religious values should consider the institutional and structural context of the situation under observation. [...] For too long, research agendas examining either culture or institutions have remained separate from one another. Developing and testing a comprehensive theory of how both

> culture and institutions affect one another will be invaluable to the study of religion and politics, not to mention the realm of social science more broadly. (Gill, 2006, p. 61)

Moving eastward form Protestantism and Catholicism to the former communist countries, the relationship between religion and democracy becomes more problematic. Enyedi and O'Mahony (2006) talk about the double implication of causality between religion and democracy – "The way in which national democracies consolidate has an impact on religious organizations, yet these organizations too can play an important role in shaping the development of democratic culture." (p. 171) The role that churches can play in democratic transition is conditioned historically and depends on

> the compatibility of church doctrine with democratic practice, the extent to which the functioning of churches depends on state-guaranteed privileges, and the degree to which new or aspiring political elites demand religious legitimization. (Enyedi & O'Mahony, 2006, p. 171)

Constitutional changes brought about by democratization influence the ways in which churches can affect democratization. These ways are to be found

> in the relationship between church and state and, in particular, in laws detailing the financing and operation of religious organizations, in the behavior and the ideological character of the major political parties, and, finally, in the dominant discourses of the churches themselves. (pp. 171-172)

Churches contribute to democratization in several ways: they respect the rules of the game, they avoid demagogical or populist discourse, and they are tolerant. In both countries the churches are part of the civil society, but with limits usually imposed by the state. In Hungary, the Catholic Church is vocal against new-Protestant religious groups, and enjoys quasi immunity from the state, not having to transform into transparent, democratic institution. The relationship between church and state therefore influences a church's behavior in new democratic societies.

Even in Africa, the continent where democracy is almost unheard of, especially because of endless civil conflicts and economic backwardness, religion has an effect on political values. Christians usually promote or mobilize for greater democratization; however, senior religious leaders tend to collaborate, or come closer to governments, which makes their democratizing efforts either obsolete or at least ambivalent. Political mobilization against unelected leaders and push for more democracy, usually lead by religious figures, Christian, have not been conducive to the institutionalization of democracy: "we saw that senior religious figures typically forged close relationships with the state, which tended to make them ambivalent towards the concept of fundamental political change." (Haynes, 2006, p. 87)

Authors note that churches that fought against authoritarian regimes, were sometimes mostly unhappy with the ensuing arrangements (pluralism, separation between church and state, etc.) so that

> several writers noted that where religion did make a contribution to democratization it was primarily in its Western, Christian form, and this led to a renewed discussion about the alleged 'compatibility' or otherwise of democracy and differing religious traditions. (Anderson, 2006, p. 1)

Increasingly, analyses of non-Christian religions and democratic political regimes have displayed more insight into the features of these religions, and their historical contexts.

First and foremost, non-Christian religions encompass a very wide range of denominations, from Islam to polytheist Eastern religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism or Taoism. In the few new democracies of East Asia, such as Taiwan and South Korea, and, to some extent, Thailand, one is faced with religious pluralism and the debate over Asian Values. Research indicates the importance of Christian religions in

triggering the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. In Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church has been vocal in criticizing the authoritarian regime, especially in the early 1980s.

The Presbyterian Church afforded to oppose the rather repressive authoritarian regime, and to pressure it for more democratic opening because of its strong transnational structure - especially its strong ties with North American sister churches. In Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church supported the Democratic Progressive Party, and during democratic consolidation, it became an advocate for human rights, and a true defender of democratic pluralism.[5] Quantitative data also show that Presbyterian churchgoers are also more supportive of pluralism. Moreover, Catholic churchgoers are also supportive of democracy, although the Catholic Church has been silent during democratic transition, mostly due to the Catholic orientation of most KMT leaders. [6] Additionally, Buddhist churches have also been silent during authoritarianism, and became involved during the transition especially by developing very strong social programs (educational, health, natural disaster relief), thereby, emulating the Western Christian Churches. Correlatively, Buddhist churchgoers exhibit higher levels of support for liberal values and democracy, than atheists or other non-Christian denominations.

This example however is not illustrative for the role played by Buddhist organization in Thailand where the state has used the influence of the latter over society in order to manipulate interests and attitudes:

---

[5] This information was collected by the researcher during a Visiting Fellowship Grant offered by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, in the summer of 2006.

[6] The data refers to the Taiwan Social Change Survey, which is available at the Academic Sinica's website - http://www.sinica.edu.tw/as/survey/index_en.html

> Rather than Buddhism itself producing political passivity, it seems more appropriate – certainly in the case of Thailand – to suggest that the state manipulated Buddhism in order to subordinate citizens, employing an officially sanctioned form of religion to provide a source of legitimacy. (McCargo, 2006, p. 167)

The most debated upon religion in the context of democratization is the Muslim faith. While most of the Western world is constructing Islam as a monolithic religion, highly oppressive and the creator of abusive theocracies, there are authors that advocate the variety of voices within Islam. In fact, the research mentioned above, by Inglehart and Norris (2003), has already shown favorable orientations towards democracy in the Muslim world. Furthermore, "some Muslim elites are encouraging political reform. Reform is evidently on the agenda of most Muslim countries, irrespective of regime orientation, political traditions, geopolitical and economic imperatives, or size." (Ehteshami, 2006, p. 104) In Islam, the states face a double challenge: to devise an economic strategy that works in the context of intense globalization, and also to co-opt moderate Muslims. Liberalization is not that much a problem as is democratic consolidation, since the mere departure of an authoritarian leader is a good start, without having to apply the American universalist perspective on democratic spreading.

The problem with democratizing Islam is that democracy brings a whole set of uncertainties, while Islam promotes ultimate absolute truths. Citizens in Muslim countries prefer this certainty to the non-guaranteed beneficial effects of democracy.

Another apparently contradicting example is the FIS (Front Islamique du Sud) in Algeria, whose slogan "Islam is the solution" presents it as a rather undemocratic movement. While it may be so, it is also a movement believing in opposition and protest (both necessary elements of a democracy), and one in which the government in power is

not democratic. Consequently, the FIS can claim legitimacy as a player on the political stage. Moreover, the FIS is offering Algerians the certainty and stability of an identity in a time of economic and political duress, and in the context of post-colonial rule politics: "the FIS did not propose a radically different identity to the Algerian people, but offered to fulfill the promise of that identity." (Heristchi, 2006, p. 129) The author ends her essay by arguing that Islam is very divided, and "for each Al-Qaeda terror cell there is a non-violent Islamist group playing a part in developing civil society in an authoritarian setting. Forgetting this complexity is convenient, but unwise. "(Heristchi, 2006, p. 129)

All the authors discussed above would agree that religion is a result of both theological dogma and political and historical context. Protestantism is assumed to contain the seeds of democratic rights and freedoms, and all over the world Protestants are fierce supporters of liberal democracy. Contrastingly, Protestantism in the United States gathers adherents to more conservative views of society and democracy. If one accepts that religions were able to change throughout time, then, one also accepts that any religion has this ability, albeit not in the same amount. The evidence presented in the last section showed numerous examples of non-Christian or Eastern Christian countries in which religion and state interacted in many different ways during the process of democratization. The ability and willingness of a religion to accommodate democracy is thus not dictated by its theological tenets, but also by its role and place in society, and historical evolution as a member of that society.

Conclusion

Religions are multi-vocal: "In a wide ranging essay published in 2001 Alfred Stepan suggested that all religious traditions were multi-vocal, containing organizational and intellectual resources that could be called upon in support of democratic forms of governance." (Anderson, 2006, p. 201) This chapter showed that, in order to understand the role that churches can play during democratization, one needs to consider many different factors that influence and condition the church's ability and willingness to support democracy. I also pointed out cases of churches that have been fairly influential in promoting democracy, and denomination has not been a discriminating factor. The role that each church can play in influencing societal support for democracy needs to be contextualized. One should also take into consideration the fact that churches and religious beliefs are not unchangeable.

The only generally applicable aspect of secularization is the placement of church and religion in a sphere of its own, but there is no final answer to the question of how large or remote this sphere has to be. Most international promoters of democracy put forward a model of privatized religion, in a space of religious pluralism, where believers have a wide set of options to choose from. For countries with one established church, the opening of their religious space may be problematic, and may trigger manifestations of religious radicalism, rather than ecumenical democratic competition.

Throughout this chapter I argued that secularized private Christian religion is not the only one compatible with democracy. Protestantism is better equipped to accommodate standards of individual freedom predicated by liberal democracy and also

those pertaining to market economy. The reason for this compatibility, I argued, resides in the historical evolution of both Protestantism and democracy. Nonetheless, as I have shown, Catholicism became more acceptant of democracy in the 20th century, and there is no reason to believe that other religions would not do the same. I also showed evidence that, in some cases, Buddhism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam also successfully integrated democracy. I also examined the ways in which religion and church can affect the citizenry's attitudes. The question is not whether different religions are compatible with democracy, but rather how each church needs to change in order to accommodate democracy, and how democratic systems themselves may have to compromise in order to incorporate religion. Therefore, I now turn to the analysis of political attitudes in new democracy, and examine the determinants of these attitudes. Then, I discuss the place occupied by religion among these determinants.

Chapter 3

Who Wants Democracy and Why?

The study of political attitudes is closely related to the study of political participation. In a consolidated democracy, both the citizenry's attitudes and its participatory acts in the affairs of the polity are the true test of the latter's viability. While attitudes usually measure the people's internalization of democratic values, participation is indicative of their willingness and ability to participate in the structures of representative democracy. Attitudes towards democracy illustrate citizens' satisfaction with the working of their political system, both in generic and more specific terms.

In this chapter, I first define the concept of attitudes, and their relationship with democratic transition and consolidation. Political attitudes have different targets, ranging from evaluating political leaders, to general opinions on the structure and rule of the political system, or even the suitability of democracy itself. Especially in the case of new democracies, favorable attitudes towards the political system are critical because of the unconsolidated status of democracy (Mishler & Rose, 1997). Second, I review the literature on the determinants of political attitudes in transition democracies. These determinants range from socio-economic status and demographic variables, to political interest and national identity. Third, I discuss the role of religion in the construction of political attitudes. In this research, religion includes both individual measures of religiosity and measures of participation in church activities.

Political attitudes are one way of measuring support for a political system. Although most of the literature on attitude formation has been developed with reference

to Western consolidated democracies, increasingly, authors discuss their applicability to the transitioning countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This process has two problematic consequences. First, the adoption of democracy in post-communist countries has been fast paced, and most of the countries in the region do not have any significant democratic precedent. Second, transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe mean the simultaneous adoption of procedural democracy, liberalism and market economy. The analysis of attitudes towards these three distinct and yet related objects of support needs to take into account the simultaneity of change of the political and the economic systems. A further complication is created by some of these countries not only democratizing, but also becoming nation states for the first time in their recent history. Hence, attitudes towards the political and economic system could be influenced by expressions of attachment for the nation state. Support for democratic politics and manifestations of national identity do not necessarily go hand in hand. Specifying the interplay between attitudes towards these two different objects of support is also one of the objectives in this chapter. Additionally, as it is the case in Central and Eastern Europe, democratization also implies Europeanization, which can sometimes conflict with strategies of constructing nation states.

Conceptualizations of Political Attitudes

Political attitudes form the nucleus of political culture. In the following, I define and analyze the concept of attitudes, and explain its applicability to my research. Almond and Verba first formulated their *Civic Culture* thesis in 1963. They defined political culture as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of a nation." (Almond & Verba, 1963, pp. 14-15) The authors conceive

attitudes as a multi faceted notion, distinguishing between objects and modes of orientations. The modes of orientations are the ways in which the individual can relate to an object, and include three different elements: cognition, affects and evaluations. The political objects differ according to their location within the political system, and consist of input objects, output objects and the self as a political actor. The combination of modes and orientations result in a matrix, whose cells represent different types of political culture: parochial, subject and participant. In their reformulation of the theory in 1980, Almond and Verba operated the following fundamental change: modes of orientation are now interrelated aspects of the one and the same attitudinal phenomenon. The other dimension of the matrix is placed under the heading of substantive content, including system culture, process culture and policy culture (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, pp. 33-34).

Therefore, the first categorization of attitudes is operated with regards to the political structure under evaluation. The first such structure is the political system, which consists of a complex set of entities. The system culture, based on David Easton's system theory, comprises

> the distribution of attitudes towards the national community, the regime and the authorities [which include] the sense of national identity, attitudes toward the legitimacy of the regime and its various institutions, and attitudes toward the legitimacy and effectiveness of the incumbents of the various political roles. (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 28)

The process culture includes "attitudes toward the self in politics (including the parochial-subject-participant distinction) and attitudes toward other political actors (such as trust, cooperative competence, hostility)." (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 28) Finally, the policy culture groups together "the distribution of preferences regarding the outputs and

outcomes of politics, the ordering among different groupings in the population of such political values as welfare, security and liberty." (Almond & Verba, 1980, p. 28) Although this categorization seems fairly strict, the system, process and policy cultures are not separate entities, but rather overlapping structures.

David Easton also provides a helpful theoretical framework for analyzing attitudes, according to their object of support. In his system analysis (1965), there are three components of a political system that can become objects of support: the political community, the regime, and the political authorities. The political community is "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor." (Easton, 1965, p. 177) The regime consists of three elements: the values of its political philosophy, the norms of the political order, and the structure of authority rules. The political authorities are the occupants of authority roles, at particular moments in time. These three categories range from inclusive to specific, but support for one category does not automatically imply support for the others. Easton introduced the concepts of diffuse and specific support, and theorizes that the objects themselves affect the formation of the correlative attitudes.

For him "diffuse support denotes a generalized evaluation, whereas specific support means an output-directed evaluation."(Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 37) Diffuse support encompasses all attitudes that an individual holds about his political system and his society. This type of support measures attitudes related to more abstract objects, such as democracy per se, the idea of having a democracy, while specific support measures acceptance of particular regimes. With reference to the political community, beliefs are thought of as a primarily affective feeling of identity or loyalty. In terms of the

regime, attitudes range along two dimensions - ideological and value-oriented beliefs concerning the institutional structure and trust or sympathy as a spillover from ideological or even instrumental evaluations of outputs. In relation to political authorities, there is the so-called ideologically based trust (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995). Identity and loyalty towards one's country are the most common types of attitudes of diffuse support, although evaluations of a specific type of democracy are also included here. The distinction between diffuse and specific support if helpful in understanding cases of inconsistent attitudes systems, in which most of the population supports democracy, but also heavily criticizes the government.

Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) developed an alternative approach to conceptualize orientations, focusing mostly on social orientations, in opposition to Easton's more political orientations and distinguishing between utilitarian types of attitudes and affective. They draw a difference between "identitive" and systemic support, in the sense that "identitive" support "gauges what might be termed "horizontal" interaction among the broader publics of the system, while systemic support probes 'vertical' relations between the system and these publics." (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p. 40) Indeed, attitudes towards a particular political system do not include only direct evaluations of that system; rather, the interactions taking place within the society, and the attitudes within the citizenry targeted on inter societal relations, are also indicative of the process of internalization of values by the population. The issue of modes of orientation marks the differences between utilitarian and affective support: the utilitarian mode is "based on some perceived and relatively concrete interest", while the affective one indicates "a diffuse and perhaps emotional response to some of the vague

ideals embodied in the notion of European unity." (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970, p. 40) The utilitarian mode resembles Easton's specific support while the affective mode resembles the diffuse mode.

Niedermeyer and Sinnott (1995) distinguish between the political collectivity, the political order, the political authorities, and policies. Westle (1987) analyzes the territorial and personal elements of a collectivity "whereas the territorial element can be described as primarily a political factor, the personal element of the political collectivity in our concept can be described in terms of the 'social' or 'socio-political system'." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 42)

The personal element of the political collectivity refers to the individual within the society "as including not only 'others' but also 'the self' as an object." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 42) The political order – "refers to the organization of the political division of labor within the collectivity." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 43) Orientations, as the core of attitude formation, form a continuous process that is also dynamic "The development of orientations begins with an awareness of the object and ends with behavioral intentions towards the object." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 44)

Finally, social psychology also presents two perspectives on attitudes that complement the literature reviewed above. First there is the multi-component view – connected with theories such as cognitive-consistency theory, or the theory of cognitive dissonance. In this view, "attitudes are seen as comprising three components: cognitive, affective, behavioral. An underlying attitude is indicated when these components show some consistency." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 45) Second, there is the one-

dimensional definition of attitudes – "narrowly defined as categorizations of an object along an evaluative and/or affective dimension which should be measured on a bi-polar scale of affect." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 45) Fishbein and Ajzen (1980) make a distinction between beliefs, attitudes, behavioral intentions, and behavior.

The two approaches share the fact that they both consider attitudes as hypothetical constructs, "forming an enduring predisposition to respond in a consistently positive of negative way to a given object." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 44) The authors consider it flawed, and affirm the weak distinction between beliefs and attitudes. For them, attitudes serve as a filter for beliefs

> Our notion of orientations comprises all the positions an individual can take with respect to a particular object. Within this wide definition, we distinguish three modes of orientation according to the strength of their behavioral relevance: psychological involvement, evaluations, and behavioral intentions. (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 48)

Psychological involvement – the weakest and most passive form – "comprises neutral knowledge of and about an object, interest in it, the salience of it, and non-normative expectations related to it." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 48) Second, there are evaluations – "any position a person has regarding a particular object in terms of a positive/negative continuum." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 48) Evaluations can be long-term and enduring or short-term and changeable. They can also be direct – positive/negative judgement, or indirect – as a demand. Third, there are behavioral intentions – "includes all actions which might be taken with different degrees of subjective probability in regard to a particular object." (Niedermeyer & Sinnott, 1995, p. 50) [1]

[1] One widely used measure of such behavioral intentions is intention to vote.

The literature reviewed above suggests intricate models of understanding attitudes by classifying them according to different criteria. While such taxonomies are helpful in analyzing the attitudinal range, rationales and objects of support, citizens' attitudes seldom form consistent belief systems. Distinguishing between diffuse and specific support is a helpful heuristic device for understanding where people stand in terms of their acceptance of democracy as a system, and particular governments. There is scholarly agreement on how attitudes are mechanisms through which citizens connect themselves to the political system. This connection is intrinsically important in democratic systems due to their participatory nature. But what influences the formation of attitudes? This is the question that I turn to in the next section.

Determinants of Political Attitudes

Positive attitudes are a measure of satisfaction with one's political system. Evidently, many factors can contribute to the formation of such positive evaluations, ranging from economic satisfaction, to measures of group identity, such as nationhood. In the following, I examine several factors that influence attitude formation. For each of these factors, I discuss their applicability in the context of post-communist democracy. As I argued in the introduction, post-communist systems are different than both consolidated democracies and other new democracies, because of their communist past and the incredible range of changes brought about by democratization. Therefore, the functioning of attitude formation mechanisms needs to be harmonized to the post-communist context. The emphasis of this research is on the effect of religious variables on support for democracy. Political attitudes are influenced by many other variables besides religion, such as socio-demographic indicators or economic development. In the

following, I examine some of the most prominent arguments in the literature, regarding the determinants of political attitudes. While in chapter 4 I explain in detail the independent control variables that I use, and I justify their inclusion in the models, here, I summarize some of the most important findings in the study of the determinants of support for democracy, and discuss their applicability for the present research.

Modernization

Modernization theses start the discussion at the country level, and trickle down to individual level. Lipset's 1959 article on the determinants of maintaining democratic government is strongly correlated with his modernization theory. As economic development takes place, levels of education increase, and the social stratification of the society changes, making space for the middle-class – the main promoter of democracy:

> First, economic development is closely associated with increases in education, which in turn promotes political attitudes conducive to democracy (e.g. interpersonal trust and tolerance of opposition). Second, economic development alters the pyramid-shaped social stratification system, in which the majority of the population is lower class and poor, to a diamond shape, in which the majority of the population is middle class and relatively well-off. (Muller, 1995a, p. 967)

According to Lipset, the middle class, the main driver of democratization, has to become more educated because of their occupational status, and, through this process, they develop pro-democratic attitudes. These attitudes spread into the larger society because of the increasing size of the middle class "the middle class emerges as the main pro-democratic force in Lipset's analysis, and this class gains in size with socio economic development." (Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, 1992, p. 14) Alternatively, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) see the advent of democracy as a direct function of the growing urban working class. In their view, it is neither political culture,

nor education that affects the diffusion of democracy, but the fact that the working class accumulates more power, and, it is only logical for the working class to engage in democratic opening dialogue (Rueschemeyer, Stephens & Stephens, 1992).

Complementarily, Muller (1995a, 1995b) argues that neither of the two theses stated above are necessary to explain democratic development and survival; he adds the critical importance of income inequality in predicting the survival of a democratic system. However, Bollen and Jackman (1995) oppose Muller's newly found effect of inequality, and assert that a better specification of the model would lead out inequality from the equation. They find that one of the strongest predictor of democratic survival is the presence of a previous democratic system.

While widely respected in the academia, the modernization theory fails to take into consideration cases of countries that exhibit high poverty rates, and also democratic forms of government. Clague, Gleason and Knack (2001) retest the modernization theory, on a larger set of countries, and add another critical explanatory variable: sequential and institutional development. They criticize Lipset's thesis on several counts. First, literacy and life expectancy are not adequate indicators for economic development, since they can be both causal factors and consequences of democracy, and hence it is almost impossible to assert causal direction. Moreover, literacy, primary education and health services could reflect cultural attitudes towards social equality that, in turn, may be supportive of democracy. It is apparent that the relationship between economic development and support for democracy is neither definitive nor necessarily direct. Sequential and institutional development is seen as indicative of a high level of institutionalization of societal interactions and potential conflicts: the mere number of groups competing for

power is not as critical as are the power relations between groups (Clague et al., 2001). They also mention colonial power, the size of the population and religion, as important predictors of pro-democratic attitudes.

The applicability of the modernization thesis in Central and Eastern Europe is partial. In general, the formation of attitudes towards a political or economic system can be explained by invoking two broad arguments. The first argument focuses on self-interested rational actors, and most of the literature on the attitudes towards market economy in Central and Eastern Europe has been grounded in this approach. In other words, individuals that see themselves as potential winners of the transition process will have more support for the new system than potential losers (McIntosh, MacIver, Abele & Smeltz, 1994). The alternative, or even complementary approach focuses on political socialization, and emphasizes symbolic politics:

> this model suggests that policy preferences toward the market and democracy are triggered by generally enduring attitudes about such "symbolic" issues as the relationship between the individual and the state, the importance of freedom versus equality and the value of new versus traditional ways. (p. 484)

The applicability of this approach to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe is limited, because of the lack of time for political socialization within democracy to take place. Furthermore, the "symbolic" relationship between citizens and the state does not have to be exclusively constructed around the tenets of democratic government. The same relationship can also be created along the lines of national identity and support for the nation state.

Societal values, persisting since communist times, may also affect and condition the formation of attitudes towards the new political and economic system. In fact,

McIntosh et al.'s findings (1994) suggest such an effect, when they find that the people that show the least amount of support for both democracy and market economy tend to be older, less educated, and overall less politically connected. The same authors also find interesting results in terms of the consistency between attitudes towards the political system and those towards the market, on a cross national research that includes Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, in the early nineties. According to their data, there is a small group of people that support both market economy and the democratic form of government. There is also a rather small group of individuals that support the market but not the democratic form of government that comprises almost 25% of Hungarian respondents. [2] The larger share of the samples consists of citizens that support democracy without a definitive commitment to market economy, probably because of its lack of security and certainty, available in planned socialist economy. Moreover, the findings are most interesting because of their robustness across countries; two central European and two Eastern European countries, usually not analyzed together, and catalogued at different levels of consolidation, fair similarly in respect to the determinants of political and economic attitudes.

Most scholars of Central and Eastern European democratization however, find support for the modernization theory. Age, gender, education, place of residence and size of the community have been mentioned in several studies as independent variables affecting people's attitudes towards democratic opening and towards the market economy system. (Fleron, Jr., & Ahl, 1998, 1994, Kullberg & Zimmerman, 1999). The effect is

[2] This findings is explained through the experimentations with private business during the Kadar regime.

consistent with the modernization theory that Lipset formulated more than 5 decades ago. More educated individuals are more supportive of democracy and the market by virtue of their higher social status that, in turn, makes them understand its net qualities. Similarly, older people (although not the oldest generations) and males also support democracy more, because of their occupational status that brings them more to the forefront of democratization, and allows them to play a more important part. Finally, the place of residence and the size of the community affects one's attitudes because larger urban settings are also more cosmopolitan, and more exposed to the diffusion of foreign ideas. Overall, socio economic status and demographic indicators such as gender and place of residence work through a process of empowerment, that results in people with higher status playing more important roles in the polity; at the very minimum, empowerment provides them with skills and abilities improving their subjective feelings of political efficacy.

The simultaneous occurrence of democracy and market economy in Central and Eastern Europe causes favorable attitudes to be developed more by citizens that stood to gain from the process. In other words, the supporters of democracy are those that benefited from an economic opportunity structure that allowed them to convert previous skills in abilities necessary for succeeding in the new economic and political context (Kullberg & Zimmerman, 1999). While the economic opportunity structure has a stronger effect on attitudes towards market economy, it also has a significant effect on political liberalization, with supporters of privatization also being more accommodating of liberal values. Thus, the modernization thesis is confirmed in Russia, where young, urban and educated Russians demonstrate less support for the economic policies of former USSR

(Miller, Reisinger & Hesli, 1993). The same authors find that support for democracy is associated with education in Russia, and with urban residence in Ukraine.

There is less agreement on how objective or subjective interpretations of a country's economic wellbeing, or individual economic status affect their position towards more democratic reform. For instance, Miller et al. (1995) show a strong relationship between individual economic hardships and an erosion of support in Russia, while Fleron (1996) finds similar relationships. Alternatively, Duch and Stevenson (1995) do not observe any such correlation in their study on Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in the early 1990s, while Gibson (1996) also finds little support for correlation between individual economic well being and support for democracy in Russia and Ukraine, on data from 1990 and 1992.

The applicability of the modernization hypotheses is also limited in Central and Eastern Europe through the presence of deeply rooted communist values. For instance, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) found that in the former USSR, highly educated people were more inclined to support political change, but also less inclined to support individual responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry. The inconsistency of this finding is evaluated against western criteria, according to which, more educated people usually do not lean on the state for support. In support of the latter assertion, Miller et al. (1993) found that in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania, education was positively related to individual responsibility and to support for political reform, and also found that political reform was positively and strongly related to support for individual responsibility. Moreover, Miller et al. (1996) rejected the more contextualized approach of Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) and claimed universal value for their findings. In 1996, Finifter

replicated her own study, with more methodological specifications, on a new dataset, and found support for her initial thesis, thus concluding that there is no universal finding that correlates positively support for political reform and support for individualism, nor between education and individualism.

Attitudes towards democracy, liberalization and free market economy are obviously distinct matters. However, in Central and Eastern Europe, and, to some extent, in Russia and the former Soviet republics, these three processes occur at once, so a question arises, regarding the relationship between the interaction of attitudes towards these three objects of support. On one hand, support for the market is a predictor for support for democracy, and vice versa (McIntosh et al. 1999, Kullberg & Zimmerman, 1995). On the other hand, given that both liberalism and market economy benefit people with skills and status to the obvious disadvantage of others, one can expect the groups of supporters for democracy and market economy to overlap only partially. Both market economy and democracy emphasize freedom and individualism, and therefore, a consistent belief system regarding the two should be possible. In contrast, democracy stresses equality, while capitalism inevitably increases inequality, so attitudes towards the two can be fairly divergent (Miller et al., 1995).

I presented evidence regarding the effect of education and material well being on support for democracy in East Central Europe. While the modernization thesis found support in the work of some authors, others discounted its applicability in the region, because of the long lasting effect of communist values. Additionally, the fact that democracy, liberalism and market economy are simultaneous processes in Central and Eastern Europe, it is interesting to specify further how consistent beliefs systems are

across these three objects of support. Therefore, in chapter 5 I explore the ways in which demographic indicators and socio-economic status affect support for democracy.

Institutions and satisfaction

In addition to the plethora of studies on the importance of demographic indicators and socio economic status in the formation of attitudes, another important set of predictors focus on political institutions. Anderson and Guillory (1997) ask the question: do political institutions affect citizen satisfaction with democracy? Generally, this question has not been answered satisfactorily, because of a methodological problem, concerning levels of analysis. While most research analyzed individual level variables when evaluating political attitudes, the effect of institutions is a system level variable and thus difficult to incorporate in a model. There are a few exceptions, such as Miller's and Listhaug's study (1990), that finds higher support for the system in political contexts that allow access to new political parties and opportunities to express discontent with the existing political arrangements. In addition, Harmel and Robertson (1986) find that more durable democratic governments make citizens more supportive of their political system. They quote Weatherford, to support their research design, since combining individual level attitudes with characteristics of the system allows for more theoretical clarity - "strengthening research on political legitimacy will depend upon renewing efforts of middle-level theorizing, with the goal not of choosing between perspectives but of combining them more constructively." (Weatherford 1991, p. 252) Their research is built around Lijphart's (1984, 1999) consensual democratic model that explores the relationship between satisfaction with the regime and its majoritarian or consensual type. Harmel and Robinson (1986) find that, in consensual systems, minorities are more

satisfied with the political system than minorities in systems based on the majority rule. Thus, it became apparent that a country's institutional and constitutional arrangements mediate the nature of political attitudes.

In East Central Europe, the role that institutions play in the formation of political attitudes is even more important because of their short existence. According to Munck and Leff (1997) initial institutional choices, affected by the identity and strategy of the agent of change, determine the extent of democratic support. In other words, people might learn democracy, but they will only be as democratic as the incumbent transitional regimes allowed them to be (Munck & Leff, 1997).

In this research, I do not test the validity of institutional hypotheses on support for democracy. Nonetheless, they are important for my argument, through the influence of institutional interaction between church and state on a church's ability and willingness to accommodate democracy. If the type of political institutions influences satisfaction with the system, then, it is reasonable to assume that the same political institutions affect other societal institutions, and, indirectly, support for democracy.

National Identity and Support for Democracy

Many authors mention the importance of attitudes towards the nation state, and their effects on attitudes towards democracy and the market in Central and Easter Europe. In East Central Europe, simultaneous processes of democratization and marketization also interact with an ongoing third process of nation building (Bunce, 2002). Throughout the transition process, nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe has been blamed for such bloodshed as Bosnia, Kosovo, and, at the extreme, Chechnya (Burgess, 1997). Eastern European national identity formation is often portrayed as dangerous and leading to wars

and genocide (Burgess, 1997). In fact, in the case of the Balkans, irrational nationalistic behavior is part of what triggers the construction of the East as different from the West (Todorova, 1997). It seems that nationalism was constructed differently in Central and Eastern Europe:

> In the 19th and 20th centuries nationalism spread to Central and Eastern Europe, to lands of entirely different traditions and social structure [...] in these lands nationalism became a trend toward collective self assertion, towards a closed society, in which the individual counted for less than the strengthened authority of the national whole [...] contemporary nationalism is a destructive force that often contains a high degree of xenophobia. (Burgess, 1997, p. 124)

Therefore, mainstream literature constructs nationalism as one of the major deterrents of democratic transition and successful consolidation. I argue that the effect that national identity has on support for democracy needs to be contextualized. There is no reason to believe that attachment for the nation state automatically follows a non-democratic path. In fact, there is growing literature that suggests the opposite: support for democracy overlaps with strong feelings towards one's nation.

Accordingly, Burgess (1997) demonstrates that nationalism is fairly weak in Eastern Europe, where, after 1989, individual survival became more important than the survival of the country. The author argues that every ethnic conflict was caused and supported through the interference of international actors, starting with the Balkan wars at the beginning of the 20th century, and ending with the Yugoslav ethnic cleansing of the 1990s. "Good" western nationalism is unproblematic because of the respectable age of Western nations and pluralist traditions. Eastern nationalism, which brought along the need to coin the concept of "ethnic cleansing", is "bad" and organically identified with the region:

> To this day, a Western constitutional, civic, and therefore at least potentially positive, 'patriotism' is counter-posed to an altogether more dangerous variety that persists in the East. This distinction has now gone so far that the national identity of a Western society such as Britain is now defined partly by its hostility to aggressive nationalism. (Burgess, 1997, p. 125)

Even if countries in the West have become racially and ethnically segregated, nationalism, as a negative force leading to bloodshed, is seen typical only of Eastern Europe.[3]

Most of the time, the discussion between nationalism and democracy takes place within a continuum limited by civic nationalism, at the "good" end, and ethnic nationalism, at the "bad" end (Greenfield, 1992, Brubaker, 1999). While it is understood that every country displays a mix of both types, it is also usually understood that Western consolidated democracies are mostly civic, while Eastern European countries are mostly ethnic. Kuzio (2001) argues that there has not yet been a sustained effort at theorizing the relationship between democracy and nationalism. He analyzes data on Ukraine, and concludes that support for nationhood is actually positively correlated with support for democracy: "strong national identity is promoting democratization, while weak national identities are more prone to be victims of sultanistic regimes." (Kuzio, 2001, p. 172; see also Eke and Kuzio, 2000). Increasingly, the literature is devoted to the potential constructive/benefic effect of national identity in the construction of democratic systems – a political system cannot exist without a state, and a state performs on shaky grounds without a nation to back it up. Accordingly, Nodia (1994) argues that nationhood provides the necessary level of social cohesion for democracy to work. Movements for

[3] Western societies show instances of the criminalization of immigrants in Britain, the status of guest workers in Germany and the treatment of Muslims in France – in stark opposition to their civic nationalism.

nationhood, understood as political autonomy, are often times movements for democracy. Rustow (1970) also believes that national unity is the sole background condition for democratization, since in order to undertake such a broad regime change as transition from communism to democracy, citizens need to be very clear as to what political community they belong to. Kuzio (2001) finds a connection between being Western Ukrainian, a speaker of Ukrainian, and also a supporter of democracy and market, as opposed to being from Eastern or Southern Ukraine, and a speaker of Russian, or being a Russian in Ukraine, and supporting socialism.

The most interesting aspect of Kuzio's study is that he does not analyze the objective cultural compatibility between democracy and market economy on the one hand, and national identity on the other (as Huntington does). Instead, his model correlates perceptions of democracy and national identity. Kuzio (2001) concludes that democracy and capitalism will be successful if they are perceived as strengthening national identity – whatever national identity may mean at one point in time. Starting from the dualistic nature of the nation – inward and outward looking – there are three mechanisms that link national identity with development models: symbolism, cultural diffusion and instrumentalism. Through symbolism, some groups are associated with some models of development, so adopting a particular model of development will raise and consecrate the status of a particular group. Cultural diffusion is a broader process that encompasses the circulation of ideas and values that accompany the adoption of a political or economic model. Finally, instrumentalism includes perceptions of how a certain foreign model is compatible with the culture of the group. The combined effect of these three mechanisms in Ukraine's transition to democracy and market economy is a

correlation between strong feelings towards Ukrainian national/ethnic identity and support for democracy.

Additionally, Hilde Weiss' work (2003) is another attempt at theorizing the relationship between democracy, market and nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. She compares public opinion data (national representative samples from 1996) for Austria, Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary and Poland. The inclusion of Austria makes for a very interesting contrasting case, by comparing consolidated and transitioning democracies, former communist and western countries. She finds that

> in post-communist countries – with the exception of the Czech republic – anti-capitalist feelings are strongly correlated with nationalist and ethnic intolerance. Such attitudes are held by the lower classes, yet this form of anti-liberalism is not directed against democracy. (Weiss, 2003, p. 377)

She assumed that expressions of nationalism were to be expected in East Central European states that became sovereign and independent after long periods of foreign rule. This nationalism could take a patriotic form, in which attachment to one's nation is expressed through commitment to democratic institutions (so basically civic nationalism), or as ethnic/xenophobic nationalism. Although I do not agree with her dual categorization of nationalism, her research indicates that radical nationalism affects support for democracy in many different ways. Nationalism may play a social functional role; for example, Keane (1994) explains the resurgence of national values in bringing security to the uncertainty brought about by pluralism and market economy.

Traditional research has correlated nationalism with ethnocentrism, xenophobia, militarism and authoritarianism. In a Marxist view the lower classes tended to express their fear of market capitalism through nationalism, but, in contemporary western

European societies, free market and nationalism go hand in hand thanks to right wing populist leaders. The nationalist "we feeling" is supposed to compensate for social disintegration. In Central and Eastern Europe it is an interesting phenomenon: the lower classes will be skeptical of the capitalist system and will prefer economic intervention and appeal to ethnic intolerance. In Austria, and, in fact, in all western countries right-wing populism goes hand in hand with intolerance and nationalism.

The relationship between national identity and support for democracy seems to vary according to different national contexts. Most probably, national identity is more salient in new nation states, and most East Central European states are fairly new. Therefore, the inclusion of a measure of national identity in study of attitudes towards democracy in post-communist countries is theoretically mandated. Analyzing the role played by national identity in the construction of support for democracy becomes mandatory, since the focus of this research is on the religious determinants of democratic attitudes, and religion is often portrayed as a key element of the nation.

Political Attitudes and the Internalization of Norms – The Case of Tolerance

Even in western consolidated democracies the support for a democratic political regime is not necessarily accompanied by deepening levels of tolerance. According to Sullivan, Shamir, Roberts and Walsh (1982), in consolidated democracies, while citizens are in principle supporting democratic rights, they are "less likely to extend these rights to disliked groups." (Sullivan et al., 1982, p. 2)

Peflley and Rohrschneider (2003) make an interesting argument claiming that the fact that Central and Eastern Europe is democratizing does not mean that tolerance of other liberal values is also widespread. They note that the literature on democratization

and political tolerance rarely intersect. According to the authors, there is overwhelming evidence that democracy is at its widest coverage ever and enjoys incredibly widespread support (Norris, 1999, Klingemann, 1998). They document the spread of support for democracy across the globe (Mishler & Rose, 2002), and identify two causes for this unexpected avalanche of countries manifesting high levels of support for democratic polities, even outside of the Western hemisphere. The first cause is the diffusion of democratic norms through mass media, personal contacts, and rising levels of education (Weil, 1989, 1993, Inglehart, 1997). This argument is a quintessential version of both of modernization and democratic contagion theses. The second cause is the changing value structure of citizens, in the sense of more personal autonomy and post-material values, that occurs in non –western contexts too (Inglehart, 1997). They complement these optimistic with the bleaker prospects of levels of tolerance not increasing correlatively with the spread of democratic regimes. Moreover, there is evidence that intolerant people hold stronger, more powerful, beliefs and attitudes than more tolerant people (Sullivan, Pierson & Marcus, 1982, Gibson & Duch (in Russia), 1993, Rohrschneider (In East Germany), 1996). They observe that in consolidated democracies, especially in the US, tolerance is harder to learn than abstract democracy. Among predictors for tolerance, the first is the longevity of a democratic system – the longer a country's experience with democracy, with the rough and tumble of politics and increased quality of governance, the more tolerant its people are. Second, it seems that federalist systems are more conducive to tolerance, probably because of making available several points of access into the political system. Third, more participatory citizens, or citizens that make the most of the use of their civil liberties, are also more tolerant. In contrast, the socio-economic

development of a country does not directly impact tolerance, although it may affect it indirectly through the longevity of democracy.

Tolerance towards minority is, I argue, an adequate measure for testing the internalization of liberal values in East Central Europe. The emphasis on tolerance, rather than other liberal values, is motivated by the hypothesized conservative values extant in most religions. Since this is a study on the influence of religious indicators on the formation of political attitudes, I argue that tolerance is one of the most visible liberal values, and also one that religious institutions may have a harder time accommodating.

In this section I have identified factors that influence the formation of attitudes. I include these factors in my analysis for two reasons. First, there is significant disagreement in the literature with respect to the direction and ways in which some factors affect the formation of attitudes. Second, their introduction is also justified by the very logic of inquiry: they represent important controlling variables in the quest for the effect of religious variables in the formation of attitudes. Establishing causality is no easy task, but the inclusion of controlling variables is one way of reducing the incidence of spurious correlations. In the next chapter, I discuss more fully the set of control variables that I use in my models, and I justify their inclusion by reference to this brief theoretical section. In the next section I turn to introducing the discussion on religious variables influencing attitude formation.

Religious Determinants of Political Attitudes

At first glance, the importance of religion on attitude formation is warranted by the fact that churches are among the few institutions that enjoy public confidence, in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Mishler and Rose (1997), disappointments caused by

democratic transition create political malaise, observable in decreasing rates of turnout, among other things. The church and the army are trusted societal actors, and, accordingly, people participate in religious activities more than any other political or social events (Mishler & Rose, 1997). There are differences within Central and Eastern Europe, but overall the rate of church attendance is higher than any other collective participatory act.

Furthermore, the role of the church as a segment of civil society that help foster the creation of civic skills is significant from an ethical point of view. According to Barnes (2001), there are few political institutions that have been left uncompromised by the communist regime. For example, trade unions represent part of the communist inheritance. High rates of participation in trade unions after 1989 are to be understood by their quasi-mandatory membership status, and not by because of their role in the society. Even Barnes' argument is questionable, because of the "compromised" status of Orthodox churches during communism. Their collaboration with the communist regimes however, does not seem to affect their popular position equally. In Bulgaria, for example, a public scandal surrounded the unveiling of the truth regarding the cooperation between some Orthodox clergy and the communist party, and, consequently, a schism occurred within the Orthodox Church that lead to decreased confidence in the church. In Romania, although the Orthodox Church also collaborated with the Ceausescu regime, societal trust did not decrease and religious participation continued to be high.

Conceptualizing the effect of religion on the formation of attitudes is not among the most researched topics. The Civic Volunteerism Model (CVM), developed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) accounts for the mobilizing role of the civil society. The

CVM asserts that tangible resources are not the only predictors of political participation. Political engagement, recruitment and civic skills also increase political participation. Engagement is constituted by those positive beliefs and attitudes towards democracy coupled with feelings of personal political empowerment and efficacy. Civic skills are practices and experiences that familiarize individuals with the political game, and its rules of play. Writing a petition, organizing a campaign, even voting makes more sense if it is practiced. The authors show that participation in non-political organizations, such as unions, voluntary organizations, churches and the workplace, creates a familiarity with the ways organizations function and give the individual a feeling of efficacy.

Nonetheless, the CVM model explains the difference in levels of political participation extant within the society. Political attitudes are not acts of political participation. In fact, Verba, Schlozman and Brady consider them as some of the prerequisites of participation, falling into the category of political engagement. I argue that while attitudinal support for democracy does not constitute participating in politics, they are both measures of how a person evaluates his or her political system. In other words, favorable attitudes towards the political system can be considered predictors of political participation. In a different vein, the formation of attitudes is not as costly as actual participation, and so, from a methodological point of view, the researcher has access to a wider set of respondents (as opposed to the participatory citizenry in the case of political participation). For this research, I argue that the analysis of attitudes instead of actual participation also allows for the inclusion of non-democratic countries in the model, such as the former Soviet Republics. While elections are not exactly free and fair in Belarus, and writing petitions may attract repression from the government, people are

still more free to hold different political views. It is possible that fear of consequence may affect the respondents' answers, but, at least through the analysis of political attitudes the researched can form an image of support for democracy is some of the less democratic countries of East Central Europe.

In the case of churches, Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) explain that they have the benefit of eliminating resource driven inequalities apparent in the American system. Racial minorities especially, find the church an empowering arena. To be sure, the authors warn that not all churches have the same impact on creating civic skills. Protestant churches, for example, are better at empowering citizens since they are focused on more discussion and participatory practices. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, is not such an effective civic skills builder, due to its strictly hierarchical organization. In brief, the church as a member of the civil society has the potential of empowering citizens, who, in turn, become more politically active, and more appreciative of their political system.

Although the organizational structure of the church as an institution is mentioned in the CVM, the weakness of the model resides in its inability to deal with the limitations of the model imposed by the internal culture of the church. Richard Wood (1999) asserts the causal autonomy of culture and states that the internal political culture of the church is formed from its cultural strategy and its cultural base. He argues that political science and social movement literatures do not address the critical issue of church's internal structure in both limiting and affecting its effect on civic skills building.

The cultural base of a church represents those segments of participants' cultural terrain that the church appeals to, those common unifying traits of the population that

offers the legitimizing base for the church's actions. The cultural strategy indicates what part of community life the organization will draw upon. These two factors lead to the formation of an internal political culture, made up of shared assumptions, perceptions and symbols that facilitate the understanding of the surrounding world. The political culture affects the projection of social power and the ability to shape the public realm.

Wood (1999) details the challenges that churches face in their formation and preservation of internal political culture. Wood's approach is designed for the pluralist religious space existing in the United States. His announced goal was to determine the effectiveness of church participation in the representation of minorities. So part of his analysis will not apply to cases of dominant religion or even state religion. The overall framework, though, is useful. Cultural base and cultural strategy carry meaning when applied outside the North-American context.

Wood's model can be used to amend the Civic Volunteerism Model. Verba et al. (1995) discuss the difference between Catholic and Protestant churches in assisting the citizens to develop civic skills. Because of the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church, these skills are not so easily acquired, in comparison to Protestant Churches. Wood (1999) develops a more general and useful way to conceptualize and study the different influence of different denomination on political attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.

The CVM holds the assumption that initial religious motivations are converted into civic skills. This assumption underlines the presence of two consecutive conversions. First, the religious motivations that prompt a person to go to the church are converted into a process of learning civic skills. Second, once these civic skills are learnt, they are subsequently converted into political participation. Wood's analysis addresses the

institutional aspect of these assumptions: initial religious motivations are converted into civic skills and then into political participation in accordance with the internal political culture of the church. In addition to this aspect, there is also an individual volitional aspect - the intention of the individual to perform this series of conversions.

Wood's study of the internal culture of the church hints at the need of understanding religion and church as part and parcel of the society that affects its internal culture. In fact, throughout history, both church and religion had to change and adapt to new political contexts. Therefore, in the next chapter, I identify what structural traits of religion and church affect its ability to influence the formation of political attitudes.

In this chapter I discussed the importance of political attitudes in a democracy, and emphasized the critical need for societal support of the system in new democracies. Democratic transitions are long and often tedious processes, and, unless the citizenry shows attachment to the system, the possibility of reverting to un-democratic forms of government looms large. I drew a difference between diffuse and specific support, and also between support for procedural democracy, liberal values and market economy. In the analysis of determinants of political attitudes I identified factors that potentially influence the support for democracy, and discussed their theoretical and methodological virtues. In chapter 4 I specify the effect of religious factors on the formation of attitudes, and explain how they interact with controlling variables.

Chapter 4

Churches as Embedded Institutions.

Contextual Factors Affecting the Relationship between Religion and Political Attitudes

The discussion revolved so far around three main topics: whether some denominations are better equipped to accommodate democracy (i.e. Protestantism and Catholicism), whether modern consolidated democracy necessarily implies secularization, and how religious belonging and participation can affect the formation of political attitudes. In response to these questions, I first argued that the relationship between religion and democracy is often constructed in terms of a "natural compatibility" between Western Christianity and liberal democracy. Framing the discussion in such terms originated in essentialist readings of Max Weber's *Protestant Ethics* that postulate a direct causal relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. One of the well-known exponents of this approach is Samuel Huntington, through his hypothesis that limits democratic development to Western Christianity. I name this hypothesis "denominational", because of its reifying conceptualizations of religion as unchangeable unitary doctrines. I brought arguments against this thesis and showed that Western Christianity is not any more or less inherently democratic than the doctrine of Orthodox Church, Eastern religions, or the Muslim faith. In the next chapter, I will test this denominational hypothesis.

Second, the theories of imminent and unavoidable secularization have also been disconfirmed (Berger, 2002). Most of the literature still agrees on the fact that modernization brings democracy, but modernization does not necessarily equal

secularization (Casanova, 1994). Democracy does not seem to require secularization, and, according to Casanova, religion can play a positive role in democratization be it as a moral authority, an arena for developing civic skills, or a social cohesion mechanism.

Third, I examined examples of such pro-democratic religions. I quoted the research of several authors that discuss different ways through which religious identification and church participation can positively influence the construction of democratic attitudes and behaviors. The corroboration of their results indicates that not only Western and Eastern Christianity, but also Islam and Eastern religions can play this positive role.

I believe that both the secularization and the Western Christian democratic compatibility arguments lack nuance of context. The interaction between church and politics is dynamic, and an apparently small change in the relationship between church and state can produce significant consequences in the role that the church assumes during democratization. The ways in which religion affects support for democracy is dependent on a myriad of factors, including but not limited to the role of the church throughout history, the inner doctrine of the church, the relationship between state and church, and the interests and preference of the church understood as institution. In order to understand a church's willingness and ability to influence democratic politics, one needs to take into account its organization as an institution - within a historical, political and economic context. Analyzing the context in which religion and church developed represents an effort to specify the relationship between religion and democracy. I propose that religion and church are embedded institutions, and the effect that they have on the formation of attitudes should be analyzed accordingly.

Therefore, I offer an alternative understanding of the relationship between church and democratization, different than the denominational hypothesis proposed by Huntington. One simple reason for the questioning of the denominational hypothesis is the following: religion and church are flexible institutions that evolved within a historical, political and cultural context, and whose interests and status in each society is not determined exclusively by their belonging to a family of religions (for example Eastern vs. Western). The separation that Huntington draws between Catholicism and Protestantism on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity, on the other, is fairly arbitrary, and even within Protestantism, there are differences in doctrine, social mission and acceptance of democratic values. It is noteworthy the conservative nature of New-protestant churches in the United States and their contrasting, more liberal European counterparts. Additionally, Catholicism has been, for many centuries, a force of conservatism, only to become a church "within democracy" after the *Vatican II Council.* Indeed, the Catholic Church recognized freedom of religion only in the mid twentieth century. By the same token, the Russian Orthodox Church has been an important political force during the tzars, only to become a subservient party substructure during communism.

Both examples suggest that, throughout history, churches belonging to the same denomination acted differently, at different moments in time, in different countries. Beyond the denominational distinction, I believe that understanding the context in which each religion exists is essential for the explanation of the ways in which it can affect people's evaluation of their political system. Consequently, the second major goal of this research is more methodological. A nuanced understanding of the relationship between

religion and democracy requires contextualization. Thus, I am interested in capturing and measuring the context in which church and state interact, and in exploring the ways in which the church affects this context.

The literature reviewed so far contained examples of different churches within different political systems that proved to have a positive effect on the political values of its confidants. Furthermore, Casanova (1994) persuasively argued that secularization is not a sine qua non condition for successful democratization. If one does not believe in the denominational effect of religion, and one accepts that different religions can impact the formation of attitudes in different ways, according to historical, political, cultural and social context, than how can one bring more theoretical preciseness in the study of religion effect on citizens' values? How can one analyze a church's ability and willingness to play along in the democratic game? What constrains the church in being a promoter of democracy?

These questions suggest the need to adopt an institutionalist view of the church. If one rejects a denominational effect, and, consequently, accepts the assumption that a church is a social institution that evolves in a multiplicity of partially overlapping contexts, then the next step further is to analyze churches as institutions, with preferences and interests, but also with identities and pasts. Institutionalism is one framework that allows an investigation of the church and that leads to testable hypotheses about their effects on societal values. This approach does not ignore the inner doctrine of the church, but rather focuses on its institutional features. Church doctrine proved to be fairly flexible throughout decades of political change, and I have already showed that churches deftly

changed core principles of their social actions in order to accommodate new political realities.

Institutionalism is employed here as a methodological tool, a framework of analysis. Therefore, I first discuss the tenets of institutionalist theory, presenting its major traits and advocating its applicability for this particular research. Second, I put forth several hypotheses about those contextual features of churches that can affect their willingness and ability to influence the formation of political attitudes. In the next chapter, I test these hypotheses.

Institutionalism - old and new

As a response to failures in behavioral theory, institutionalism hails the coming back of institutions in the study of politics. Institutions encompass rules and norms of behavior, they affect political agency, and also diminish uncertainty of outcomes. Three major schools of thought are prevalent in institutionalism: rational choice, historical and sociological. There is agreement in all three schools that institutions structure behavior. The differences between the three kinds of institutionalism refer either to the conceptualization of institutions, or to their respective methods.

Historical institutionalism tries to understand and explain political outcomes. According to Pierson and Skocpol (2007), it has three defining features. First, it addresses big, substantive questions that have relevance for the broad public and not just the community of scholars. Second, it places heavy emphasis on temporal sequencing, establishing causality according to a historically adequate perception of time. Third, it analyzes macro contexts and hypothesizes about the combined effects of institutions and processes. Although historical institutionalists start off with an empirical puzzle, they

theorize at a broader level usually preferring mid-range theorizing on a set of cases that are unified in time and space (Thelen, 1999). Therefore, historical institutionalism is usually associated with a more empirical approach, in opposition to rational choice institutionalism that starts off with a hypothesis, constructs a model, and then tests it. In this respect, historical institutionalism is inductive, because it attempts to explain political outcomes (Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth, 1992), and it is not a theory in search of evidence. For historical institutionalists, institutions are structuring variables through which battles over interests, ideas, and power are fought.

In contrast, rational choice institutionalists employ a deductive approach, through which they test the empirical validity of a theoretically created mode. In classical rational choice institutionalism, each actor has exogenous and clearly formulated preferences and interests. The routinizing of behavior through institutions is a function of reducing uncertainty. From a rational choice perspective, institutions have a coordinating role, while for historical institutionalists different institutions originate at different moments in time, in different contexts, and therefore they do not form a coherent whole, and are not necessarily synchronized (Orren & Skowronek, 1994).

In both approaches, institutional change is problematic. For rational choice theorists, equilibrium is the stable outcome of any interaction, and institutions are there to ensure that a particular equilibrium is reached and secured. Actors are self-interested and prefer the existence of stable rules. Consequently, after a particular institution has been put in place, very few changes will be operated because these would increase uncertainty, threaten the equilibrium and attract higher costs of operation. The question of path-dependency is understood as an institutional arrangement that persists in time until either

another equilibrium is found, or there is a significant source of change that threatens the status quo. Historical institutionalists view path dependence as responsible for institutional stability, with each institution creating its own mechanisms for survival and preservation, which, in turn, start affecting acceptable modes of behavior. Historical institutionalists have a slightly different understanding of path-dependency – emphasizing institutions that are not delivering their services in the most efficient manner, but which, because of being resistant to time and change, continue to function.

Sociological institutionalism differs from the first two species from the beginning by its different conceptualization of institutions: " relatively enduring collections of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources" (March & Olsen, 1989, 1995). Sociological institutionalists stress the endogenous nature of institutions, and their social construction. The main differences between sociological institutionalism and the previous two types are the emphasis on the meaning that institutions create, and the dynamic process of interaction between institutional meaning, roles of conduct and identity. Institutions are

> constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behavior; structures of meaning, embedded in identities and belongings; common purposes and accounts that give direction and meaning to behavior and explain, justify and legitimate behavioral codes. (March & Olsen, 2005, p. 2)

Their emphasis on constructions of meaning and cultural embeddedness also leads to two of their most important concepts: logic of appropriateness and historical inefficiency. A logic of appropriateness is the motivation behind an action that does not seem to be the most rational or efficient, and it is opposed to a logic of consequence: "prescription based on a logic of appropriateness and a sense of rights and obligations derived form identity."

(March & Olsen, 2005, p. 6) Actors comply with cultural norms and customs that do not necessarily lead to efficiency. Choosing an inefficient but culturally desirable course of action forms the principle of historical inefficiency.

For sociological institutionalists, institutional change occurs as an adaptation to a new context, but the change is slow and mostly incremental, precisely due to its cultural embeddedness. Multiple institutions function simultaneously, each of them developing its own organizational identity and sharing partially overlapping audiences (Orren & Skowronek, 2004). Simultaneous, overlapping institutions result in the creation of multiple identities, which need to be harmoniously reconciled at the societal level. This reconciliation can sometimes be a difficult task.

Thelen (1999) does not believe that the differences between the three schools of institutionalism are pronounced, and she notes increasing border crossing for scholars within each sub-field. There are illustrations of such border crossing processes such as the combination of rational choice deductive approach coupled with an effort at contextualization or the increasing attention devoted to collective action within historical institutionalism. These inter sub-field interactions also change conceptualizations of institutions: " more expansive views of institutions, not just as strategic context but as a set of shared understandings that affect the way problems are perceived and solutions are sought." (Thelen, 1999, p. 371) Thelen believes that institutionalism should move into a direction that combines methodological and conceptual tools from all three subspecies, and she stresses the importance of critical junctures and developmental pathways. Although institutional change is not the strength of any institutionalist school, it is made possible through the introduction of critical junctures: foundational moments when a

particular decision is made, a model is adopted, that, then, becomes fairly unchangeable for a long time. It is yet uncertain how such an event becomes a critical juncture, and what makes it bear such a powerful legacy. Once adopted however, the path dependent model benefits from a self-reinforcing positive feedback – a trademark of historical institutionalism. Developmental pathways respond to changes in the environment but in ways that are consistent with the past. Therefore, institutionalism is neither purely theoretical (rational choice), nor empirical (historical), but rather a combination of both elements. Thelen argues that each institutionalist analysis should start with an empirical puzzle that informs the creation of a theory that is subsequently tested. In the following, I apply the main tenets of historical and sociological institutionalism to the particular case of church within democratic transition.

The Church as an Institution – The Capturing of Context

The institutionalized form of religion is the church. Like any other collective actor in the society, the church has its rules and norms, practices of behavior, interests and preferences. In Central and Eastern Europe, the church as an institution cannot be analyzed without exploring the relationship between church and state, because of, at least, two reasons. The first reason is the strong secularizing effect of communist regimes. Marx's famous formulation of religion as opium for the people served as a symbolic basis for the anti-religious policies of each communist regime. The communist experience instituted a practice of heavy control of the religious sphere by the state. It is interesting to find out the ways in which democratization affects this fifty years long tradition of state control over religion, and what are the consequences of re-establishing religious freedom, on the relationship between church and state. The second reason refers

mostly to Orthodox Churches, which, historically, have a much closer relationship with the state, than Catholic or Protestant churches. This close relationship between Orthodox Churches and the political regime suffers re-configuration during democratic transition. I argue that Orthodox Churches have more difficulty accepting democratic values especially because of this change in their relationship with the state, usually entailing the acceptance of religious pluralism and the consequent lowering of their religious monopolistic status. Understanding how a church affects one's political values is therefore influenced not only by the church's own interests and preferences, but also by its ability to do so, which is, in part, affected by its relationship with the state. For example, in a system in which the church is controlled by the political regime, its effect on believers is restricted to the freedoms that the state allows the church to have. Alternatively, in a situation in which the state is completely separate from the church, there will probably be many competing denominations, each of them having extensive freedom to gather new confidants and popularize their creeds.

From a rational choice perspective, churches are interest maximizing institutions trying to acquire more power in the society, either through increasing numbers of confidants, or, if possible, by securing a privileged relationship with the state. The applicability of the rational choice approach however, ends here, because the preference and interests of a church are not exogenous. Rather, they were formed in the context of the historical relationship between church, state and society. For example, the Russian Orthodox Church may be less interested in attracting confidants, than in playing an important political role. I suggest that church interests are formed in the interaction

between church and state, while also being influenced by the roles traditionally played by religion in society.

Historical institutionalism is therefore more helpful, because of its emphasis on critical junctures. All the countries in this research share two critical junctures in their recent past that determines not just the reconfiguration of their institutional settings, but also a change of values (Bunce, 2002). The first juncture is the collapse of communism. All 14 countries share at least half a decade of communism, and, in the early 1990s, all of them changed to a radically different type of regime. The second juncture, obviously related to the first, is the installation of democracy, in most of these countries, and the starting of a period of transition. For some countries the transition ended successfully and they became consolidated democracies. For others the transition stage became more or less permanent, and the arriving point is yet unknown. It is noteworthy that both critical junctures are rather sudden, not representing true developmental pathway, in the sense that historical institutionalism talks about. The abrupt change of regime places even more tension on the system's need to adapt to new circumstances. It is not the place here to go into the causes of the collapse of communism, but it is important to understand post-communist democratization as a major change of regime, that entails an even bigger change in all sectors of society. In this context, the church is also one institution that needs to adapt to these changes, and reconfigure its mission and place in the new political context.

Finally, sociological institutionalism is also a valuable tool for analysis in this respect, because of its emphasis on shared understandings and organizational culture. The collapse of communism and the ensuing transition created new institutions, and,

correlatively citizens have to tune themselves in to the new arrangements. It is democracy's trademark to invite and require participation, and so the new institutions need to gather legitimacy through citizen participation. In and of itself, this is a novel strategy for acquiring legitimacy, especially in comparison to the former communist regimes. The change in political regime, that also entails a change in all social, political and cultural spheres, is only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is represented by the meanings that people attach to these changes, their understandings of the new political space. Furthermore, citizens are not only individual passive recipients of this change, and future electorates, but also members of different institutions and groups, whose role in the new polity changes too. The Catholic Church in Poland was a strong anti-communist arena for dissidence, but once a new democratic government was in place, its mission has to change, and so did its place in society (Gautier, 1998).

Histories of church and state relationship, different communist regimes, the denominational configuration of each country – all affect the roles and mission of religion and church in a society. National, religious and political identities are also affected by the 1989 double juncture, and their interaction can result in many possible permutations. Moreover, while I attempt to capture contextual features that affect the relationship between church, state and society, I acknowledge that the large set of 14 countries encompasses an enormous amount of variation, and capturing context is bound to be a reifying process. This is why, in the case-study chapter, I will change lenses to allow for more space of maneuvering when interpreting the relationship between church, state and society in post-communist Romania.

Contextualizing the Relationship between Church, State and Society

This section of the chapter identifies differences in the relationship between church, state and society that influence the ability and willingness of a church to affect citizens' formation of political and economic attitudes. These differences are important not only for the effect of religion on attitudes, but also for the societal role and identity of churches themselves. Different relationships between church and state are the result of the historical constructions of religion, church and their role within the polity.

Secularization

Every country is at a different level of secularization. Authors wrote extensively about religious revival in Central and Eastern Europe, on the assumption that once the communist regime lifted the ban on religious manifestations, hordes of believers will flock right back into the church (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, Froese, 2001). While charming, the idea has to be further qualified. Communism did not have the same secularizing effect in every country; in Russia for instance, the longer period of communist domination probably impacted the influence of the church over the society more than in Romania, where the communist regime tolerated religious manifestations. At the moment of collapse of communism, countries in Central and Eastern Europe were at different levels of economic development, and, religious revival may have not meant all that much in a richer country, since, according to modernization theory, economic development places religion in the private sphere. Therefore, I hypothesize that the effect of belonging to a particular religion on political attitudes is mediated by the country-level

indicators of religious identification and participation. Being a religious person in a context in which there is a high number of non-religious people means something else than being religious in a fairly religious context. In Central and Eastern Europe, religion and politics, and also their institutionalized forms - the church and the state - are intertwined. Less secularization consecrates the church as an important player in post communist society, and makes it a more influential opinion leader. Secularization is also related to the discussion about believing and belonging (Davie, 1994). In the sociology of religion there is a difference between people that are highly religious (measured as both subjective feelings of religiosity and through the practicing of religious rituals, prayer, or meditation) and people that participate in religious matters. The overlap is not complete, and therefore I consider four categories of people according to their believing and belonging status. First, there are people that choose to identify themselves as non-religious. Second, there is the category of people that are individually religious, but do not participate in church matters. Third, there are people that attend religious services and are involved in church activities, but whose levels of inner religiosity are not necessarily high, the church being just another arena for social interaction, or satisfying a sense of duty/tradition. Fourth, there are the people who believe and belong, highly religious people that also participate religiously. Making a distinction between these four categories allows one to observe in what ways religion affects one's political and economic attitudes, and also whose attitudes are most efficiently influenced by religion and church.

The Church under Communism

The second element of context is the position that the church had towards the communist regime and, correlatively, the status that the regime granted it. According to Gautier (1997, 1998), this position was either oppositional or collaborationist. The stereotypical oppositional church is the Catholic Church in Poland, who became a veritable arena for democratization, and who played an important part in the collapse of the communist regime. However, after the installation of the democratic regime, the Catholic Church in Poland became a rather conservative political actor, simultaneously trying to secure an important role in the Polish society, and putting forth a conservative agenda in issues such as religious education and abortion (Ramet, 2006). On the other hand, the typical collaborationist church is the Romanian Orthodox Church. The communist regime tolerated it and transformed it into its partner in order to acquire a more efficient control over the population. The communist regime granted the Romanian Orthodox Church the status of the only recognized church, and even entitled it to the religious property of the Greek-catholic Church. The latter church was outlawed and portrayed as an enemy of the Romanian people, because of its relationships with the Vatican and capitalist Western Europe in general (Andreescu, 1998). This is perhaps the one contextual characteristic that seems to be constructed along denominational lines. Orthodox Churches have been more collaborationist than Catholic or Protestant. I argue that this is due to the closer relationship between church and state in Orthodox countries.

The expectation is that those churches that vocally opposed the communist regimes will be more willing and dedicated to the construction of political attitudes. For example, there is extensive literature on churches in Poland and East Germany that fostered civil society, and supported political opposition to the communist regimes.

East Germany is a creation of the Second World War. Mainly Protestant, it has a tradition of providing educational and social services through the church. The communist regime in East Germany was among the most repressive, and the efficiency of the Secret Police, the *Stasi*, likewise (Ekiert, 1996). Protestant churches were primarily independent from the state, at least in what the nomination of priests was concerned. The church supported some of the communist state's policies in order to be allowed to function. According to Nielsen (1991) cooperation with the regime was also sometimes accepted because it signified a distancing from Nazi-ism, whose spectrum was still prevalent. The position of the church in East Germany was more privileged than in other countries and the Protestant clergy seized the advantage. Consequently, some churches became base groups or centers of resistance. Participation in these base groups was influenced by people's dissatisfaction with communism. They started off as intellectual forums, in which concepts like feminism and environmentalism were discussed (Nielsen, 1991). However, in time, the church sponsored more and more such Christian groups that eventually gathered atheist members too. In 1989, the Protestant churches in East Germany were veritable arenas for political dissent. The idea of peaceful processions against communism in East Germany originated in the church. The marches in Berlin and Leipzig, with thousands of people holding candles, atheists and Christians alike, gave the German uprising the name of the *revolution of light*. Nielsen (1991) believes that without

the contribution of the protestant churches, the revolution of 1989 would not have been peaceful. In Poland, the figures of cardinal Wysinski and, more importantly, of the Polish Pope John Paul the Second are symbols of anti-communist resistance. The Catholic Church mobilized resistance efficiently because of the appeal it had to people, and also because of being a symbol of Polish nationhood (Casanova, 1994). Additionally, Poland was not as secularized as East Germany, and "there was growing popular participation in worship and church life." (Nielsen, 2001, p. 83) The strategy of the church in Poland changed according to the demands of the regime, but never collaborated. When the Solidarity movement called for a strike the church calmed the public down, without betraying the dissident cause.

Contrastingly, in Hungary, religion did not offer a viable alternative arena for gathering civil society. People increasingly distrusted the clerics, since they proved willing to collaborate with the communist regime. The country is split between Catholics and Protestants, but the government had power over both by choosing their leaders. Cardinal Midszenty is a widely recognized symbol for Hungarian anti-communist dissidence. He had to find refugee at the U.S. Embassy in Budapest in order not to be prosecuted by the communist authorities. However, his stance was more rigid than his counterparts in Poland and East Germany, by refusing any sort of compromise. Although, one can see the same group bases of dissidents, like in the East German case, the Hungarian Catholic Church did not grant them any legitimacy and their efforts did not result in the church's involvement in the breakdown of the communist regime.

Czechoslovakia presents a similar story. The country consists of Catholic and Protestant believers, with the former living predominantly in the Czech territories and the

latter in the Slovak parts. Religion was highly controlled by the regime and the church had to develop an underground activity. The revolution in Czechoslovakia was led by intellectuals and artists that also formed the secrete constituencies of the underground churches (Nielsen, 2001). The highly repressive nature of the Czechoslovak communist regime made people refrain from practicing religion, but underground religion did form an arena for opposition. Moreover, ecumenical efforts had also been witnessed, given that Cardinal Tomasek was looked upon as a leader by both denominations.

In the Orthodox parts of Eastern Europe there are very different stories. In Bulgaria, the religious issue was not very salient to begin with. The state effectively controlled the church, and the church did not engage in any dissident activity. Moreover, the legitimacy of the communist regime was higher in Bulgaria given the degree of economic backwardness with which the country began its communist phase. Although the communist regime isolated and persecuted the Muslim minority, up to the point of denying any freedom of expression, the Orthodox Church was allowed to survive. Similarly, in Romania, the Orthodox Church is dominant, but a significant minority of Catholic Uniates populates the North-Western parts of the country. The Orthodox Church actively supported the communist regime, mainly as a trade off for forbidding any other form of religion. The Romanian Orthodox Church was the only tolerated denomination and it enjoyed a privileged status. Like in Bulgaria, after 1989, the Romanian Orthodox Church pledged allegiance to democracy, by a "swift, sudden" change in views. In both Romania and Bulgaria, Orthodoxy forms the basis of national identity.

The examples discussed above suggest a clustering of the relationship between church and state during communism along denominational lines. While Orthodox

Churches accepted offers of collaboration with the communist regime (to ensure their survival and dominant status), Catholic and Protestant churches tended to form a transnational vocal opposition to communism. Nonetheless, the degree to which religious opposition was manifested varied from the democratizing Polish Catholic Church, to the more compromising Hungarian Catholic Church.

The collaborationist stance of all Orthodox Churches during communism creates a situation of collinearity that makes more difficult the attempt to introduce this variable in a model. While I cannot control for the collaborationist/oppositional church factor, because of the impossibility of quantifying the relationship between church and state, I have identified two country level indicators that approximate the tightness of the relationship between church and state: the general regulation of religion index (GRI) and the general funding of religion index (GFI) (Grim & Finke, 2006).

GRI measures the extent to which the government is involved in regulating religious matters. The components of the index include state regulation of religious education, internal structure, and freedom of religion. Religious regulation mostly has a negative connotation, higher values suggesting more state intervention in religious matters, including diminishing religious freedom. The general funding of religion index captures not only the amount of funding that each church gets in every country (education, clergy, church property costs), but also the amount of favoritism. Higher values for GFI represent privileging of one particular religion over others. I propose that these two indices are useful in measuring the relationship between church and state. Higher regulation of religion and higher privileging is indicative of a closer connection

between church and state during communism, which also continues in the post-communist era.

I argue that, although the GRI and the GFI quantify the relationship between church and state after the collapse of communism, they still reflect the status of the church in the pre-democratic times.[1] One hypothesis is that, in countries with higher regulation and favoritism of religion, the church may affect citizens' attitudes in the sense of supporting the government that granted it a privileged status. However, this effect is also conditioned by the position of dominance or minority that a church has. If a church it is dominant, privileging will work to its advantage, while minority churches will be more critical of the granting of these privileges. Privileges granted to the dominant church will render it more supportive of the government and minority churches will resent such policies and will make them more critical of the government. The effect of the relationship between the state and the dominant and minority churches may influence the church's support for democratization. Moreover, transition to democracy requires the acceptance of religious pluralism and religious freedom. Because of institutional interests, Orthodox Churches resent this feature of democratic systems. Being privileged by the state may make Orthodox churches more accepting of further democratization, because their privileges form a safety net that ensure the maintaining of their dominant position after the religious opening caused by democratization. Correlatively, underprivileged minority churches may use their status to advocate further democratization, as a vehicle for securing a more prominent place in the society.

[1] In the next chapter, I will show that GRI and GFI take higher values for countries with a dominant Orthodox Church, thus confirming my guess that the two indicators reflect pre-democratic institutional arrangements between church and state.

Religious Pluralism or Homogeneity

I also argue that the homogeneity of the religious space influences the ways in which religion and church can impact the formation of attitudes. Religious pluralism denotes a familiarity with different faiths, and hence leads to an image of a civil society that understands the need to be tolerant and accommodates different denominations. Religious homogeneity also suggests the existence of one church that comprises most of the population, and, its grip on the society may be more efficient, because of its large number of followers. Religious pluralism is also conducive to inter-religious dialogue and collaboration, and hence confidants become more familiar with an active democratic civil society, a value that they need to internalize in order to become democratic citizens. Hence, the hypothesis to be tested is: in contexts of higher religious pluralism, religious belonging and participation will have a positive impact on citizens' attitudes towards democracy.

Transnational or Autocephalous Churches

The one defining characteristic of Orthodoxy in comparison to Catholic or Protestantism is its autocephalous structure – their highest structure of authority is at the country level, so each national Orthodox Church has its own patriarch. In contrast to this national structure of the Orthodox Church, Catholicism is a transnational church, having the pope as the highest leader. Protestantism is also transnational, and it includes community of believers from many countries, but lacks the transnational hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church.

Autocephaly is defined as independence and self-government, and it is "an attribute of the major Orthodox Churches." (Walters, 2002, p. 357) At its origins, the term denoted the ability of local Orthodox parishes to elect their leadership (Meyendorff, 1982). According to the same author, in Central and Eastern Europe, the rise of modern nationalism transformed the autocephalous institution into a validation mechanism for both national identity and the nation state. Especially in Romania and Bulgaria, autocephaly becomes a strong vehicle for the legitimizing of new nation states, either freed from under the domination of Ottoman rule (such as Bulgaria), or formed through the re-configuration European geography after significant conflagrations (such as the return of Transylvania to Romania at the end of the First World War). Therefore, Orthodox Churches, through their claims for autocephaly played a significant role in the history of their nation states. I argue that autocephaly is indicative of a very close connection between church and state, indeed a connection that is fashioned through the channel of nationhood.

In the case of both Catholic and Protestant churches in Central and Eastern Europe, transnationalism makes them privileged in two ways. First, it ensures more independence from the hosting state. Belonging to a transnational structure also means access to resources, without having to rely on the state. Second, especially given the democratic values extant in the Protestant faith, and even within the Catholic Church after the *Vatican II Council*, there could be a demonstration/contagion effect, through which the international "democratic" church spreads its political creeds to the church already under communism. These two features of the transnational church make it a probable supporter of democracy. Not having to rely on the state for resources distances

the church from state official policy, and creates an opportunity for opposition. This argument is strictly dependent on the idea that the higher transnational leadership is a promoter of democratization itself. Transnational Protestantism is known for playing a pro-democratic role in transitioning countries. For instance, in Taiwan, the Presbyterian Church, heavily funded by its mother structure in the United States was an efficient democratizing actor during democratic transition. Reverend Kao and the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan succeeded in pressuring the Chang Kai-Shek's regime to democratize precisely through their transnational network. The authoritarian regime did not sanction harshly the reformist Presbyterian priests because of fear of international penalties – especially the United States, an ally of Taiwan in its conflict with mainland China. In Central and Eastern Europe, both Protestantism and Catholicism are supporters of democracy at the end of the Cold War, and so transnationalism inside the church could trigger a pro-democratic effect.

Nevertheless, transnationalism exists within the Orthodox Churches too. The Russian Orthodox Church became a transnational structure by virtue of the imperial tendencies of the Soviet Union. For example, the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova are under the control of the Moscow Patriarchate. Transnational Orthodoxy had an integrative function during communism, the Russian Orthodox Church leadership becoming a partner of the Soviet state, and helping its strategy of Sovietization of the republics. The transnational effect is expected to work differently in this case than in the case of the Catholic Church. Nonetheless, the transnational effect of the Russian Orthodox Church in its former republics is not expected to be along the lines of democracy promotion, because of the strong relationship between the Russian Orthodox

Church and the non-democratic Russian regime. In other words, the transnational structure of the church influences a church's position towards democracy, according to the position held by the core of the religious leadership. The Catholic Church became a promoter of democracy in Poland through the presence and political agenda of Pope John Paul II. By the same token, the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine is expected to have a more reserved stance towards democratic values, because of the conservative anti-democratic leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church.

To further complicate the story, in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine there are also parallel Orthodox Churches. The dismantling of the Soviet Union and the newly acquired independence of former Soviet Republics required the cutting off of ties with Moscow. As discussed above, autocephaly is one way of asserting national identity, and so autocephalous Orthodox Churches appeared in the early 1990s in former Soviet Republics. Even the process of establishing autocephalous churches in these new states is further complicated by the relationship between state and church. In other words, if the government in power favors a rapprochement to Russia (such is the case with the Lukashenko regime in Belarus) then an Orthodox Autocephalous Church would not be acceptable by the government. In fact, the Belarussian Autocephalous Church is not recognized in Belarus, after many attempts to registering only existing in exile. Quite at the opposite, in Ukraine, the government favors Ukrainian independence from Russia, and so not one but two Orthodox Churches function in parallel with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev Patriarchate claims autocephaly, but its metropolitan Filaret is the former Russian-named Exarch of Ukraine. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is the third competitor for believers'

pledge, but it also has the least number of parishes. In Moldova, a conflict followed its independence, in which the Romanian Orthodox Church demanded access to the Moldovan religious space, based on the historical belonging of Moldova to Romania. Again, like in the case of Belarus, the Russofile, Moldovan government denied the Romanian Orthodox Church'a claims, who only managed to obtain recognition after a trial at the International Court on Human Rights in Strasbourg.

This discussion emphasized the need to understand and analyze autocephaly in relationship to both political structure and transnational religious structure. Because of the complex nature of autocephaly and the presence of parallel Orthodox Churches in some of the former Soviet republics, the effect of autocephaly of the Church on the formation of political attitudes will be analyzed through a more exploratory lens, rather than confirmatory.

Dominant or Minority Churches

The last contextual feature of the religious space in central and Eastern Europe is the dominant or minority position of a church. A dominant church, one that claims most of the confidants, will have a higher status in comparison with other churches, while minority churches will be disadvantaged. This higher status is expressed either through the mere numbers of believers, and hence the existence of a broader mass of people to influence, or, especially in the case of Orthodox Churches, through the support the church receives from the state. On the one hand, dominant churches can round up more confidants' support, and implement their political agenda more efficiently because of the number of their followers. On the other hand, minority churches have the potential of being more active mobilizers because of the need to defend and, if possible, improve their

status, and the fact that their demands need to be voiced louder because of their minority status.

From Context to Statistical Modeling

In this section, I argued that the relationship between church, state and society mediates and conditions the effect that religion and church has on the formation of political and economic attitudes. I proposed that context needs to be taken into consideration. Through the use of historical and sociological institutionalist frameworks of analysis, I suggested that churches are institutions in need of re-identification in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. They need to redefine their mission, interests and role in the post 1989 era. I also argued that this need for re-invention depends on the churches' historical relationship with state and society. This relationship is culturally embedded and, therefore, I attempted to capture contextual features that affect a church's willingness and ability to affect the construction of political attitudes.

The five contextual features discussed above were the levels of secularization, the relationship between church and the communist and post communist state, religious pluralism, church transnational structure and dominant position. Not only each country has a specific combination of these five factors, but also each denomination in every country. Moreover, the effect of each of these contextual factors need to be understood in a nuanced way, by paying attention to what meanings they have in any particular country and religion, and to the relationship between church and state. The effect of the contextual factors on the formation of political attitudes should be analyzed by taking into consideration their dynamic interaction. For example, Orthodox autocephaly is a process that cannot be understood without reference to the creation of the nation state and

the historical relationship between church and state. Separating these contextual features is part of an effort to take context into account and adjust it to quantitative analysis. In the context of having 14 different countries, I believe that reifying the context is mandated by the comparative scope of the research. I subscribe to a methodological approach of partial theories that stresses the applicability of a special combination of hypotheses for each country (Scharpf, 1997).

The rest of the chapter will be devoted to the explanation of the variables used in the construction of statistical models. I discuss choice of variables, levels of measurement, concern for spurious effects and hidden causal mechanisms.

Description of Variables and Processes

The models that are estimated in this research try to specify the effect that religious belonging and participation have on attitudes towards the political system. I consider appropriate the distinction between three types of political attitudes, according to their object of support. First, I consider support for the democratic system, as a measure of acceptance of procedural democracy, and also evaluations of specific governments. Second, I analyze the effect of religion on attitudes towards privatization. Third, and last, I consider the effect of religion on liberal values. The justification behind this tripartite specification is the following: while democratization in Central and Eastern Europe brings procedural democracy, market economy, and liberal values as a pre-packaged deal, there is not reason to consider attitudes to be consistent along these three dimensions. For example, a person may support democracy as an abstract form of government, while rejecting market economy, because of its nefarious effects on personal welfare. In chapter 3 I presented evidence according to which, in Central and Eastern Europe, support for

one of these dimensions does not necessarily imply consistency across the other dimensions.

The 14 countries analyzed in this research are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. The choice of country was motivated by both availability of data and the amount of variation across dependent and independent variables. This set of countries includes consolidated democracies and transitioning countries. By including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, I can also analyze countries for which transition to democracy seems to have stopped at the point of parting with the communist rule. Economic development also varies from the successful economies of Central Europe, to the less developed economies of Albania and Moldova. From a religious point of view, these countries encompass believers of Western and Eastern Christianity, and also Muslim believers. They also display different relationships between church and state, varied degrees of religious pluralism, and cases of both autocephalous and transnational churches.

The data is part of the World Value Survey data collection, from the end of the 1990s. The timing of the data gathering also support this research, because in the late 1990s, East Central Europe had already witnessed fairly different outcomes of democratic transition, from consolidation to non-communist authoritarianism. The dataset used in this research includes a set of items that measure support for all three dependent variables: procedural democracy, privatization and liberalism. On theoretical and methodological grounds, I decided to construct composite indices instead of using one single item for each variable. Democracy, market economy and liberalism are multi-

faceted concepts, impossible to capture through one item. Therefore, after a careful selection of items that could logically be included in the construction of indices, factor analysis has been used to decide the final list of components of each index. [2]

For procedural democracy, principal component analysis indicated that two different indices may be constructed. First, there are two items that measure so-called specific support, namely the rating of the political system governing the country, and overall satisfaction with the way democracy develops. While these two items do not test citizens' knowledge of democratic government, they are an overall measure of levels of acceptance of democracy as it is unfolding at one moment in time. The first index contains these two items, and was titled specific support. The second index consists of items that measure support at a more abstract informed level, expressing satisfaction with democracy as a political system, including the opposition to communism. It contains 7 items as follows: evaluations of the communist regime, opinion towards the importance of a strong leader, and the principle of army rule, the importance of a having a democratic political system, and also the opinion towards three particular traits of a democratic system (whether democracies re indecisive and have too much squabbling, whether democracies are not good at maintaining order, and whether democracies may have problems, but it is still the best form of government). Rejection of the communist regime, of army rule and strong leader governments, together with positive evaluations of the democratic system correlate highly, and this index was titled procedural democracy.

Factor analysis indicated a very clear cut between the two indices factor coefficient scores ranking almost equally for each variable composing the indices.

---

[2] For a detailed account of variables used in the construction of each index and the formula for index construction, refer to appendix A.

Initially an additional item was included, measuring the importance of having technocratic governments during transitions and consolidation, but it was subsequently dropped out of the analysis, because of its lack of correlation with any of the other items. These two indices measure evaluations of democracy in both more abstract and specific terms. For both measures, higher values represent more support for democracy. The construction of both indices – specific support and support for procedural democracy – was realized by adding each component variable with equal weights.

The attitudes towards privatization have also been grouped in one index, that comprises 4 items, all measured on a one to ten scale: attitudes towards private or state ownership of business, whether personal welfare should be state's or personal responsibility, whether economic competition is good or harmful for businesses, and whether states should offer more or less freedom to businesses. Overall these 4 items express a person's perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of the market economy system. Factor analysis has again shown that answers on these four items are correlated, and, consequently, one factor has been extracted. The privatization factor scores higher values for more support for privatization. [3]

Support for liberal values was initially conceived as tolerance towards different types of minorities. As indicated in chapter 3, even in consolidated systems, tolerance does not correlate strongly with support for democracy as an abstract principle, which is more reason to expect the same pattern in new democracies, because of shorter exposure to democracy. Initial exploratory analysis indicated no support for construction of tolerance towards minorities through a model including religious variables, and the other

[3] For a subset of countries, only three out of four items have been available in the construction of the index, and this problem was solved by constructing a factor out of the available items, and weighing the component variables by 4/3 in order to compensate for the missing values.

controls detailed in chapter 3. It is possible that different countries have different sets of problematic minorities, and so I decided to only include tolerance towards the Rroma minority. The latter forms a transnational issue in Central and Eastern Europe, and, even though the issue has different levels of saliency and urgency, it is one common problem in all the countries in the dataset.

For the independent variables the same logic of selecting variables was employed. Religious variables have been separated in distinct categories, according to what sector of religious activity they captures. While denomination itself is one of the most important variables, I also make a distinction between religiosity and religious participation. More religious people may have different attitudes towards democracy and its workings because of their religion. Or, their attitudes can be influenced as a result of them participating to church activities. Furthermore, I have included variables that measure attitudes towards secularization.

For religiosity, there are 5 items that correlated the highest through factor analysis: whether the person is a member of a denomination, a subjective measure of religiosity, incidences of prayer and meditation outside of church, and whether the person sees religion as getting more importance in the future. These five items measure the degree to which an individual is tightly connected to his or her religion, and whether religion is part of his daily life.

For religious participation, I included church attendance, measured as frequency of participation to the service, but also time spent with people from the church, membership in any religious association, and voluntary/unpaid work for religious organizations.

Finally, I also included items measuring people's perception or secularization. It is important to know how salient people think religion should be in society. If modernization theories are valid, citizens that see religion as a private matter, separate from politics, should also be more supportive of democracy. Based on factor analysis, I have constructed three indices for secularization.

The first factor (individual secularization) groups together four items asking people to identify whether the church, as a more abstract entity, offers answers to problems of morality, family, spiritual and social issues. Evidently, people that answer yes to more of these items have a more religious approach towards life in the polity, while those that respond negatively, hold more secularized beliefs. Overall, this factor represents a more individual type of secularization. The second factor refers more specifically to the relationship between religion and politics, and contains two items: whether people believe that religious leaders should influence how people vote and whether religious leaders should influence government (church secularization). This factor tackles precisely the possibility of churches becoming opinion leaders, and the thorny issue of state and church separation. Third, we constructed a factor that measures whether political figures should be religious in the new democracies. This factor (political secularization) contain two items: whether people believe that politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office, and agreement with a statement according to which it is better to have people with strong beliefs in public office. These three factors together cover the whole spectrum of secularization, from the role of religion in society, to the role of religion and church in democratic politics. All three factors have been

aligned so that lower values represent more secularization, while higher values represent support for religious politics.

The rest of the independent variables have been introduced for the purpose of controlling the effect of religious variables. Education and income are illustrations of socio economic status. In addition to these variables, I have also introduced measures of nationalism, civic engagement and political interest. The selection of these control variables have been motivated not only by methodological concerns, but also because of substantive claims on their effect, that I discussed in chapter 2.

The first category of control variables includes demographic and socio-economic status indicators, used in most studies on political attitudes. The socio-economic indicators are represented in the sample by education and income. Education, on the one hand, is included because of most other findings suggest that favorable attitudes towards democracy increase with education. More educated people have a more informed perception of the political system, they understand its working better, and it is expected for them to be more supportive of it. Also, in Central and Eastern Europe, intellectuals played an important part in the demise of communist regimes, so there is more ground to include education. The last argument for including education in the set of control variables is the fact that in some research education and religiosity and church attendance variables are correlated. The underlying observation is (Inglehart and Norris, 2004) that education also privatizes religion, and people with less education rely on the church for general information and advice, or even political clues. For income the logic is fairly similar, namely that people with higher economic status are also more supportive of the system by virtue of the system allowing them to acquire a certain level of wealth

In terms of demographic controls, it is customary to use age and gender. The rationale is that women and older people are less supportive of democracy than their younger, male and urbanite counterparts. In the Central and Eastern Europe the gender control is not significant, probably because of the egalitarian policies of 5 decades of communism, and so it was not included in the analysis. Age per se becomes relevant especially in conjunction with income; older people, mostly retired, that worked one job during communism, find themselves on shaky grounds after 1989, and form one of the most uniform category citizens that "lost" in the transition game. Moreover, some older generations, the ones that spent a fairly large portion of their life in communism, have more vivid memories of the totalitarian regime, while younger generations have been educated either at the end or after communism.

The rest of the controlling variables include political interest, civic engagement, and national identity. Political interest, such as political discussion, self declared interest or consumption of political news, affect how a person evaluates democracy. On the one hand, more information about politics exposes the individual to its defects, inefficiencies and may trigger a negative evaluation of the system. On the other hand, political interest may make people understand the difference between the democratic system, which is the only option and thus desirable, and the actual regime in power at some moment in time. To make matters more complicated, political interest should be interacted with the age variable, since forming the perception that democracy is the only option varies with a person's age, and exposure to different types of regimes.

Nationalism is mostly portrayed as harmful to democratization. Nonetheless, some authors have argued the opposite: after all most of the countries in Central and

Eastern Europe are fairly new states, and support for democracy as a political system cannot be realized without have a prior territorial sovereign entity. Therefore, I introduced a control variable that asks people how proud they are of being members of their nationality.

Although civic engagement is usually portrayed as a dependent variable measuring political involvement of democratic citizens, in this research, I argue that it can also be considered predictor of support for democracy. Being able to participate in voluntary organizations is a consequence of having a democratic system, and citizens that understand the virtues of such a system, will probably be more supportive of it. World Value Surveys include two types of items that measure civic engagement: membership in a voluntary association, and unpaid voluntary work. The former measures lower levels of engagement, because membership requires less actual involvement, while unpaid work represents higher levels of engagement. Factor analysis yielded two interesting results. First, within each category of voluntary activity, associational membership and unpaid voluntary work correlate highly. Second, out of the realm of possible such associations, two distinct factors were created. The first factor includes participation in educational, youth and sports associations, as the stereotypical civic organizations. The second factor, which correlates negatively with the first, consists of membership in political parties, labour unions, professional and women's associations. In other words, the first factor (civic engagement) represents engagement in civic associations proper, while the second factor (political engagement) represents a more politicized involvement. The negative correlation between the two is probably due to the fact that political parties and labor unions (as the items with the highest scores) do not have the same positive effects on

attitudes towards democracy because of their undemocratic internal politics, represented by demagogical discourse, corruption and bribery. Moreover, communist mandatory membership in both political parties and labor unions also affects their popularity in post 1989 Central and Eastern Europe.

Political interest is also included as a control variable, because of the assumption that more political involved people will have different attitudes towards the system. One can expect either a positive effect, assuming that people that are interested in politics are more appreciative of democracy, because they realize the system's benefic feature. On the other hand, a negative expect can also be hypothesized, since exposure to the every day dirty game of politics overemphasizes the system's failures. The political interest index contains three items: frequency of political discussion, frequency of news consumption and a subjective appreciation of interest in politics. Again, only two of these items are available for a subset of countries, and, in this case, the factor was constructed only out of these variables, after checking for consistency.

Finally, several country level independent variables have also been included in the model. I believe that evaluations of the political and economic system in one country are also dependent on its economic well-being and overall quality of democracy. In other words, a country's level of economic development and democratic evolution influences its citizens' evaluations. Therefore, I have included gdp/capita, the gini index, EU membership and Freedom House scores. GDP/capita is A classic measure of wealth, and, as mentioned in most transition to democracy literature, economic prosperity is helping democracy, or, at least, affecting its survival rate (Przeworksi et al., 2000). I also included the GINI Index (Muller, 1995b) because I believe that higher inequality also has an effect

on how people evaluate their system, especially in a region in which communism made great efforts towards an egalitarian system. EU membership is a variable that has three values, according to which a county is not a member, or it is a recent member (Romania and Bulgaria), or an older Eastern European member. The effect of EU membership is many-fold. On the one hand, the EU accession process requires the implementing of several democratizing and market economy oriented policies. Older members of the EU thus should have higher levels of democracy and privatization, and their evaluations of the system should be affected by this process of enlargement. On the other hand, these policies may render people more dissatisfied with democracy, and especially the economic system, since Poland, Hungary and Czech republic all suffered a period of economic recession after their integration. Finally, Freedom House scores are also included, because of their attempt to quantify quality and quantity of democracy in the world. The FH democratization score has been introduced here because it combines several measures of democratization: national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence and corruption.

All these independent variables are hypothesized to have an effect in support for democracy. In this section I discussed these effects, and justified the introduction of each control variable. I also offered detailed information on composite index construction. In the next chapter, I report the results of quantitative data analysis testing both the denominational and the 5 contextual hypotheses that I put forth. I examine the effects of religious variables on the formation of pro-democratic attitudes by placing them in statistical models accompanied by the above-mentioned set of control variables.

Chapter 5

Effects of Church and Religion on Support for Democracy

In this chapter I quantitatively analyze the effect of religious variables on support for democracy. This quantitative data analysis has two major goals. First, univariate analysis allows for a better understanding of the "status" of religion in 14 Central and Eastern European countries: Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Albania. I look for differences among denominations - in terms of religious identification, religiosity and religious participation in Central and Eastern Europe. According to the religious revival thesis, one should see more religious revival in Orthodox countries than in Catholic or Protestant countries, because of the delayed modernization and economic development in the former. In addition, correlations between support for democracy and overall economic and democratic development of a country helps clarify the strength of any relationship that might exist. In other words, I want to see whether higher economic and political development, at the country level, is matched by similar levels of support in the population. On the one hand, Przeworski et al. (2000) argue that the best predictor of democratic survival is the pre-existence of a democratic government. Consequently, more successful stories of democratization, such is the case in Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, should be perceived as such by enthusiastic publics. On the other hand, the political and economic reforms implemented in these countries, coupled with pressures from the European Union to implement fast reform, may have made the citizenry fairly critical of democracy. The dataset comprises countries at different levels of transition

and consolidation, and hence it is possible to explore this relationship between support for democracy and actual levels of democratic development in detail.

The second goal of this chapter is confirmatory and aims to identify whether religion does play any role, and, if so, to what extent, in predicting support for democracy, market economy and liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe. I start off by testing the "denominational" hypothesis, namely whether there are any effects of religion on attitudes towards democracy and privatization, by religious denomination. According to the Samuel Huntington, the effect of religion on support for democracy should be negative for Orthodox and Muslim believers, and positive for Catholic and Protestant believers. The civilizational lines that split Europe, in Huntington's terminology, would create these differences between pro-democratic Western Christianity, and the anti-democratic Eastern Orthodox and Muslim religions. One methodological problem is raised by the fact that the majority of Western Christian believers live in more democratic countries, while Orthodox and Muslim live in countries either still transitioning, or still non-democratic, such as Belarus. This effect is controlled by introducing country levels variables for economic and democratic development. Furthermore, I amend Huntington's denominational hypothesis by analyzing believers in Orthodox countries according to the five contextual features presented in the previous chapter: levels of secularization, religious pluralism, dominant church, transnational church and the relationship between state and church during communism.

Sacred and Secular Democrats. Religious Revival in Central and Eastern Europe

I begin this section by presenting univariate data on religious identification and religious pluralism in 14 Central and Eastern European countries. I conceptualize religious identification as a "thin" measure for religious beliefs, and so I differentiate between people that belong to a denomination, and atheists. By displaying the number of confidants per country and religion, I also indirectly test the religious competition hypothesis, according to which religious pluralism is conducive to more intense religious participation. Table 1 presents the percentages of believers per country and denomination, including secular people. Unfortunately, the World Values Surveys data does not make distinction within denomination, such as Orthodox Ukrainians belonging to different Orthodox Churches (Ukrainian, Russian, etc.), or between Roman and Greek Catholic believers. However, for the latter distinction, most Catholic confidants in Romania and Ukraine are Greek-Catholics and not Roman Catholics, according to the CIA World Factbook. Although the values for religious identification are obtained from national samples, they have been checked against other sources of information and have been found consistent.[1]

[1] The CIA World Factbook includes data on religious identification. For more detailed information, refer to https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html

Table 1. Religious identification per country percentages

Country/denomination	Catholic	Protestant	Muslim	Orthodox	None
Albania	8.8	0	58	18	12.9
Bulgaria	.2	.7	10.9	57.7	30
Belarus	6.9	0	.2	44	47.8
Czech	27.8	3.6	0	.1	66.1
Estonia	.4	13.3	.1	10.2	75.2
Hungary	39.2	14.8	0	.3	42.8
Latvia	19.6	16.9	.1	16.7	40.6
Lithuania	74.7	2.4	0	2.8	18.7
Moldova	2.6	1.2	0	94.6	0
Poland	94	.4	0	.3	4.2
Romania	7.4	2	0	84.7	2.4
Russia	.2	.3	2.9	46	49.5
Slovakia	63.9	11.3	0	.9	23.2
Ukraine	.9	2.1	.2	41	43.4

Percentages in each national samples (N=1230)

From the outset, the data shows wide variation in terms of both rates of secularization and of religious pluralism. Moldova is one case in which everybody identifies with a denomination (Orthodox), while Poland and Romania are also highly religious countries, with less than 5% of respondents declaring themselves as not belonging to any denomination. In opposition to these "sacralized" societies, 75.2% of respondents in Estonia are non-religious, and high levels of secularization are also recorded in the Czech Republic (66.1%), Russia (49.5) and Belarus (47.8). Albania, Slovakia and Lithuania show percentages of non-religious people in between 10 and 20%, placing them in between secular and sacred societies. These findings are interesting from the perspective of religious revival in Central and Eastern Europe, since they show no uniform revival of religious sentiments. The percentage of secular people varies from country to country, but not by denomination. Nor do the findings confirm a case of higher religious belonging in Orthodox Countries. Indeed, Romania and Moldova are at the highest levels of religious identification, while Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are at the

lowest, and even Bulgaria scores fairly low, with 30% non-religious people. From the point of view of religious pluralism, the data set also contains variety: Poland, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and Russia and Belarus are religiously homogenous countries, while Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia have pluralist religious systems. Even within the category of pluralist systems, there are differences between countries in which denominations enjoy fairly equal number of respondents, such as Latvia, and most other countries where the religious space is shared by one dominant religion, and a significant minority.

The highest levels of religious identification are however in religiously homogenous countries. This result is confirmed by Inglehart and Norris' analysis of secularization Central and Eastern Europe (2004). By the same token, this finding is in contradiction with supply-side theories of religious behavior that postulate higher religious identification and participation in countries in which multiple religions compete on the religious market (Finke & Iannacone, 1993). Nonetheless, even in homogenous countries, high levels of religious identification are not the norm, since Russia and its former republics Ukraine and Belarus display significant percentages of non-religious respondents. The secularizing strategy of Sovietization did not affect all former republics in the same ways. In Lithuania for instance, Russification through the Orthodox Church did not have a strong effect, since most of the population re-embraced the Catholic Church, after the fall of communism. Low levels of religious identification in the former Soviet space could be explained by the powerful effect of Soviet communism (Gautier, 1997), although Moldova displays very high levels of religious identification. Another hypothesis that was put forth relates the popularity of a church after 1989 with its anti

communist engagement before 1989 (Gautier 1998, 2003, Nielsen 1991). While Poland confirms this hypothesis, Romania and Moldova contradict it, with both countries serving as examples for collaborationist church, and yet both displaying high levels of religious revival. Finally, an explanation for low levels of religious identification in Central Europe can be described as an effect of emulating modern/secularized Western Europe (Froese, 2001), but then what could account for the wide difference in secularization levels in the Czech and Slovak Republics?

So far, it seems that religious revival in Central and Eastern Europe is a process that is not influenced by denomination. Each of the hypotheses mentioned above has partial applicability, but there is no single one that can explain variation in levels of secularization.

Therefore, I take the analysis one step further, and present levels of religiosity and religious participation per country and denomination. In so doing I attempt to see whether there is any relationship between religious identification and more involved religious variables that go beyond mere religious identification. Religiosity is a composite index that measures both subjective self-evaluations of how religious a person is, and frequency of praying and meditation. Religious participation consists of more collective and participatory acts, such as church attendance and volunteering time and work within one's church. Religiosity and religious participation taken together capture a wide range of religious acts, and includes both individual and collective beliefs and behaviors. Nonetheless, religiosity can potentially be a proxy measure for conservatism, or apathy with all social and political matters by grouping people that prefer the refuge of religion to the public arena of social life. Although both religiosity and religious participation are

related, I believe that they measure fairly different types of religious involvement, and so I keep them distinct. I want to test whether widespread religious identification is accompanied by higher religiosity and religious participation, or whether religious identification is merely a symbolic label that discourages manifestations of social undesirability. The collapse of communism brought religion back in the public realm, and not identifying with any faith could be considered socially undesirable. Table 2 shows the average scores and their standard deviations for the religiosity composite index, per country and denomination. The results need to be interpreted with a fair amount of caution given the small differences in means. However, even if these differences are small, higher religiosity and church attendance in one country or within one denomination suggest the significance of these differences.

Table 2. Levels of religiosity

Country/denomination	Catholic	Protestant	Muslim	Orthodox
Albania	10.96 2.63(108)		9.28 3.38(616)	8.78 3.19(219)
Bulgaria			8.41 3.56(130)	7.06 3.48(691)
Belarus	9.18 2.85(85)			8.33 3.14(526)
Czech	8.35 3.45(332)	8.13 3.55(43)		
Estonia		8.83 3.38(161)		7.58 3.17(120)
Hungary	8.67 3.64(481)	8.76 3.54(180)		
Latvia	8.99 3.18(242)	7.93 3.21(207)		7.82 3.02(205)
Lithuania	8.71 3.20(884)			
Moldova				10.24 2.66(1045)
Poland	11.00 2.27(1138)			
Romania	10.13 3.18(89)			10.76 2.80(1035)
Russia				8.36 3.35(549)
Slovakia	10.20 3.01(775)	8.44 3.40(135)		
Ukraine	11.42 1.91(92)			9.55 3.05(483)

Religiosity is presented per country and denomination. The numbers in each cell represent average national sample value, standard deviation and the number of respondents in each case. The religiosity index takes values between 0 and 12. (N=1230)

First, the results suggest a slightly lower level of religiosity for Protestant believers in all the countries. This is consistent with the more privatized structure of Protestant churches in Europe, and their "secularized" structure. In contrast to their American counterparts, protestant churches in Western Europe are more liberal and dissociate themselves from the public sphere of social and political life (Casanova, 1994). Religiosity within the category Orthodox confidants is also lower than their Catholic counterparts, but only in countries in which there are high levels of secularization, or in which the Orthodox Church is not dominant. It is probable that Catholic Church discipline and hierarchical structure explains its strong positive effect on both religiosity

and church attendance. Overall, the findings in Table 1 reappear in Table 2, with Poland, Romania and Moldova, again having the highest level of religiosity. Additionally, Catholic believers in Slovakia and Romania are also more religious overall than their counterparts in Hungary or Lithuania. I argue that, religious spaces with one dominant church create a more religious flock, irrespective of religion. In such contexts, high rates of religious identification are accompanied by more individual religiosity, not only for the dominant church, but also for its minority competitors. Levels of religiosity vary more by country, than by denomination, which is the first sign that contextual variables, such as the historical relationship between church, state and society are more important in explaining religion, than transnational religious doctrine per se.

Table 3 exhibits levels of religious participation by country and denomination. The results are consistent with the previous image depicted in Tables 1 and 2. Most Catholics in Poland are church going, followed closely by Catholics in Slovakia, Romania and Ukraine, while in Hungary and Czech Republic, there is less church participation. In Poland and Slovakia the Catholic Church is dominant, but in Romania and Ukraine it has a minority status – findings that raise issues regarding the transnational effect of the Catholic Church. It is obvious that the role played by the Catholic Church in Poland in opposing communism, especially through the symbolic figure of Pope John Paul the econd had made the church more popular, but, transnationally, it did not affect Catholic believers elsewhere similarly. The lack of strong Catholic dissidence in Hungary proves this point. In Romania and Ukraine, higher Catholic participation rates are probably affected by the historical rivalry between the Greek-Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches. One could also add the more recent patrimonial conflict over

religious property that is ongoing in both Romania and Ukraine between the two churches. Hence, high levels of religious participation in these two countries may indicate a mobilization effect on the part of the Greek-Catholic Church. Unfortunately World Value Surveys do not differentiate between Roman and Greek Catholic believers in Romania and Ukraine.

Table 3. Levels of church attendance per country

Country/denomination	Catholic	Protestant	Muslim	Orthodox
Albania	4.60 1.72(108)		3.18 2.32(713)	3.78 1.80(221)
Bulgaria			2.50 2.00(134)	3.19 2.03(710)
Belarus	4.28 1.76(85)			3.16 1.80(541)
Czech	3.18 2.30(340)	3.06 2.42(44)		
Estonia		4.04 1.65(165)		3.39 1.74(126)
Hungary	3.05 2.23(482)	2.59 2.20(182)		
Latvia	3.18 1.98(244)	2.54 1.77(210)		2.95 1.88(208)
Lithuania	3.86 1.72(935)			
Moldova				3.78 1.68(1080)
Poland	5.26 1.50(1153)			
Romania	4.68 2.09(91)			4.14 1.68(1039)
Russia				2.59 1.96(564)
Slovakia	4.87 2.12(783)	3.86 2.22(138)		
Ukraine	4.68 1.26(96)			3.52 1.62(500)

Church attendance is presented per country and denomination. The numbers in each cell represent average national sample value, standard deviation and the number of respondents in each case. The church attendance index takes values between 0 and 6. (N=1230)

Protestant believers have some of the lowest rates of church attendance, while Orthodox believers can score fairly high values in Romania or Moldova, or very low values in Russia or Latvia. Overall, the Catholic Church seems to be the most effective in preserving the religious sentiment and propagate high rates of religious involvement,

while the Orthodox Church seems to be more efficient on the religiosity dimension. The three most religious countries in our data set, in terms of both religiosity and religious participation are Poland, Romania and Moldova. There are three structural commonalities shared by these three countries: the existence of a quasi-homogenous religious space coupled with a strong dominant church and high levels of religious identification. Therefore, I suggest that religious revival in Central and Eastern Europe is more a function of the relationship between church and state, and the historical role played by religion, rather than a denominational effect. The premise for analyzing the effect of religion and church on support for democracy needs to be grounded in a contextualized understanding of the interaction between religion and society, and between church and state. I am not arguing that religious doctrine is not important; instead, I propose that church ideology and its effect on mass values are embedded in historical context.

I now turn to the analysis of democratization and economic development. Table 4 summarizes the averages and standard deviation values for all 14 countries along three variables: support for procedural democracy, specific support and support for privatization. Support for procedural democracy measures evaluations of the democratic system in more abstract terms. It includes both rejection of authoritarian forms of politics, and acceptance of the rules of the game in a democracy. Specific support measures mostly acceptance of the government in power, and its "democratic" quality. Support for privatization captures evaluations of private property restitution and creation, and also evaluations of the principles of market economy and free economic initiative. The fourth dependent variable – societal tolerance to the Roma minority - has not been included here because of its dichotomous nature.

Table 4. Averages values per dependent variable

Country/support for democracy	Procedural democracy Min 0 – Max 27	Specific support Min 0 – Max 12	Support for privatization Min 0 – Max 36
Albania	20.16 4.22 (1149)	4.77 2.92 (1202)	22.46 6.59 (1153)
Bulgaria	17.46 5.46 (920)	4.78 2.78 (1087)	21.66 8.69 (1054)
Belarus	16.11 4.85 (911)	4.42 2.96 (920)	20.80 7.71 (1119)
Czech	18.99 4.26 (1170)	4.55 2.96 (920)	20.80 7.71 (1119)
Estonia	17.60 4.00 (1014)	4.96 2.15 (1074)	17.67 7.23 (1147)
Hungary	16.45 3.92 (1050)	4.22 2.26 (1152)	17.92 7.68 (1102)
Latvia	16.61 3.91 (1080)	4.58 2.06 (1118)	16.88 6.48 (1138)
Lithuania	15.68 4.72 (891)	3.18 2.42 (1000)	21.25 7.66 (1076)
Moldova	15.88 3.99 (929)	4.18 2.77 (1052)	16.95 6.25 (1121)
Poland	16.09 4.61 (1094)	4.39 2.34 (1082)	17.81 7.48 (1179)
Romania	15.43 5.69 (1037)	3.61 2.69 (1125)	21.70 8.86 (1114)
Russia	13.46 4.99 (998)	2.16 2.00 (1087)	18.07 7.80 (1143)
Slovak	16.55 4.94 (1108)	3.80 2.31 (1145)	17.33 7.00 (1096)
Ukraine	15.55 4.95 (928)	3.20 2.33 (1048)	18.96 9.10 (1118)

Mean values for 3 dependent variables per country. The numbers in each cell represent average national sample value, standard deviation and the number of respondents in each case. (N=1230)

On the one hand, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland display high levels of support for procedural democracy (these countries forming the core of Central European consolidated democracies). On he other hand, Bulgaria and Albania have even higher rates, and Belarus the least democratic country in the dataset (at least by Freedom House scores) is at the same level with Poland. These findings need to be taken with a grain of salt since the measures of democratic support that I am using are different than

Freedom House's operationalization of democracy.[2] Consequently, one can observe inconsistencies between these measures, because of different operationalizations and measurements of democracy. Additionally, because the dataset comprises different national samples, the comparison between means needs to be understood with caution.

The same distribution of support by country is observed in the case of specific support. The consistency of results between levels of support for procedural democracy and specific support is encouraging from a methodological point of view. These findings do not argue in favor of a denominational hypothesis, because, if the latter was true, lower levels of support for democracy should have been recorded in Orthodox and Muslim countries. Instead, Albania is consistently the one country that exhibits the highest levels of support for democracy.

The third variable - support for privatization - shows a slightly different pattern, with Albania, Bulgaria and Romania at the forefront of the list of supporters, and Moldova and Slovakia at the bottom. I suggest that one potential cause for this distribution of support for privatization can be due to the salience of privatization at the time of the survey in different countries. The transition to a market economy had already finalized in most Central European countries, while in Romania and Bulgaria it is still on the agenda. Once privatization is completed and the market economy is a functioning concept for a number of years, like in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, support for privatization may decline as a consequence of losing its applicability.

The findings in Table 4 suggest that support for democracy and privatization at individual level are not matched by country level indicators of political and economic development. Therefore, Table 5 shows country level values for GDP/capita, Freedom

[2] For more detailed information on index construction refer to appendix A

House democratization scores, and the two general indexes of religious regulation and favoritism scores (GRI and GFI). Gross domestic product /capita (GDP) and Freedom House democratization scores (FHD) are widely used measures of economic development and democratization, respectively. Higher GDP/capita denotes the overall economic development of a country, while FHD is the general democratization score created by Freedom House. A Higher FHD score represents lower democratic development (footnote on the construction of FHD). I have also included country level indicators for religious regulation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, GRI and GFI measure the position that a state has towards religion and church. Grimm and Finke (2006) constructed these indicators in order to assess how much state regulation there is in a country and also how much funding and favoritism of religion exists. The general regulation of religion index (GRI) measures overall involvement of state in regulating religious matters, including laws restricting access of new religions to the national religious market. The general funding of religion index (GFI) measures the amount of state funding to religion (clergy salaries, religious education). The measure receives higher values especially in cases of disproportionate funding of one privileged church – which renders the usefulness of this indicator fairly vague. Higher values for both GFI and GRI are indicative of a stronger relationship between church and state, in which the state intervenes in religious matters, either through regulating their institutional status, or delineating a cumbersome procedure for state recognition of new churches and religious organizations. In the case of the Orthodox Church, both indicators also suggest its status of privilege in comparison to the other players in the religious arena.

Table 5. Country level indices

Country level indicators	GDP/capita	FHD	GRI	GFI
Albania	5600	3.79	0	1
Bulgaria	10400	2.93	6.10	7.50
Belarus	7800	6.71	6.10	7.50
Czech	21600	2.25	0	7.30
Estonia	19600	1.96	0	1
Hungary	17300	2	1.40	6.80
Latvia	15400	2.07	3.90	6.20
Lithuania	15100	2.21	2.20	6.20
Moldova	2000	4.96	3.10	6.70
Poland	14100	2.14	0	3
Romania	8800	3.39	4.70	6
Russia	12100	5.75	4.70	3
Slovakia	17700	1.96	1.40	5.50
Ukraine	7600	4.21	6.40	5.20

GDP/capita are taken from World Bank. Freedom House Democratization scores (FHD) are taken from the Freedom House Website. The two general indexed for religious regulation and religious funding (GRI and GFI) are taken from the Association of Religion Data Archive. Refer to Appendix A for more information. (N=1230)

The first hypothesis dealt with an association between GDP and FHD on the one hand, and support for procedural democracy, on the other. The rationale behind this expectation is the following: since procedural democracy is an evaluation of democracy in principle, I assumed that more consolidated democracies should display higher levels of support for procedural democracy (even if only because of the citizenry understanding the political game and already having had experience with its ups and downs). The second hypothesis was in countries with dominant Orthodox churches to have higher scores of both GRI and GFI based on the historically closer relationship between church and state, and on the traditional state funding of religion.

According to economic development and Freedom House democratization scores, Central European countries have the highest levels for both, with the Czech Republic leading in economic development (21600) and Estonia and Slovakia being categorized as the most democratic (1.96). All Central European countries have a GDP higher than

10000, and a FHD score around a value of 2, but not higher than 2.25 (Czech Republic). Romania and Bulgaria rank immediately after them in terms of FHD score (3.39 and 2.93 respectively) while Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus have Freedom House scores ranging between 4.21 for Ukraine to 6.71 for Belarus. Their respective GDP/capita values are also lower, with the exception of Russia.

So far, the results depict a mixed image of Central and Eastern Europe. While most Central European countries are more developed economically and are considered consolidated democracies, they are not matched by high levels of support for democracy. Indeed, Belarus shows very high levels of support for both procedural democracy and specific support, while being the least democratic and also in the lower tier of countries in terms of economic development. Albania is another interesting case, since it exhibits the highest levels of support for democracy, but has a poor economic and democratic record. There are some significant differences between Romania and Bulgaria, in the sense that democracy seems to be more advanced in the latter, although the two countries are usually analyzed together and perceived at equal levels of development (at least in the European Union integration process).

The lack of solid overlap between people's support for democracy and privatization and country levels of economic and democratic development has several explanations. First, initial enthusiasm with democracy in consolidated countries can decrease due to economic hardships (Przeworski, 1991). Second, high levels of support for democracy in countries that are less democratic denotes both knowledge of and attachment to democratic values, in a context of transition from one form of

authoritarianism to another.[3] Indeed, since some authors explain the breakdown of communist regimes through contagion and demonstration effects (Ekiert, 1996), one can hypothesize that Albanian citizens are aware of democratizing countries around them, and their political systems.

The two columns at the right of Table 5 show the values for the two religious indexes. In most countries in which there is dominant Orthodox Church there are higher levels of regulation and funding of religion. One explanation for this result is the protectionist stance that most post communist governments took towards their respective Orthodox Churches. Most dominant Orthodox countries have passed laws that either recognize the Orthodox Church as a privileged actor, or limit the access of other religions to the national religious space. The same stands true for the favoritism index – dominant Orthodox Churches involving higher levels of funding of religion. There are several reasons for this denominational distribution of GRI and GFI. First, Orthodox Churches have been traditionally financed by their states. Second, Catholic and Protestant churches are traditionally more separate from the state, not in the least because of their transnational structure. Third, it is possible that Central European countries have become more secularized during their EU integration process – as data on religious identification levels shows.

Summarizing the findings of the univariate analysis, two points need to be made. First, religious identification, religiosity and church participation rates in the 14 countries are not distributed along denominational lines. Instead, different interactions between church and state, and different roles of religion in society, seem to explain differences between levels of religious revival. History also plays a part in explaining these

[3] Belarus and Albania are appropriate examples in this category.

differences, as both the relationship between church and state and the role of religion in society are embedded in the national historical context of each country. Second, support for democratic principles of government is in all 14 countries is fairly high, irrespective of or against the actual level of democratic and economic development of a country. This result suggests mechanisms of contagion and demonstration at play in Central and Eastern Europe, through which even citizens of authoritarian regimes display not only a preference for democracy, but also an understanding of its basic principles.

I now turn to testing alternative hypotheses regarding the role that religion and church play on the construction of economic and political attitudes. The next section will start with the testing of the denominational hypothesis, and will move along into more contextual interpretations of how religion and church affect attitudes.

Confidants and Citizens – The Effects of Religion on the Formation of Political Attitudes

First, I ran linear regression models in which the only independent variable is denomination, and I compare believers with non-believers in each country. In this way, I test Huntington's denominational hypothesis, and compare support for democracy, privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority, between religious and non-religious respondents. If Huntington were right, one should notice lower support for democracy in the case of Orthodox and Muslim confidants, and higher support in the case of Protestants, Catholics or secular people.

Table 6. Effect of denomination on support for procedural democracy and privatization, specific support and levels of tolerance towards the Rroma minority.

Country and Denomination	Procedural democracy	Specific Support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Albania Muslim	1.026* (.523)	.741* (.359)	2.576** (.836)	Na
Albania Catholic	.651 (.427)	-.077 (.292)	.966 (.668)	Na
Bulgaria Orthodox	.090 (.395)	.339 (.187) *(.07)*	-1.165* (.583)	.109*** (.031)
Bulgaria Muslim	.508 (.684)	-.281 (.302)	-1.846 (1.009) *(.068)*	.114* (.050)
Belarus Orthodox	.254 (.333)	.803*** (.201)	-.814 (.479) *(.089)*	.007 (.030)
Belarus Catholic	-.600 (.670)	1.272*** (.387)	-1.999* (.939)	-.047 (.058)
Czech Republic Catholic	-.096 (.281)	.120 (.142)	-.374 (.473)	-.033 (.031)
Czech Republic Protestant	.174 (.677)	-.063 (.340)	-.932 (1.172)	-.092 (.076)
Estonia Protestant	.799* (.374)	.000 (.191)	-.121 (.646)	-.033 (.042)
Estonia Orthodox	-2.160*** (.411)	-1.125*** (.214)	-3.013*** (.723)	-.012 (.048)
Hungary Protestant	-.247 (.357)	.554** (.195)	-.064 (.692)	Na
Hungary Catholic	-.372 (.264)	.626*** (.144)	.243 (.505)	Na
Latvia Protestant	1.007** (.334)	.237 (.173)	-1.314* (.541)	.057 (.036)
Latvia Catholic	-.096 (.321)	-.042 (.167)	-.946 (.515) *(.066)*	.086* (.034)
Latvia Orthodox	-.045 (.334)	-.041 (.177)	-.299 (.546)	-.040 (.036)
Lithuania Catholic	.059 (.360)	.274 (.174)	.341 (.531)	.175*** (.031)
Moldova Orthodox	1.936*** (.374)	-.536* (.253)	1.246* (.561)	-.004 (.035)
Poland Catholic	-.706 (.581)	-.145 (.301)	-4.838*** (.897)	.083 (.059)
Romania Catholic	1.193 (.917)	.146 (.410)	2.891* (1.347)	.092 (.073)
Romania Orthodox	-1.474* (.647)	-.330 (.298)	.309 (.961)	.180*** (.053)
Russia Orthodox	-.513 (.316) *(.105)*	.053 (.122)	-1.466** (.461)	.040 (.029)
Slovakia Catholic	-.148 (.349)	.281 (.162) *(.083)*	-1.299** (.500)	.023 (.028)
Slovakia Protestant	-.399 (.538)	.058 (.247)	-1.506* (.762)	.006 (.043)
Ukraine Orthodox	-.331 (.341)	-.144 (.150)	-1.438* (.571)	.063* (.030)
Ukraine Greek-Catholic	2.690*** (.585)	.826** (.283)	2.016* (1.014)	.049 (.055)

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1)(Each country sample N=1230).*** significant at .001 **significant at .05* significant

According to the data presented in Table 6, within the group of Central European countries, the effect of religious denomination is fairly weak. For instance in Czech Republic, Catholic and Protestant believers are in no way different than non-religious people in support for any of the dependent variables. In Hungary on the other hand, both Protestant and Catholic believers show higher rates of specific support than non-religious people. In Poland, there is no effect of religion on political attitudes, but Catholics are strongly opposed to privatization, when compared to their secular counterparts, and Slovaks show the same pattern, with both Protestant and Catholic believers being less supportive of privatization, than non-religious people. When moving on to countries further East, to Estonia and Latvia (countries with a minority of Orthodox believers), there is no denominational effect. In Estonia, being an Orthodox believer makes one less supportive of democracy and privatization than secular respondents. In Latvia, Orthodox confidants are no different than non-religious people, while Protestants are more supportive of procedural democracy, and less supportive of privatization.

Bulgaria and Albania are the only two countries that have a significant number of Muslim believers, and the ways in which Muslim religion affects support for democracy differs from one country to the other. In Bulgaria, Muslim confidants are no different than non-religious people in their support for democracy, but they are more opposed to privatization. In contrast, in Albania, Muslim believers are more supportive of democracy and privatization. Finally, in countries with a dominant Orthodox Church, the picture becomes is more mixed. In Bulgaria, there is no difference between Orthodox believers and secular respondents, but in Moldova, Orthodox confidants are strongly more supportive of procedural democracy and in favor of privatization, but also offer less

specific support. In Russia and Ukraine, Orthodox believers are less supportive of privatization, but in Belarus, both Catholic and Orthodox believers are more supportive of their regime, while being less supportive of privatization. From the point of view of tolerance, the effects are much less significant, with overall more religious people being less tolerant than secular people. Such is the case with Orthodox people in Romania and Bulgaria, or Catholic people in Lithuania.

This preliminary data analysis disconfirms any denominational effect on the formation of political and economic attitudes. While in Romania, Orthodox believers are less supportive of procedural democracy, in Moldova and Belarus they are more supportive. While in Hungary, Catholics and Protestants are more supportive than secular people of their regime, in Poland Catholic believers are very much against privatization. The same rejection of privatization is expressed by Catholics and Protestants alike in Slovakia, while Catholic believers in Ukraine are more in favor of privatization.

In those instances in which denomination affects the formation of attitudes, I found a significant amount of variation within each denomination. Consequently, I proceed further to analyze how the relationship between church and state affects the formation of attitudes. Therefore, I analyze the effect of religiosity and religious participation by transnational denominational groups - Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Orthodox believers. In so doing I explore whether the mechanisms of attitude formation are similar within different faiths. Since no consistent denominational effect between confidants of a certain religion and secular people was found, I test whether within the groups of religious people, individual religiosity and religious participation influence the formation of attitudes along similar lines. The subsets of respondents include believers

that identify with a particular faith across countries, although, geography also plays its part, with most Catholic and Protestant believers living in Central Europe, and Orthodox and Muslim believers living in Eastern Europe. I use OLS regression to construct models predicting attitude formation within each denomination. The results are in Tables 7 through 10 – each table depicts 4 models (1 for each denomination) for every dependent variables – procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance of the Rroma minority.

The independent variables are both at individual level and country level. I include measures of religiosity, church attendance and secularization, at the individual level of religious belonging. Feeling of individual religiosity and religious participation behavior are complemented by three indexes of secularization which measure what role religion should have in society, in politics and in their life for all our respondents. The introduction of these measures of secularization has a twofold motivation. First, I want to see whether more religious people also score consistently higher on measures of secularization, hence ensuring a validity check between different independent variables. Second, when I refine the analysis and only consider people that are non-religious, the presence of these three secularization measures will show to what extent atheists are still influenced by the presence of religion in their society.

The set of control variables includes age, education and income as demographic and socio economic indicators. At the individual level, I have also introduced political interest and involvement in civic and political associations. A measure of national identity was also included, in order to see whether there are any constructions of nationhood along denominational lines (Burgess 1997), and to test the effect of pride in

one's nation and support for democracy. At country level, besides the GDP/capita and FHD score, there are Gini index (to test the effect of social inequality on support for democracy and especially privatization), and the position of a country vis-à-vis European Union structures (with the assumption that EU members would be more supportive of democracy than non-members, with candidate countries somewhere in between). The two general indexes of religious regulation and funding have also been included. Tables 7 through 10 compare the effect of religiosity and church attendance on support for democracy and the market cross-country within denominational groups.

As a common pattern, socio economic indicators are significant across denominations and dependent variables. In most cases, more educated and more well off people are also more supportive of procedural democracy, government performance, and privatization. Country level indicators for economic and democratic development are also significant in most of the models, with higher GDP and lower FHD scores being correlated with higher support for democracy and privatization. These results are important for at least two reasons. First, they are in line with most of the literature on determinants of political and economic attitudes, according to which better educated and more well off people understand the democratic game better, and are able to appreciate more exactly by understanding its weaknesses. Higher income also brings appreciation of the regime that allowed for this higher financial status to be attained. Second, the significant effect of education and income in the direction specified in the hypotheses supports the validity of our findings. Besides the interdenominational effect of education, income and country level democratization indicators, I now discuss in more detail the effect of religious variables on the formation of attitudes, within each denomination.

Table 7 displays support for procedural democracy for the four religious groups.

Table 7. Support for procedural democracy for believers by denomination

	Catholics	Protestants	Muslim	Orthodox
Age	-.095 (.085)	.034 (.168)	.333 (.192) (*.082*)	.418*** (.088)
Education	1.130*** (.093)	.819*** (.177)	.483** (.169)	.959*** (.095)
Income	.210*** (.039)	.195* (.079)	.144 (.081) (*.076*)	.216*** (.034)
Religiosity	.074* (.037)	.045 (.064)	-.211** (.063)	-.145*** (.033)
Church attendance	.102 (.052) (*.052*)	.136 (.096)	-.040 (.086)	.156** (.052)
National identity	.181 (.107) (*.093*)	-.036 (.220)	.033 (.281)	-.194* (.096)
Gini	.168*** (.043)	.368*** (.101)	.665 (1.527)	-.350*** (.029)
Gdp	.001*** (.000)	.001*** (.000)	Na	.001*** (.000)
FHD	-2.171*** (.328)	-5.816** (1.727)	-3.323 (4.277)	-1.273*** (.181)
EU	-6.386*** (.690)	-10.155*** (2.612)	-12.394 (16.940)	-5.909*** (.726)
Political interest	.204*** (.039)	.365*** (.084)	-.197** (.073)	.220*** (.041)
Individual secularization	.001 (.001)	.002 (.001)	.002 (.001) (*.095*)	.0001 (.001)
Church secularization	.007** (.002)	-.006 (.006)	-.013* (.005)	-.003 (.003)
Government secularization	-.006*** (.002)	-.002 (.004)	.008* (.004)	.000 (.002)
Civic engagement	-.019 (.451)	.322 (.798)	.939 (.621)	.139 (.467)
Political engagement	-.690 (.510)	-.744 (.907)	.909 (.607)	.774 (.473)
GRI	-.132 (.113)	-.221 (.2840	-3.918 (5.312)	-1.386*** (.129)
GFI	.067 (.119)	.563** (.190)	4.210 (5.8420	1.275*** (.153)
R^2	.150	.175	.177	.206
N	3131	613	706	3352

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

Among the control variables, political interest is a significant predictor of support for democracy, with more interested Catholic, Protestants, and Orthodox believers being more supportive of democracy. This is consistent with explanations of support based on

political interest and information that leads to a better understanding of the democratic system. Civic and political engagement do not affect support for procedural democracy, which is not a surprising result given the overall low rates of civic engagement in East Central Europe.

The religious variables have different effects according to religion, as shown in Table 7. More religious Catholic believers are also more supportive of procedural democracy than symbolic believers (those that only identify with a denomination without being more religious or participatory). In contrast, more religious Muslim and Orthodox believers are less supportive of democracy. Church attendance is a significant variable only in the case of Orthodox believers suggesting a possible positive effect of the Orthodox Church in the formation of political attitudes. The Orthodox believers also form the only group within which national identity is significant and negatively correlated with procedural democracy. The government regulation and favoritism of religion indexes are mostly insignificant, except again for the case of Orthodox believers, for which they are not only highly significant but also fairly large compared to the rest of the coefficients. Among Orthodox believers, less regulation of religion but also more funding of religion attracts more support for procedural democracy. This effect appears to be significant for all denominational groups. The opposite directions in which GRI and GFI affect support for democracy are puzzling. On the one hand, the correlation between less state intervention in religious matters and higher support for democracy suggests a move forwards towards modernization and privatization of religion. On the other hand, the association between more religious funding and more support for democracy, suggests a preference of the citizenry for a closer relationship between church and state.

In other words, I argue that citizens of East Central Europe would like to see religious pluralism and a church that is not controlled by the regime, which is understandable since such a structure would trigger memories of communism. Additionally, they may also go a step further and support a state that, through funding, consecrates the privileged status of religion in society. One also has to note that the effects within the groups of Protestant and Catholic believers may be triggered by the few values of GRI and GFI and their interesting distributions (for instance Czech Republic with 0 GRI and 7.3 GFI). Nonetheless, countries with a dominant Orthodox Church exhibit much higher values for both GRI and GFI, suggesting the strong relationship between church and state. Overall, this table shows that while socioeconomic indicators matters at individual and country levels, religion is a salient feature of political life in countries where there are mostly Orthodox believers.

When predicting levels of specific support, the models have less explanatory power, compared to procedural democracy, but the roles played by the independent variables are similar to the preceding cases, as shown in Table 8. Specific support is not explained by education, but the effect of income persists. It is evident that more educated people may not agree with their governments, and, in fact, intellectuals are known for being critical. The disappearance of the effect of education from procedural to specific support shows the two different meanings that people attach to procedural and specific support respectively. The effect of income suggests that well-off people support the system more – consistent with an individualistic rational choice approach to evaluating a political regime. Interestingly, national identity becomes highly significant across

denominations, indicating a positive relationship between pride in one's nation and support for the government, whether democratic or not.

Table 8. Specific support for believers by denomination

	Catholic	Protestant	Muslim	Orthodox
Age	.070 (.046)	.090 (.087)	-.192 (.116)	.017 (.048)
Education	.078 (.050)	.053 (.093)	.181 (.103) (*.079*)	-.016 (.052)
Income	.109*** (.021)	.097* (.042)	.073 (.049)	.067*** (.019)
Religiosity	-.003 (.019)	.049 (.033)	-.197*** (.039)	-.021 (.018)
Church attendance	.033 (.027)	.022 (.049)	.156** (.052)	.038 (.028)
National identity	.488*** (.055)	.592*** (.114)	.426* (.167)	.585*** (.053)
Gini	.081*** (.023)	.284*** (.054)	.075 (.171)	-.114*** (.016)
Gdp	.0001** (.000)	-2.5e-005 (.000)	Na	.001*** (.000)
FHD	-.178 (.174)	-2.868** (.923)	-1.450 (1.397)	-.756*** (.100)
EU	-1.465*** (.367)	-3.671** (1.378)	-.763 (4.240)	-4.100*** (.405)
Political interest	-.008 (.021)	.052 (.042)	-.117** (.044)	-.055* (.022)
Individual secularization	.002*** (.000)	.001 (.001)	.002 (.001) (*.077*)	.001 (.000)
Church secularization	.004** (.001)	.007* (.003)	.004 (.003)	-.003 (.001) (*.085*)
Government secularization	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.002)	.004 (.002)	.0001 (.001)
Civic engagement	.321 (.238)	.982* (.430)	.031 (.390)	.111 (.263)
Political engagement	-.027 (.274)	-.967 (.498) (*.053*)	.270 (.381)	-.173 (.265)
GRI	-.125* (.059)	-.525 (.146)	Na	-.907*** (.072)
GFI	.118 (.062) (*.055*)	.314 (.102)	-.139 (.428)	1.220*** (.085)
R^2	.064	.137	.101	.117
N	3255	670	764	3629

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

I do not propose any final explanation for this finding, but the fact that most East Central European countries are new states may give more leverage to the national identity question – in order to support democracy, one needs to first belong to a nation-state. Overall, country level indicators of democratization also show that respondents in more democratic countries are more satisfied with the functioning of their democracy.

One other puzzling effect is observed within the group of Muslim believers, where religiosity is negatively associated with support, while the effect of church attendance is positive. I interpret this finding as the potentially positive effect of participation in the church as an arena for socialization, in which confidants learn the virtues of democracy and become more supportive. Similar effects will be observed within the category of Orthodox believers, hence suggesting that even Muslim or Orthodox churches can be arenas for the cultivation of support for democracy. This effect however can also be a mere mirroring of a mobilization effect, in which the leadership of the church is recruiting people into supporting a specific government, without any real concern for democratic values.

Table 9. Support for privatization for believers by denomination

	Catholic	Protestant	Muslim	Orthodox
Age	.220 (.138)	.825** (.282)	.052 (.295)	.607*** (.133)
Education	1.062*** (.152)	1.058*** (.298)	.614* (.258)	1.041*** (.145)
Income	.525*** (.063)	.289* (.135)	.318* (.124)	.537*** (.053)
Religiosity	-.046 (.058)	-.057 (.108)	-.180 (.097) (*.062*)	-.233*** (.051)
Church attendance	.034 (.084)	.194 (.162)	-.078 (.132)	.186* (.078)
National identity	-.286 (.170) (*.093*)	.767* (.366)	1.017* (.419)	-.152 (.146)
Gini	.321 .070 ***	-.039 .173	-2.027 1.609	-.498 .045
Gdp	-2.9e-005 (.000)	-9.3e-005 (.000)	Na	.0001 (.000)
FHD	-1.924*** (.520)	-1.538 (2.907)	6.582 (5.481)	.775** (.279)
EU	-5.594*** (1.129)	-1.077 (4.299)	18.639 (20.666)	2.825* (1.135)
Political interest	.107 (.064) (*.095*)	.203 (.139)	-.126 (.110)	.299*** (.062)
Individual secularization	.002 (.001)	-.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)	.0001 (.001)
Church secularization	-.002 (.004)	-.027** (.009)	-.018* (.008)	-.002 (.004)
Government secularization	-.007** (.003)	.003 (.006)	.0001 (.005)	.0001 (.003)
Civic engagement	.422 (.736)	-.143 (1.366)	1.791 (.957) (*.062*)	.029 (.732)
Political engagement	-.225 (.849)	-2.442 (1.636)	-.974 (.938)	.460 (.733)
GRI	-.903*** (.180)	-.516 (.475)	4.015 (5.217)	.551** (.201)
GFI	1.187*** (.188)	.229 (.326)	-4.207 (6.126)	-.576* (.238)
R^2	.097	.109	.092	.165
N	3322	645	728	3766

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

In the case of privatization, the country level indicators of democratization lose some of their significance, but are consistent with the previous findings, as shown in Table 9. Within the group of Orthodox believers, less democratic countries have higher support for privatization. As mentioned above, this may be the effect of decreasing

saliency of privatization in consolidated democracies. The Orthodox believers also display reversed effects in terms of the influence of GRI and GFI on the dependent variables. While Catholic believers are more supportive of privatization in countries in which there is less regulation and more funding (as in the previous case of procedural democracy), Orthodox believers support privatization more if there is more regulation and less funding. This effect can be explained through the influence of the Orthodox Church on the religious property restitution process, taking place in most countries that have a dominant Orthodox Church. For example, in Romania, the Orthodox Church maintains illegal ownership of Greek-Catholic Church property, without the state trying to enforce the retrocession of property to the latter. In countries with a dominant Orthodox Church, there is widespread religious conflict between Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches, originating to the beginning of communism when the former was granted privileged status and the latter was most of the time outlawed. Accordingly, religiosity and church attendance play a role in the formation of attitudes only within the group of Orthodox believers. More religious Orthodox believers are against privatization, but churchgoers are more in favor of privatization. This apparently counterintuitive result can be explained by the positive effect that going to church can have on supporting privatization. In the late 1990s Orthodox Churches become more vocal on issues of religious property restitution, which is part and parcel of the wider processes of reconstructing property rights and privatization.

The models predicting tolerance of the Rroma minority seem to be almost exclusively explained by country level variables, as Table 10 shows. The effect of religious variables is limited to Catholic believers, for whom religiosity and church are

significant. More religious Catholics are more tolerant than less religious believers, while churchgoers are less tolerant than non-churchgoers. Participating in church activities may make one less accepting of the Rroma group because of their pagan origins, and also their "embarrassing" influence in society. The country level measures of democracy are important predictors, with more democratic countries or countries members of the EU being less tolerant, across Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox. Additionally, richer countries show less acceptance of the Rroma minority.

Taken together, the models presented in Tables 7 through 10 suggest that Orthodox believers are different in their mechanisms of attitude formation than other confidants. Within the transnational group of Orthodox confidants, religiosity and church attendance play significant roles, both in predicting procedural democracy and support for privatization. No similar importance of religiosity and church attendance has been observed for any other denominations. Consequently, I explore the relationship between Orthodox faith and support for democracy and privatization in more detail. At the beginning of the chapter I showed that Orthodoxy, even measured as mere form of religious identification plays significant roles in the formation of attitudes, but these roles have not been the same in all countries with Orthodox believers. Therefore, I focus on the group of transnational Orthodox believers, but I sub-categorize this group according to contextual features describing the relationship between church and state, and also according to the historical role of religion in society. Some contextual characteristics have been considered from the beginning, such as religious pluralism and the relationship between church and state as measured by state regulation and funding of religion. Here, I add two more features of the context.

Table 10. Tolerance towards the Rroma minority for believers by denomination

	Catholic	Protestant	Muslim	Orthodox
Age	-.021* (.008)	.017 (.017)	-.003 (.008)	-.002 (.007)
Education	-.006 (.009)	.016 (.018)	-.008 (.007)	-.005 (.008)
Income	.017*** (.0040)	-.009 (.0080)	.014*** (.0030)	.002 (.003)
Religiosity	-.015*** (.004)	-.010 (.007)	.005 (.003) (*.062*)	.0001 (.003)
Church attendance	.028*** (.005)	.004 (.010)	-.003 (.003)	.003 (.004)
National identity	-.066*** (.010)	-.032 (.022)	.014 (.011)	-.028*** (.008)
Gini	-.028*** (.004)	-.078*** (.011)	.171*** (.044)	-.016*** (.002)
Gdp	1.74e-005* (.000)	2.93e-005* (.000)	Na	9.19e-005 (.000)
FHD	.238*** (.032)	.949*** (.179)	-.542*** (.148)	.058*** (.015)
EU	.602*** (.070)	1.432*** (.263)	-1.662** (.560)	.231*** (.062)
Political interest	.008* (.004)	-2.8e-005 (.008)	.005 (.003)	-.004 (.003)
Individual secularization	.0001** (.000)	5.50e-005 (.000)	-4.6e-005 (.000)	.0001* (.000)
Church secularization	.0001 (.000)	.001 (.001) (*.082*)	.0001 (.000)	-1.7e-005 (.000)
Government secularization	.001*** (.000)	.062 (.098)	.0001 (.000)	.0001 (.000)
Civic engagement	.024 (.046)	.206* (.086)	-.008 (.026)	-.010 (.041)
Political engagement	.092 (.053) (*.084*)	.062 (.098)	-.014 (.025)	-.080 (.042) (*.055*)
GRI	.127*** (.011)	.225*** (.029)	-.446** (.141)	.129*** (.011)
GFI	-.123*** (.012)	-.188*** (.020)	.567** (.166)	-.067*** (.013)
R^2	.127	.189	.515	.239
N	3606	720	792	4114

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

The first contextual variable under consideration is the autocephalous or transnational structure of the Orthodox Church. While Romania, Russia, Albania and Bulgaria have autocephalous churches, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic countries have only branches of the Moscow Patriarchate. The second contextual variable captures the difference between a dominant and a minority status of the Orthodox Church, in comparison with other denominations. In one category, namely autocephalous church in a minority status, there is only one country, Albania, and therefore, its case will be analyzed separately. Tables 11 through 14 examine the effect of religiosity and church attendance within groups of Orthodox believers, separated by the status of this church in each country.

Table 11 shows the effect on procedural democracy for three categories of Orthodox believers – in countries with autocephalous dominant Orthodox Church (Romania, Bulgaria, Russia), in countries with transnational dominant Orthodox Church (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova), and in countries with transnational minority Orthodox Church (the Baltics). As mentioned in the previous chapter, dominant autocephalous Orthodox churches have a stronger relationship with their respective states, and here, I want to see whether these structural differences affect the formation of attitudes. Correlatively, transnational dominant Orthodox Churches create a situation in which churches depend on a higher authority, in this case the Moscow Patriarchate, but also on the states in which they exist, in either symbolic hierarchical terms, or financially. It is interesting to explore how churches in these contexts negotiate this double allegiance,

and what is the effect of transnational Orthodoxy (given that Orthodox Churches are usually portrayed as national churches).

Table 11. Support for procedural democracy for Orthodox believers, differentiated by the status of Orthodox Church

	Orthodox autocephalous	Orthodox minority transnational	Orthodox dominant transnational
Age	.460*** (.134)	-.146 (.477)	.565*** (.128)
Education	1.203*** (.152)	.660 (.433)	.744*** (.137)
Income	.221*** (.049)	.378 (.217) (*.086*)	.054 (.064)
Religiosity	-.169** (.051)	-.031 (.144)	-.061 (.048)
Church attendance	.219** (.076)	-.061 (.223)	-.062 (.076)
National identity	-.393* (.160)	-.041 (.494)	-.120 (.129)
Gini	Na	.883 (.482) (*.071*)	.101 (.094)
Gdp	.0001 .000	Na	Na
FHD	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	.316*** (.065)	.014 (.207)	.158** (.058)
Individual secularization	.0001 (.001)	.004 (.003)	.002 (.001) (*.097*)
Church secularization	.005 (.004)	-.034* (.016)	.001 (.004)
Government secularization	-.001 (.002)	.012 (.009)	.002 (.002)
Civic engagement	1.845* (.924)	2.505 (3.261)	-.674 (.625)
Political engagement	-.428 (.861)	3.100 (3.667)	2.034** (.654)
GRI	Na	Na	Na
GFI	.781*** (.108)	-.184 (.197)	.679*** (.147)
R^2	.245	.176	.101
N	1635	100	1395

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

None of the independent variables are explaining support for procedural democracy in the Baltic States, a result that I attribute to the high levels of secularization.

The lack of significance for religious indicators for Orthodox believers in the Baltic States suggest the double effect of independence from the Soviet Union and higher levels of secularization. Independence brings about wide rejection of the Orthodox Church, commonly associated with Communist regimes. High secularization also diminishes the effect of religion on people's beliefs systems. Methodologically, the number of Orthodox believers is also small in all these three countries together, increasing the difficulty of obtaining statistical significance.

The next two categories under study are the believers in Orthodox dominant autocephalous and transnational countries. Education, income, age and political interest are significant for predicting support for procedural democracy in both categories. However, the variation in the dependent variables is also partially explained by religious indicators. Religiosity and church attendance are only significant in Romania, Bulgaria and Russia. Religiosity is negatively associated with support for procedural democracy, while church attendance is positively associated. I believe that it is not a coincidence that religious variables are significant in autocephalous countries, where the relationship between church and state is strong. This strong relationship between state and church in Romania, Bulgaria and Russia, closer is also reflected in the high values that GRI and GFI indicators have, suggesting a protectionist policy from the part of these states for their Orthodox Churches. The positive effect of church attendance is part of the church's agenda of accommodating democracy. In the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus however, political engagement is a predictor of procedural democracy, suggesting that in these countries, which are yet to democratize, participation in party politics is a predecessor of democratic politics.

In terms of specific support, the religious variables lose their significance, but there is a strong positive effect of national identity in both autocephalous and minority Orthodox countries, as Table 12 shows. The positive effect of national identity in the former Soviet Republics is probably related to their newly acquired independence. The relationship between pride in one's nation and Orthodox religion remains mysterious when several countries are analyzed together. National identity is constructed differently in each country, and it takes on different forms according to whether a country was part of the Soviet empire. Because of different effects of both religion and national identity in Orthodox countries according to contextual historical features, I will explore this relationship in a country-by-country analysis further on.

Coming back to the three categories of Orthodox believers and specific support, one also sees a negative effect of education in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, indicative of a critical stance of more educated people in these countries, towards their non-democratic governments. This is also confirmed by the negative effect of political engagement and political interest. The fact that procedural democracy and specific support are not predicted by the same model can be explained through the different levels of democratization in countries hosting Orthodox believers. Support for procedural democracy shows that people are familiar with the concept and supportive of it, at least in theory. Specific support measures evaluations of governments in power and governments' efforts to deepen democracy – which trigger critical responses of the society, especially in less democratic countries, such as the former Soviet Republics of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

Table 12. Specific support for Orthodox believers, differentiated by the status of the Orthodox Church

	Orthodox autocephallous	Orthodox minority transnational	Orthodox dominant transnational
Age	.111 (.066) (*.092*)	-.153 (.263)	-.101 (.078)
Education	.192** (.073)	-.194 (.252)	-.251** (.083)
Income	.027 (.024)	.282* (.112)	.098* (.038)
Religiosity	7.06e-006 (.025)	-.013 (.081)	.016 (.030)
Church attendance	.053 (.037)	-.058 (.129)	-.011 (.046)
National identity	.299*** (.078)	.888** (.270)	.831 (.0780
Gini	Na	.440 (.2920	.043 (.057)
Gdp	.0001*** (.000)	Na	Na
FHD	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	-.015 (.032)	-.211 (.117) (*.076*)	-.091* (.0350
Individual secularization	.001 (.001)	.004* (.002)	.0001 (.001)
Church secularization	.002 (.002)	-.013 (.009)	-.005* (.002)
Government secularization	.0001 (.001)	.002 (.005)	.001 (.001)
Civic engagement	1.560** (.467)	1.884 (.163)	-.134 (.386)
Political engagement	.609 (.438)	3.126 (2.925)	-1.088** (.396)
GRI	Na	Na	Na
GFI	.720*** (.053)	-.199 (.122)	.671*** (.088)
R^2	.160	.270	.154
N	1788	99	1516

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

Support for privatization follows the model of attitudes towards procedural democracy. Hence, education and income in Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus are positively associated with support for privatization, as Table 13 shows.

Table 13. Support for privatization for Orthodox believers, differentiated by the status of the Orthodox Church

	Orthodox autocephalous	Orthodox minority transnational	Orthodox dominant Transnational;
Age	.470* (.198)	.029 (.891)	.978*** (.196)
Education	1.595*** (.226)	-.282 (.805)	.789*** (.211)
Income	.361*** (.073)	1.031* (.403)	.509*** (.099)
Religiosity	-.242** (.076)	-1.000** (.282)	-.147* (.075)
Church attendance	.160 (.113)	1.914*** (.418)	.103 (.118)
National identity	-.256 (.2380	.307 (.917)	-.506* (.200)
Gini	Na	.235 (.891)	-1.030*** (.146)
Gdp	-.002*** (.000)	Na	Na
FHD	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	.331** (.096)	-.783* (.392)	.445*** (.089)
Individual secularization	-.001 (.002)	.011* (.006)	.003 (.001) (*.067*)
Church secularization	-.005 (.006)	-.056 (.029) (*.053*)	.006 (.006)
Government secularization	-.003 (.004)	.005 (.018)	.001 (.004)
Civic engagement	2.931* (1.4300	-6.029 (5.6020	-1.965* (.9920
Political engagement	-1.576 (.13280	1.664 (6.982)	1.303 (1.032)
GRI	Na	Na	Na
GFI	.212 (.162)	.316 (.366)	.824*** (.225)
R^2	.187	.389	.137
N	1793	105	1650

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

In summary, the data also shows a negative effect of religiosity throughout all the countries with orthodox believers, again reinforcing the hypothesis of religious people being political apathetic and not keeping up with the changes imposed by the process of

transition. In terms of contextual variables, the countries with a dominant autocephalous Orthodox Church (Romania, Russia and Bulgaria) and dominant transnational Orthodox Church (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) are very similar. Interestingly, Orthodox Church goers in the Baltic states are more supportive of privatization than non-churchgoers. I interpret this finding as an effect of Orthodox Churches in the Baltics being caught up in the same religious property restitution processes as elsewhere. Overall, the models predicting support for procedural democracy and those predicting support for privatization are fairly similar, which proves that people understand that democracy is accompanied by a market economy.

Finally, in most countries, the models predicting tolerance towards the Rroma minority are fairly weak, indicating perhaps a low salience of the issue, with no noticeable effects due to religious variables (Table 14).

The analysis of countries that have either a majority of Orthodox believers or, at least a significant minority, indicates a similarity in the effect played by religion on the formation of attitudes between countries with an autocephalous dominant Orthodox Church and a transnational dominant autocephalous church. But different roles played by national identity and its interplay with religion begs the replication of the models for Romania, Bulgaria, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. In so doing I hope to better specify in what ways religion and nationhood interact, and how their interaction influences support for democracy and free market.

Table 14. Tolerance for the Rroma minority for Orthodox believers, differentiated by the status of the Orthodox Church

	Orthodox autocephallous	Orthodox minority transnational	Orthodox dominanta transnational
Age	-.002 (.0120	.075 (.057)	.0001 (.009)
Education	-.013 (.014)	.027 (.053)	.006 (.010)
Income	-.001 (.005)	.012 (.025)	.007 (.005)
Religiosity	.001 (.005)	-.003 (.018)	.0001 (.004)
Church attendance	-.003 (.007)	.045 (.027) (*.099*)	.008 (.006)
National identity	-.038** (.014)	-.049 (.059)	-.019 (.010) (*.051*)
Gini	Na	-.181** (.059)	-.205*** (.007)
Gdp	-7.1e-006 (.000)	Na	Na
FHD	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	-.003 (.006)	.002 (.0240	-.006 (.004)
Individual secularization	.0001 (.000) (*.062*)	.0001 (.0000	-8.4e-005 (.0000
Church secularization	.001 (.000)	.001 (.002)	.0001 (.000) (*.099*)
Government secularization	.0001 (.000)	-.002 (.001)	.0001 (.000)
Civic engagement	-.023 (.091)	.415 (.377)	-.037 (.049)
Political engagement	-.223** (.0840	.440 (.4770	-.009 (.051)
GRI	Na	Na	Na
GFI	.014 (.0100	.007 (.024)	-.070*** (.011)
R^2	.018	.206	.378
N	1949	116	1820

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

But first, I will briefly discuss the case of Albania as the only country with an autocephalous Orthodox Church, which is in minority, compared to the majority of the

population – that is Muslim. Table 15 shows the results of OLS regression on the Albanian sample, including both religious and non-religious respondents.

Table 15. Support for procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority in Albania

	Procedural democracy	Specific support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.195 (.146)	-.073 (.098)	.483* (.230)	Na
Education	.442*** (.123)	.103 (.084)	.607** (.196)	Na
Income	.179** (.063)	.055 (.043)	.278** (.101)	Na
Religiosity	-.186*** (.049)	-.231*** (.033)	-.026 (.078)	Na
Church attendance	.082 (.072)	.094 (.048) (*.053*)	-.284* (.114)	Na
Nation	.169 .209	.552 .141 ***	.442 .326	Na
Political interest	-.191*** (.054)	-.156*** (.036)	-.251** (.086)	Na
Individual secularization	.002 (.001) (*.079*)	.003*** (.001)	.004* (.002)	Na
Church secuarization	-.004 (.004)	-.001 (.003)	-.013* (.006)	Na
Political secularization	.004 (.003)	.004* (.002)	.008* (.000)	Na
Civic engagement	.166 (.410)	-.144 (.281)	.558 (.650)	Na
Political engagement	.836 (.438) (*.057*)	.626* (.301)	.353 (.691)	Na
Orthodox	1.135** (.462)	.173 (.315)	1.900* (.733)	Na
Muslim	1.021** (.397)	.598* (.270)	1.558* (.6270	Na
Catholic	1.480** (.566)	1.341** (.3890	3.373*** (.909)	Na
R^2	.066	.084	.072	Na
N	1091	1139	1095	Na

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

In this country, even after controlling for socio-economic indicators, political interest and civic engagement, people that identify with a denomination tend to be more supportive of democracy than secular people.

Moreover, this relationship is significant for Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic respondents, for both procedural democracy and privatization. For the last two

denominations there is denominational influence on diffuse support too. Belonging to a denomination seems to affect support for democracy positively, without any differences between denominations. Thus, people that chose to identify with either of the three denominations are more supportive of democracy and a market economy when compared to non-religious respondents. The results are all the more interesting, because, in Albania, Western and Eastern Christianity coexist with Islam. The cross-denominational positive effect of religious identification on political and economic attitudes in Albania is contradicting both denominational and secularist hypotheses. It seems that the co-habitation of Western and Eastern Christianity and of Islam created a situation in which all three churches are supportive of democracy, and, correlatively, a situation in which religious people are more supportive of democracy than their secular counterparts. The cross denominational effect of religion on political attitudes in Albania may be suggestive of a contagion effect through which democratic values become internalized by each church, perhaps in opposition to the previous secular communist regime. Also, maybe the effect of religious pluralism, and the peaceful co-existence of three very different religions are also conducive to more support for democracy. Nevertheless, these arguments are all speculations, but the effect between religion and attitudes in Albania is indeed unique. In the rest of the chapter, I turn to analyzing the relationship between Orthodox faith and political attitudes in six countries with dominant Orthodox Churches: Russia, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.

The selection of these six country cases is motivated by the dominant status of the Orthodox Church, and also by the amount of variety between countries in many other respects. These are countries that have both autocephalous and transnational Orthodox

Churches, and include both high levels of religious identification, such as Romania or Moldova, and fairly secularized societies, such as Russia or Ukraine. The set of six countries also includes different levels of democratic and economic development, and European Union Membership. Each country model includes the whole sample of respondents, thus comprising both religious and non-religious people. I include dummy variables for Orthodox respondents, and, where applicable, for the other religions that constitute a fairly important minority (at least 10%).

Tables 16 through 21 examine the effect of religious variables on support fr democracy and the market in six Eastern European countries. The national samples used in each regression include religious and non-religious respondents. First, I analyze Romania, Bulgaria and Russia as cases of dominant autocephalous Orthodox Church. Russia (Table 16) exhibits less democratic development than Romania or Bulgaria, and this is apparent in both country level indicators and societal support. The data confirms that democratic transition in Russia is at a halt, and that consolidation is not the most probable outcome. In Russia, the Orthodox country with the highest percentage of non-religious people, secularization's effect is apparent in the construction of attitudes, with religion not being significant, either at the level of denomination, religiosity or church attendance. As everywhere, in Russia education and income seem to be the two indicators that explain the formation of attitudes, complemented by the positive and significant effect of age.

Table 16. Support for procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority in Russia

	Procedural democracy	Specific support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.743*** (.174)	.214** (.070)	1.455*** (.259)	,012 (.017)
Education	1.079*** (.186)	.009 (.076)	.737** (.279)	.017 (.018)
Income	.283*** (.059)	.081** (.024)	.384*** (.088)	.004 (.006)
Religiosity	-.097 (.065)	.015 (.027)	-.158 (.097)	.0001 (.006)
Church attendance	.119 (.106)	.074 (.043)	.180 (.158)	-.016 (.010)
Nation	-.242 (.178)	.179* (.072)	.098 (.265)	-.031 (.017) (*.076*)
Political interest	.083 (.085)	-.016 (.035)	.013 (.128)	-.010 (.008)
Individual secularization	.001 (.001)	.0001 (.001)	.001 (.002)	-5.7e-005 (.000)
Church secularization	-.001 (.006)	-.002 (.002)	-.004 (.009)	.0001 (.001)
Political secularization	-.001 .004	-.003 .002 (.084)	-.007 .006	.0001 .000
Civic engagement	3.132* (1.5780	1.119 (.669) (*.095*)	3.491 (2.440)	.064 (.165)
Political engagement	-2.093 (1.680)	-.108 (.679)	-4.151 (2.558)	-.250 (.168)
Orthodox	.212 (.424)	.134 (.175)	-.206 (.642)	.074 (.042) (*.078*)
Muslim	-.360 (1.145)	.342 (.437)	-.734 (1.617)	-.134 (.104)
R^2	.144	.052	.112	.016
N	881	951	995	1055

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

In Bulgaria (Table 17), religious denomination does not affect support for democracy or privatization, but religiosity is negatively correlated with support for privatization, while church attendance is positively correlated. This is the same effect that was discussed earlier, through which church attendance can be a participatory act leading to more support for democracy, while higher individual religiosity characterizes political apathetic people. Predictably, education and income are significant positive predictors for all dependent variables and support for national pride is positively correlated with specific support.

Table 17. Support for procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority in Bulgaria

	Procedural democracy	Specific support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.235 (.258)	.095 (.100)	-.394 (.310)	-.038* (.018)
Education	1.539*** (.265)	.533*** (.122)	1.733*** (.396)	.005 (.022)
Income	.196** (.069)	.068* (.033)	.330** (.103)	.013* (.006)
Religiosity	.059 (.077)	.043 (.036)	-.328** (.115)	-.002 (.0060
Church attendance	.146 (.107)	.078 (.052)	.522** (.160)	.013 (.009)
Nation	.128 (.218)	.424*** (.102)	.362 (.321)	-.039* (.018)
Political interest	.200* (.094)	.039 (.044)	.075 (.137)	.005 (.008)
Individual secularization	.0001 (.002)	.001 (.001)	-.002 (.002)	.0001* (.000)
Church secuarization	-.008 (.006)	.004 (.003)	-.016 (.009) (*.082*)	.001 (.001)
Political secularization	.009* (.004)	.0001 (.002)	.010 (.007)	-.001 (.000)
Civic engagement	.812 (1.1380	.634 (.577)	3.620* (1.785)	.019 (.107)
Political engagement	-.124 (1.071)	.504 (.544)	-2.454 (1.669)	-.268** (.101)
Orthodox	-.545 (.477)	.090 (.231)	-.894 (.715)	.094* (.042)
Muslim	.272 (.822)	.148 (.385)	1.280 (1.264)	.137* (.069)
R^2	.137	.099	.104	.035
N	774	897	870	974

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 *Significant at .01

When moving on to the Romanian case (Table 18), not only are Orthodox believers less supportive of procedural democracy, but also more religious believers are even less supportive of procedural democracy. On the other hand, church attendance tends to make people more supportive of procedural democracy – similarly to Bulgria. Very differently than the Bulgarian case however, in Romania, supporters of nationhood are less supportive of procedural democracy and privatization, even when controlling for religion, while political interest is positively associated with these variables. The image

that the data depicts is one in which Orthodoxy and nationalism are intertwined, and both have a negative influence on the creation of democratic values. The case study on Romania will show that indeed, nationalism and orthodox religion in Romania are very closely tied together, and will explain the effect of this symbiotic relationship on support for democracy.

Table 18. Support for procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority in Romania

	Procedural democracy	Specific support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.299 (.188)	-.006 (.097)	.281 (.283)	-.027 (.017)
Education	.844*** (.206)	.038 (.106)	1.335*** (.317)	-.028 (.019)
Income	.221** (.075)	-.001 (.039)	.473*** (.115)	.008 (.007)
Religiosity	-.232** (.075)	-.045 (.038)	-.080 (.113)	.0001 (.007)
Church attendance	.218* (.110)	-.011 (.056)	-.103 (.166)	-.005 (.010)
Nation	-1.102*** (.249)	.376** (.127)	-.672 (.377) (*.075*)	-.031 (.023)
Political interest	.455*** (.090)	-.037 (.046)	.497*** (.137)	-.007 (.008)
Individual secularization	-.001 (.002)	.001 (.001)	-.005* (.002)	-9.2e-005 (.000)
Church secularization	-.012* (.005)	.003 (.003)	-.016* (.008)	.0001 (.000)
Political secularization	-.007* (.003)	-.001 (.002)	-.007 (.005)	.001 (.000) (*.070*)
Civic engagement	1.829 (1.503)	2.243** (.799)	1.839 (2.387)	-.233 (.148)
Political engagement	-.171 (1.196)	.804 (.640)	-1.007 (1.870)	-.105 (.116)
Catholic	.292 (.928)	.270 (.469)	1.181 (1.385)	.087 (.084)
Orthodox	-1.727** (.662)	-.598 (.339) (*.078*)	-1.058 (.997)	.154* (.061)
R^2	.248	.032	.188	.028
N	879	942	950	1012

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

For the three countries in which the Orthodox Church is autocephalous and dominant, only in Romania is there a negative effect from religion, and this effect is also correlated with the negative effect of nationalism. Although both Bulgaria and Russia

have a dominant autocephalous Orthodox Church, the negative effect of both national pride and Orthodox faith is specific to Romania, which raises questions about the mechanisms of interaction between religion and nationhood.

Moving to the countries with transnational dominant orthodox churches, the situation gets complicated further. For instance, Orthodox believers in Moldova (Table 19) are overall more supportive of procedural democracy and privatization, and less supportive of the current regime. The findings also suggest that those who participate in church related matters, because of the church's allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate, are more pro-Russian, while non-participatory believers are more pro-Romanian. Moldova has a history of being alternatively a Romanian and Russian province. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, its independence triggered questions about a possible reunification with Romania. The Romanian government did not show any intention of claming Moldova as a Romanian territory, but the Romanian Orthodox Church did cause a conflict with the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova, claiming that Orthodox confidants in Moldova should be members of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Because of the timing of the data collection, most of church going believers in Moldova are members of the Russian Orthodox Church, and hence defenders of Moldova's Russified past.

Table 19. Support for procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority in Moldova

	Procedural democracy	Specific support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.171 (.153)	-.336** (.104)	.474* (.236)	Na
Education	.845*** (.148)	-.260* (.102)	.480* (.230)	Na
Income	.017 (.074)	.125* (.050)	.114 (.114)	Na
Religiosity	.029 (.060)	.129** (.041)	-.164 (.093) (*.076*)	Na
Church attendance	-.198* (.094)	-.114 (.063) (*.070*)	-.129 (.143)	Na
Nation	-.202 (.163)	.559*** (.110)	-.174 (.252)	Na
Political interest	.202** (.070)	-.043 (.048)	.282** (.108)	Na
Individual secularization	.001 (.001)	1.44e-005 (.001)	.005** (.002)	Na
Church secularization	-.001 (.004)	-.003 (.003)	.006 (.007)	Na
Political secularization	.003 (.003)	.002 (.002)	.009 (.005) (*.074*)	Na
Civic engagement	-.435 (.560)	.695 (.391) (*.076*)	-.443 (.864)	Na
Political engagement	1.802** (.609)	-1.807*** (.415)	1.699 (.951) (*.074*)	Na
Orthodox	1.812*** (.423)	-.506 (.289) (*.080*)	2.111** (.666)	Na
R^2	.117	.128	.064	Na
N	818	902	954	Na

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

In the Ukraine (Table 20), Orthodox believers are overall less supportive of democracy and privatization, while Greek-Catholic believers are strongly supportive of procedural democracy. While socio-economic indicators are positive and significant in predicting all the dependent variables, religiosity and church attendance are not significant, but support for nationhood is positive in all respects. However, people that are somewhat religious are also more supportive of democracy and privatization.

Table 20. Support for procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority in Ukraine

	Procedural democracy	Specific support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.968*** (.178)	.252** (.083)	1.970*** (.310)	.022 (.018)
Education	.940*** (.238)	.077 (.108)	1.744*** (.409)	-.006 (.023)
Income	.362*** (.088)	.204*** (.041)	.757*** (.153)	.010 (.009)
Religiosity	-.051 (.063)	.018 (.029)	-.078 (.108)	-.009 (.006)
Church attendance	-.032 (.110)	.080 (.051)	-.034 (.185)	.004 (.011)
Nation	.644*** (.175)	.608*** (.079)	.493 (.297) (*.098*)	-.038* (.017)
Political interest	.053 (.086)	.025 (.040)	.116 (.148)	-.001 (.008)
Individual secularization	.004** (.001)	.001 (.001) (*.084*)	.008** (.002)	.0001 (.000) (*.075*)
Church secularization	-.004 (.007)	.002 (.003)	-.004 (.011)	-.001 (.001) (*.084*)
Political secularization	.008* (.003)	-.002 (.002)	-.001 (.006)	.001* (.000)
Civic engagement	1.730 (1.311)	-.888 (.612)	-.663 (2.145)	.155 (.126)
Political engagement	.218 (1.179)	.634 (.555)	-3.115 (2.105)	-.123 (.125)
Orthodox	-.619 (.430)	-.636** (.195)	-.506 (.719)	.116** (.042)
Greek Catholic	1.893** (.688)	-.133 (.330)	1.737 (1.185)	.087 (.069)
R^2	.206	.160	.169	.028
N	794	886	935	1007

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

In Belarus (Table 21), the situation is almost reversed. Nationhood is negatively associated with support for procedural democracy and privatization, and positively associated with support for the current regime. The current regime in Belarus is nationalist, and opposed to democracy, so the findings are consistent with political reality. On the other hand, politically interested people are more supportive of democracy and privatization. Overall Orthodox believers are also more supportive of both.

Table 21. Support for procedural democracy, specific support, support for privatization and tolerance towards the Rroma minority in Belarus

	Procedural democracy	Specific support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	1.145***	-.359**	1.089***	-.021
	(.192)	(.114)	(.277)	(.018)
Education	.700**	-.428**	.916**	-.007
	(.224)	(.129)	(.322)	(.021)
Income	-.077	-.025	.740***	.016
	(.104)	(.061)	(.151)	(.010)
Religiosity	-.003	-.023	-.095	.0001
	(.069)	(.040)	(.100)	(.007)
Church attendance	-.120	.059	.066	-.002
	(.105)	(.062)	(.155)	(.010)
Nation	-1.011***	1.139***	-1.298***	-.025
	(.189)	(.110)	(.270)	(.018)
Political interest	.177*	-.055	.299**	.001
	(.080)	(.047)	(.114)	(.007)
Individual secularization	.001	.0001	-.003	.0001
	(.001)	(.001)	(.002)	(.000)
Church secuarization	-.005	-.004	-.004	-.001
	(.005)	(.003)	(.007)	(.000)
Political secularization	-.002	.0001	-.008	.0001
	(.004)	(.002)	(.005)	(.000)
Civic engagement	-1.188	.120	2.837	-.070
	1.573	.912	2.431	.167
Political engagement	1.772	-.599	-2.213	-.010
	(.147)	(.860)	(2.233)	(.155)
Orthodox	.859*	.376	1.144	.025
	(.411)	(.243)	(.589) (*.052*)	(.040)
Catholic	.202	.841*	.615	-.017
	(.739)	(.427)	(1.062)	(.072)
R^2	.162	.231	.164	.012
N	786	784	940	1015

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

Finally, in order to specify the effect of religious denomination on political and economic attitudes, I have run the same models but only for sub samples of non-religious respondents, obviously eliminating religiosity and church participation, but keeping measures of secularization. In so doing I am able to see whether religion still affects the formation of political and economic attitudes for people that do not identify themselves with any religion. Logically I would expect measures of secularization to be insignificant

for atheists, and, if they prove to have an effect, I assume that it is a contagion effect created by religion, as a social factor in the society. I argue that while secular people do not identify with any religion, they may still have religious beliefs and, at least, have attitudes towards the role played by religion and church in the society. In Tables 22 through 25, I analyze groups of secular people separately, according to geographical region, in order to see whether formation of attitude is different in Western Christian countries, and in Orthodox countries, according to our tripartite distinction (dominant autocephalous, dominant transnational and minority transnational).

The group of "classical" Central European countries – Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia display all possible combinations of different levels of secularization and of religious pluralism. Age, education and income are all positive and significant in explaining the variation of all four dependent variables (Table 22). In fact education and income, and most of the time age, are fairly consistent control variables across denomination, and across secular people in different countries. National pride remains positively associated with specific support, and the direction in which GRI and GFI affect the dependent variables is the same with the case of Catholic and Protestant believers (negative for GRI and positive for GFI). Individual measures of secularization become significant and positively associated with procedural democracy and specific support, suggesting that even if a person does not have a religious affiliation, religious faith still exists and affects their belief systems.

Table 22. Support for procedural democracy and privatization, specific support and tolerance for the Rroma minority for non-religious respondents in Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia

	Procedural democracy	Diffuse support	Support for privatization	Tolerance for Rroma
Age	.350** (.124)	.143* (.067)	.577* (.228)	.017 (.012)
Education	.969*** (.123)	.085 (.066)	1.298*** (.226)	-.013 (.012)
Income	.279*** (.048)	.160*** (.026)	.385*** (.088)	-.003 (.005)
National identity	-.148 (.145)	.346*** (.077)	.012 (.262)	-.012 (.014)
Gini	.094 (.129)	.112 (.069)	.565* (.237)	-.245*** (.013)
Gdp	Na	Na	Na	Na
FHD	Na	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	.253*** (.052)	.024 (.028)	.167 (.095) (*.079*)	.0001 (.005)
Individual secularization	.002* (.001)	.002** (.001)	.003 (.002)	.0001 (.000) (*.077*)
Church secularization	-.001 (.003)	.0001 (.002)	-.006 (.005)	-8.6e-005 (.000)
Government secularization	-.006 .005	.005 .002 (.057)	-.010 .008	.0001 .000
Civic engagement	1.099* (.460)	.419 (.372)	.796 (.845)	.003 (.046)
Political engagement	-2.288** (.680)	-.204 (.372)	-2.077 (1.279)	-.084 (.069)
GRI	-1.016*** (.250)	-.211 (.113)	-1.258** (.458)	-.504*** (.025)
GFI	.690*** (.184)	.328** (.098)	.933** (.338)	-.364*** (.018)
R^2	.208	.099	.118	.294
N	1338	1365	1361	1412

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

Secular respondents in countries that have Orthodox believers are all influenced by education and income in their formation of attitudes, but the situation becomes more differentiated when autocephaly and transnational structure of the Orthodox Church are taken into consideration. Thus, measures of religious involvement in the government matters are negatively correlated with support for procedural democracy and privatization (Table 23). Political engagement is positively associated with procedural democracy,

another staple of consolidate democracy. Perhaps the most interesting finding is the negative correlation between GFI and support for procedural democracy, insignificant but with the same direction for Orthodox believers in the Baltic States, indicative of the secular nature of politics in these countries. I argue that this effect if triggered not only by high levels of secularism in the Baltics, but also by the success in democratic development in Estonia – the one country with the highest percentage of non-believers. Thus, the effect of GFI on political attitudes is mediated by the degree of secularization. In countries where most people are religious, more funding of religion by the state brings in more support for democracy. In contrast, in secularized environments, a clear-cut separation between church and state is conducive to more support.

This finding is also interesting in the sense of the contextualized functioning of GFI, and contains an indirect effect of religion on political attitudes. When the society is more religious, the citizens that prefer democracy also prefer the church to be closer to the state, supported by the state, so showing how the church may inculcate in citizens an appreciation of democracy.

Table 23. Support for procedural democracy and privatization, specific support and tolerance for the Rroma minority for non-religious respondents in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

	Procedural democracy	Diffuse support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.098 (.138)	.204** (.072)	.156 (.233)	.025 (.017)
Education	.290* (.136)	.028 (.072)	.803** (.231)	-.003 (.017)
Income	.095 (.061)	.072* (.032)	.595*** (.103)	-.014 (.007) (*.053*)
National identity	.468** (.149)	.550*** (.076)	.464 (.248) (*.061*)	-.013 (.018)
Gini	.275 (.174)	.578*** (.090)	-1.393*** (.293)	-.116*** (.021)
Gdp	Na	Na	Na	Na
FHD	Na	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	.217** (.069)	.031 (.036)	-.073 (.115)	-.009 (.008)
Individual secularization	.002 (.001)	.0001 (.001)	-.003 (.002)	.0001 (.000)
Church secularization	-.013* (.005)	.006 (.003)	.001 (.009)	-.001 (.001)
Government secularization	-.014** (.004)	.001 (.002)	-.026*** (.007)	.0001 (.000)
Civic engagement	.482 (.728)	-.137 (.377)	.972 (1.231)	.043 (.089)
Political engagement	3.660** (1.119)	.314 (.593)	2.491 (1.942)	-.105 (.141)
GRI	Na	Na	Na	Na
GFI	-.381*** (.064)	-.342*** (.033)	.466*** (.106)	-.012 (.008)
R^2	.131	.193	.138	.074
N	917	949	1002	1052

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

On the other hand in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, individual measures of secularization are positively associated with procedural democracy and support for privatization, while political engagement is negatively associated with privatization (Table 24).

Table 24. Support for procedural democracy and privatization, specific support and tolerance for the Rroma minority for non-religious respondents in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine

	Procedural democracy	Diffuse support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	1.343*** (.198)	-.068 (.097)	1.925*** (.313)	.017 (.019)
Education	1.000*** (.244)	-.303* (.117)	1.035** (.387)	-.041 (.023) (*.082*)
Income	.230* (.102)	.161 (.048)	.533** (.157)	.020* (.010)
National identity	-.229 (.185)	.822*** (.087)	-.161 (.287)	-.041* (.018)
Gini	Na	Na	Na	Na
Gdp	Na	Na	Na	Na
FHD	Na	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	.149 (.088) (*.091*)	.026 (.043)	.016 (.138)	.011 (.008)
Individual secularization	.003* (.001)	.001 (.001) (*.091*)	.006* (.002)	-3.7e-005 (.000)
Church secularization	-.006 (.006)	.003 (.003)	-.013 (.009)	-.001 (.001)
Government secularization	-.005 .004	.003 .002	-.013 .007 (.067)	.000 .000
Civic engagement	.243 (1.400)	.812 (.673)	1.931 (2.109)	.143 (.131)
Political engagement	.405 (1.262)	.364 (.612)	-.6.247** (2.084)	-.104 (.130)
GRI	Na	Na	Na	Na
GFI	.416* (.162)	.202** (.076)	.719** (.255)	.0001 (.016)
R^2	.156	.175	.129	.019
N	756	793	896	937

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

Finally, in Romania, Russia and Bulgaria, no measure of secularization is significant in explaining any of the dependent variables, suggesting that non-religious people are in fact true atheists, for which state and church are completely different matters (Table 25).

Table 25. Support for procedural democracy and privatization, specific support and tolerance for the Rroma minority for non-religious respondents in Bulgaria, Romania, Russia

	Procedural democracy	Diffuse support	Support for privatization	Tolerance
Age	.417 (.220) (*.058*)	.290** (.092)	.549 (.325) (*.091*)	-.029 (.019)
Education	1.074*** (.243)	.026 (.103)	.893* (.365)	.009 (.022)
Income	.300*** (.070)	.079** (.029)	.503*** (.104)	.017** (.006)
National identity	-.109 (.210)	.274** (.088)	.604 (.312) (*.053*)	-.030 (.019)
Gini	Na	Na	Na	Na
Gdp	-.001 (.001)	.0001 (.000)	-.001 (.001)	-4.7e-005 (.000)
FHD	Na	Na	Na	Na
EU	Na	Na	Na	Na
Political interest	.105 (.102)	.058 (.043)	-.240 (.150)	-.010 (.009)
Individual secularization	.004* (.002)	.001 (.001)	.0001 (.002)	-4.8e-005 (.000)
Church secularization	-.005 (.007)	-.001 (.003)	-.014 (.010)	.0001 (.001)
Government secularization	-.004 (.005)	.002 (.002)	-.007 (.008)	.001 (.000)
Civic engagement	2.096 (1.572)	.591 (.702)	5.116* (2.478)	.002 (.154)
Political engagement	-1.108 (1.393)	.534 (.606)	-3.408 (2.172)	-.181 (.134)
GRI	Na	Na	Na	Na
GFI	.675** (.232)	.509*** (.102)	.407 (.368)	-.007 (022)
R^2	.198	.259	.125	.021
N	701	780	810	848

Table presents OLS unstandardized coefficients, standard errors (in parantheses) and level of significance (in italics where <.1) *** significant at .001 **significant at .05 * significant .01

This analysis of the mechanisms of attitude formation for groups of respondents without religious affiliation raises two important points. First, I observe that non-religious people are affected in the same way as their religious compatriots by all the controlling variables. Therefore, in those cases in which I see that members of a particular denomination are more or less supportive of democracy and market economy than secular

people, I can safely argue that it is religion that creates this effect, because of the inner mechanisms being similar. Second, the analysis of secular people also shows that in countries in which there are more secular people (such as the Baltics), the effect of secularization is also observable in the ways in which people form their attitudes.

Discussion of the Findings and Dynamic Context

The findings of data analysis are as much explanatory as they raise more questions. To answer Huntington, there is no clear denominational effect in terms of the relationship between religion and the formation of a democratic political culture. The 14 countries display very different levels of religious identification, church attendance and religiosity, and also very different levels of support for democracy, both procedural and specific, and for privatization. Support for democracy is somewhat higher in central European countries, but it also shows record high levels in Albania or Belarus for example.

According to the data, Protestant believers are mostly detached from religion, with low levels of religiosity and church attendance. Protestantism does not make one more or less supportive of democracy, but, overall, it consists of more tolerant believers. Protestantism illustrates the case of privatized religion, in which church and state are separate entities, and in which religion is not a major public actor. Similarly, Catholic confidants are most of the time no different than secular people in terms of support for, especially in secularized countries. Nevertheless, they can also become fierce supporters of democracy in contexts of minority Catholic Church, such as Ukraine or Romania. Also, the Catholic Church is efficient at bringing people into the church, especially when it is a dominant church in a religiously homogenous space, such as Poland.

Orthodox believers have been the main focus of this research. The analysis of their political and economic attitudes revealed intriguing results. Within the group of Orthodox countries under study, only Romania and Moldova are highly religious countries, and increased levels of religious identification are matched by higher religiosity and rates of church attendance (in comparison with Orthodox believers in other countries). Russia and its former republics, but also Albania, and Bulgaria show at least 30% of religiously non-affiliated people (a rather high percentage considering than in Romania and Moldova, this percentage is around 3%). Post-communist religious revival is thus not a common trait of Orthodox countries. The secularizing effects of communism did not create the same results in every country – proof that the pre-communist position of religion and historical relationship between church and state ned to be taken into account too.

From the perspective of political and economic attitudes, the effect of religious variables varies immensely. While in Russia and Bulgaria, being Orthodox does not make one more or less supportive of democracy and privatization, in Albania, Moldova and Belarus there is a strong positive correlation between Orthodox denomination and support for democracy. Alternatively, in Romania and Ukraine the effect is negative. A very interesting interaction has been observed between Orthodox faith and national identity. In Romania, national identity and Orthodoxy are strongly and positively correlated with each other, and have a negative effect on support for democracy. In Ukraine and Belarus, Orthodoxy and nationhood are in an inverse relationship, due to the parallel functioning of Orthodox Churches, both non-recognized autocephalous and Russian Exarchates, and also to the problematic development of national identity in

former Soviet Republics. While Ukrainians show high support for their own nation, Belarussians are much less attached to their national values, and favor a Russian identity.

This research shows that Orthodox religion does not affect democratic attitudes in a consistent way. It also dismisses myths of "dangerous" religious revival in former communist Orthodox countries.

The one major answer that this research offers is the importance of including context in analysis, and accounting for different historical, political and religious settings that affected the church as an institution and also its relationship with the society and the state. Correlatively, the different meanings that religion and church have acquired throughout history are also important in assessing their effect on support for democracy. On the one hand I have found that the effect of the long years of secularizing communism had an effect on religious revival in Russia and its former Soviet republics, but not in Moldova. The high rates of religious identification in Moldova can be accounted for through the effect of the Romanian Orthodox Church having Moldova under its structure for over 50 years before Moldova became part of USSR. Moldova therefore became part of the Soviet Union, and religiously, a part of the Russian Orthodox Church. This double integration also affects constructions of national identity, since the majority of Moldovans perceive themselves as ethnic Romanians, but the political leadership prefers a Russofile approach. The same process of political and religious integration affected Ukraine and Belarus, and the effects are also visible in the ways in which religion and national identity affects democratic support in these two countries.

I also found that in countries in which the Orthodox Church is a minority church, its effect on citizens' attitude is most of the time insignificant. Nonetheless, when it is

insignificant, like in the Baltics, it is also a carrier of Russian national identity, but in countries in which Russification was not as successful as in Belarus for instance. Additionally, while still a speculation, data shows that the Orthodox Church, just like its Catholic competitor has a transnational structure that is not necessarily a messenger for radicalism. For instance, in Belarus, where the effect of the Moscow Patriarchate is fairly strong, data suggests that Orthodox believers are more supportive of democracy, probably as a consequence of being members of the Russian Church that, in comparison to their radical nationalist regime, is a promoter of democracy. In other words, the effect of Orthodox religion and church on people's support for their political regime depends in large measure on the state and regime that the church is legally connected too. The Orthodox Church of Russia is tied to the Russian government, and so it may represent a force of democratization in comparison to the Belarussian government, but it can also represent an antidemocratic force, for the Ukrainian regime that is more democratic than Russia.

The interplay between Orthodoxy and national identity in Ukraine and Belarus is indicative of the dynamic nature of historical contexts. Because the World Value Survey dataset does not allow distinguishing between membership in the three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (Moscow Patriarchate, Kiev Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church), I cannot fully describe the relationship between Orthodoxy and support for democracy. Nonetheless, it is clear that nationhood is not constructed along religious lines in Ukraine. According to the data, national identity has a positive influence on support for democracy. This finding is confirmed by other research (Kuzio, 2001), and it suggests that Ukrainian democracy is constructed along the lines of independent

Ukrainian nationhood, and, implicitly, by opposition to Russian domination. The opposition to Russia is also evident in the negative effect on support for democracy created by Orthodoxy. Although no separate data exists for religious membership within each of the three parallel Orthodox churches, I argue that two Ukrainian Orthodox Churches (Moscow Patriarchate and Kiev Patriarchate) take an antidemocratic stance, but for different reasons. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is more supportive of democracy, but the numbers of its followers is very small compared to membership in the other two churches. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate has a negative influence on support for democracy in Ukraine because of the Russian Orthodox Church's resistance to democracy. Nevertheless, even if the anti democratic effect of Orthodoxy is not due to the transnational effect of the Orthodox Church, then, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev Patriarchate also takes an anti-democratic position because of its conservative position towards Western values. Additionally, Ukrainian Orthodoxy represents the center of Eastern Orthodoxy through its rich tradition of erudition and the printing of sacred Orthodox texts. Orthodoxy in Ukraine is very strongly opposed to Catholicism, because of historical reasons and conquests, and also because of the conflict with their Greek-Catholic minority. So, irrespective of what church the Orthodox confidants go to in Ukraine, that church is antidemocratic through either its affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church, or through its conservative position within doctrinal Orthodoxy. Moreover, the competition between the three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches created cleavages in the society, and the Parliament too. Because of Ukraine's strategy of moving towards democracy as an independent nation, Orthodoxy is constructed as a symbol of either communism or conservative autocracy.

In contrast, in Belarus, the Orthodox religion has a positive effect on support for democracy, while national identity has a negative effect. The negative effect of national identity is probably due to the timing of the survey (late 1990s) when a radical nationalist trend became popular in Belarus. Since then, president Lukashenko promoted closer ties to Russia. Overall, national identity in Belarus is much less salient than it is in Ukraine. Belarussians have loose conceptualizations of national identity, and those that take pride in their nation were, at the time of the survey, exponents of radical nationalism, and, opposed to democracy. The positive effect of the Orthodox Church can be explained by the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, which, in this case, functions in a more democratic context than its Belarussian counterpart. There are voices inside Belarus today arguing that Belarussian democracy should follow the Russian model, since, indeed, Russia is more democratic than Belarus in any understanding of the term. In this context the Belarussian Orthodox Church Moscow Exarchate can be a supporter of democracy. Furthermore, the Belarussian Orthodox Church is also considered the moral consciousness of the people. President Lukashenko declared himself an "Orthodox atheist" - and, while he does not repress the Orthodox Church, the state intervenes in most internal matters of the church, triggering dissatisfaction of the clergy. From this perspective, the Belarussian Orthodox Church looks up at democracy as a system in which the church would be freed from the state, and allowed to fulfill its mission without restrictions.

Moldova also shows the same inverse relationship between Orthodoxy and nationhood. Orthodox believers are more supportive procedural democracy and privatization, but also oppose the politics of the government in power, which is pro-

Russian and non-democratic. National identity on the other is positively correlated with the regime, similar to the situation in Belarus. Therefore, I argue that in both countries, the Orthodox Church is an arena of opposition against non-democratic regimes. Nonetheless, the reasons for which the church chooses to be more supportive of democracy are influenced by both its position within the state, and also its status in the transnational hierarchy of the Eastern Orthodox Church.

Therefore, this discussion illustrates that constructions of identity are affected by the interaction between church and state. Contrary to popular belief that the Orthodox Church is most of the time promoters of national identity, I only found this relationship to stand true in Romania.[4] As the case study in the next chapter will show, the Romanian case is unique, and the strong relationship between Orthodox and national identity can be explained through a historical approach.

I also argue that autocephaly is a direct function of the relationship between religion and national identity; when the state wants to acquire self-determination, then the church actively seeks recognition of its autocephalous status. The fact that the Belarussian government denied repeatedly the registration of the Belarussian Autocephalous Orthodox Church is indicative of Lukashenko's preference for a close relationship with Russia.

The amount of variation of the mechanisms in which religion affects the formation of attitudes is highly contextual, and it seems that a combination of the five contextual hypotheses that I put forth explains the effect that religion has on societal

[4] Most of the discussion on the role of Orthodox Churches in the creation of radical nationalist movements was focused on former Yugoslavia. However, according to the data analyzed in this chapter, the role of Orthodox in national identity formation needs to be understood along the lines of the historical relationship between church and state, and the transnational or autocephalous status of the church.

support for democracy. The relationship between state, church and society is so historically and political embedded that each national context constructs different configurations of the interaction between church and state, and it creates different meanings for religion's role in the society. The one uniform feature I identified is the role that religion plays in the formation of political and economic attitudes in countries with dominant Orthodox Church – more visible than in the case of any other denomination. This observation suggests that Orthodox Churches are more politicized and have a more important role in the polity – confirmed by the higher GRI and GFI scores, and also by historical evidence.[5] Yet, most importantly, this strong connection between church and state is not necessarily anti-democratic, and I presented evidence supporting this argument. Furthermore, in the case of Orthodox Churches, the relationship between church and state needs to be understood in the context of historical quest of self-determination and the formation of national identity. Whether a church is willing and capable to support democracy depends on its historical role in society, on its relationship with the state and also with transnational structures, both political and religious.

One question remains: what can explain the very powerful status of the Romanian Orthodox Church and its anti-democratic effect on citizens? What accounts for the very strong relationship between Orthodoxy and national identity in Romania, and for their combined negative effect on support for democracy? It is to these questions that I turn to in chapter 6.

[5] Indeed the role of Orthodox Churches in post-democratic politics is influenced by different contextual factors such as its historical political role, the existence of parallel Orthodox Churches in one country, or schismatic movements like in Bulgaria.

Chapter 6

The Interplay between State and Church in Romanian Constructions of National Identity

The main goal of this case study on Romania is to explore the unique relationship between church, state and society, and to explain the strong association between religion and nationhood. From a historical perspective, Orthodoxy has been a unifying factor for Romanians living under different foreign empires, and because of its important role in history, it became the dominant discourse in constructions of nationhood in Romania. The Romanian state had traditionally granted the Orthodox Church a privileged status in comparison to any other religion. I argue that its privileged status indicates the state's recognition of the historical role played by the Orthodox Church in preserving nationhood.

I show that the relationship between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian state is historically embedded, and that, in time, this relationship remained strong, major political changes notwithstanding. I also argue that, while the privileged relationship between state and church in Romania suggests a path dependent evolution, significant historical conjunctures did take place. These conjunctures create points of contestations of the dominant discourse, which also suffers transformations as a result of contestation. For example, the Greek-Catholic Church is one contender for the role of representative of national identity. Its construction of identity emphasizes the common Western Christian inheritance of Romania and the rest of Western Europe. Therefore, Orthodoxy and Catholicism offer two versions of nationhood. The Romanian state privileges the Orthodox Church, but the Greek-Catholic Church's construction of

nationhood is also considered, although indirectly, through the latter's relationship with Western Christianity, and the democratic European Union.

From a methodological standpoint, the institutionalist approach employed in the previous two chapters is complemented in this chapter by additional tenets of social constructivism. One needs to analyze institutions as contextually dynamic entities, in permanent interaction with other institutions and individual political actors. If one accepts that institutions affect each other, and in turn, they affect political agency, the next step is to understand that structure and agency cannot be separated. In this case study, the Romanian Orthodox Church cannot be understood without also analyzing the historical evolution of the state, and the role that the church had in the definition of the Romanian nation. The ongoing interaction between church and state through the channel of nationhood renders this research compatible with the constructivist approach, because of the latter's emphasis on intersubjectivity and the importance in understanding institutions.

In the following section, I discuss constructivism and its suitability for this case study. Then, I substantiate my argument by bringing forth three types of evidence. First, there is an historical account of the relationship between church and state, focusing on the role of Orthodoxy in Romania's quest for identity and independence. Cosmopolitan and indigenous understandings of national identity have been constructed throughout two millennia of history. Second, I analyze two policies through which different Romanian post-communist governments regulated the regime of religions in Romania. These policies show privileging of the Orthodox Church, to the detriment of other denominations, against sustained criticism from both national and international civil

society actors. Third and last, I present primary data – results of interviews with active employees of the Romanian Orthodox Churches and also of other churches - summarizing what roles the Romanian Orthodox Church assumes during Romania's democratic transition and consolidation. The qualitative evidence includes both primary and secondary data, and captures both past and present in Romanian history.

The relationship between church and state in Romania is historically embedded. The state and the Orthodox Church fashion their interaction following an apparent path-dependent strategy. Through the use of national identity symbols, the church asserts itself as a strong political actor, whose role is more important in Romania than in any other Orthodox country. This use of national symbols also explains the high levels of religiosity in Romania, compared to its Eastern or Southern neighbors. The path-dependency refers to the privileged status of the Romanian Orthodox Church throughout centuries, due to its identification with nationhood. I qualify this path dependent approach as apparent because both state and church transformed their shape and identity countless times throughout centuries, and, consequently, so did their relationship. The use of path-dependency theory here is closer to that of historical institutionalism than the concept in rational choice theory. Indeed, the strong connection between church and state survived both communist secularization and post-communist liberal democratization. Privileging the Orthodox Church means different things in the newly independent Romania of 1878, in communist Romania of 1950, and in democratic Romania of 2007. At every major political turn in history, both church and state had to re-define their identity and interests, and also their relationship with each other. Therefore, characterizing the relationship between church and state as path-dependent would be reifying and historically inaccurate.

Constructivism, Intersubjectivity and Context

The set of 14 countries under analysis in the previous chapter comprise a vast amount of variation in terms of not only the relationship between church and state, but also in terms of different levels of democratization and economic development. Each country has a different past, beyond such commonalities as communism and former imperial domination. Social constructions of the past, of identities and interests, of facts and alleged historical proofs make the set of 14 countries look more different than similar.

Ontologically, "constructivists characterize this interactive relationship between what people do and how societies shape their action as the mutual constitution of structures and agents." (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 7) While the Romanian state had to change fundamentally in 1989, the church also had to adapt to new circumstances. This process of adaptation, however, implies the creation of new strategies on the part of the Orthodox Church, in order to respond to the new situation. When changing, the church also takes into consideration its role in Romanian history and its identity. Correlatively, the state and the society both have to redefine their relationship with the church, and reconfigure their identities. Because of this emphasis on identity, constructivism is a helpful conceptual tool. In the triad church-state-society, the church is at once a structure and an agent. As a structure, the church influences the creation of beliefs and attitudes, and also impacts behavior of its confidants. As an agent, the church tries to change the political context, according to its interests. Since Romanian national identity is mostly constructed by reference to the Orthodox faith, the interaction of church, state and society concentrates around the concept of national identity. The process of understanding this interaction is facilitated by three key concepts in constructivist thought: intersubjectivity,

contextualism, and power. According to Klotz and Lynch (2007), "intersubjective understandings comprise structure and agents. These norms, rules, meanings, languages, cultures and ideologies are social phenomena that create identities." (p. 7) Particular meanings can become stable over time, and can create social orders. The intersubjectivity of the relationship between church and state in Romania is illustrated by the role that the church played in history, and the ways in which different Romanian regimes constructed this role as a preserver of national identity. Correlatively, "official" understandings of the role of religion and state affect societal attitudes regarding the centrality of religion in post-communist politics.

Contextualism is also critical in analyzing the relationship between church and state in Romania because, as shown in the previous chapter, I can only account for some features of context at the general level of 14 countries. This is a consequence of an attempt to quantify context for the sake of obtaining generalizable results. The limitations imposed by quantitative data analysis on the analysis of context are reduced when conducting a case study. In this chapter, context can be particularized further and, thus, "reified, essentialized, or static notions of culture which preclude the possibility of change" can be avoided (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 9). Furthermore, in this case study I can also take into consideration the dynamic features of the contextual relationship between church and state, and analyze how they interact with each other too.

Finally, according to constructivism, power materializes itself in relationships, and it is not simply measured by material capabilities. The relationship between church and state exemplifies the relational character of power.

From an epistemological standpoint, constructivism employs the genealogical method, which is particularly interesting to apply in this case study, because of its rejection of deterministic or teleological arguments of historical evolution. Through a genealogical approach, one accepts the possibility of change even in the most stable structures and genealogies that "enrich or challenge previous interpretations, rather than producing one correct objective history." (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 35) The genealogical method originated with Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*, and was employed to much acclaim by Michel Foucault in his *Discipline and Punish*. In the analysis of how penal systems have constructed punishments throughout time, Foucault focuses on the disciplinary control in the society. Through a genealogical method, he notes how different institutions have been made more effective in controlling people's behavior and values, although these institutions' primary purpose was not necessarily societal control. The genealogical analysis implies the idea that history does not unfold as a predetermined rational sequence of events. Rather, it unfolds according to contingent turns of history and becomes part of the constructivist approach, as Reus-Smit (2002) shows (quoting Bartelson (1995)): "a method that "is strategically aimed at that which looks unproblematic, and is held to be timeless; its task is to explain how these present traits, in all their vigour and truth, were formed out of the past." (p. 73) Institutionalism's critical junctures play an important part in the genealogical approach through the space for agency that they create. As it will be shown below, different readings of Romanian history identify different critical junctures, conducive to very different conceptualizations of nationhood.

Finally, the constructivist take on identity is also highly useful for this analysis: "constructivists view identities as social relationships that change over time and across contexts." (Klotz & Lynch, 2007, p. 65) Constructivism started the discussion of identity by criticizing reifying constructions of the other. In mainstream literature, the other is a fixed and antithetic reference. In contrast, constructivism challenges the reified status of the other, and elaborates on portrayals of other through the power-imbued discourse of elites, through a process of fixing group identities and complexes of inferiority. Most importantly, constructivism recognizes that identities are fluid, multiple and overlapping. In direct relationship with this case study is the idea that some overlapping identities may not be consistent with each other, and so "domestic regimes may have a legitimacy crisis when competing identities cannot be reconciled. Indeed the most relevant other may be a person's or country's past." (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 81)

I argue that in Romania, the overlap between Orthodoxy and nationhood, while historically constructed, could become a situation of conflictual identities. Being Romanian now means being a democratic citizen and member of the European Union, while only 20 years ago it meant being under a communist regime. Seventy years ago, in World War II, it meant shifting allegiance from the Germans to the Russians. Yet, Romanians have always been Orthodox. Reconciling cosmopolitan and indigenous identities is one goal of successive Romanian governments. In the language of ethnic and civic nationalism, I argue that the latter is an insufficient basis for national identity. Civicness in new democracies is a measure of internalizing democratic values, but it does not replace the need for having a strong national identity that legitimizes and guarantees the nation state. Therefore, I argue that Orthodoxy, as an indigenous construction of

nationhood, pre-dates cosmopolitan versions of national identity, and is a sine qua non condition for democratic consolidation.

The Uniqueness of the Romanian Case Study

Romania is the only Orthodox country that was not part of the Russian Empire, either as a legal republic, or heavily influenced by pan-Slavic relationships, as was the case in Bulgaria. Romania was also not militarily conquered by the Ottoman Empire, and most of its history emphasized the struggle to resist Muslim conquest (although the sultan still named political leaders and taxed Romanian territories). Romania is the only Orthodox country whose official language is part of the Romanic family.

Because of its uniqueness, Romania is sometimes compared to Greece, which also has a strong autocephalous Orthodox Church and is not Slavic. Similar to the Romanian case, the Greek Orthodox Church was an agent of resistance to democratization and EU integration (Andreescu, 1998, p. 26). I ran similar models to those described in the previous chapter for Greece, trying to establish whether church and state in Romania and Greece have similar effects on the formation of attitudes. The results are mixed.[1] Greece is religiously homogenous, and the percentage of secular people is similar to that observed in Romania (smaller than 5%). Also, more religious Greek confidants are less supportive of procedural democracy, when controlling for education, income, age and political interest, which is similar to the effect of the Romanian Orthodox Church on political attitudes. Although the position of the Greek Orthodox Church is very strong

and has much political influence, I did not see the same correlation between the Orthodox denomination and national identity as in Romania. More religious Greek respondents are less supportive of democracy, but national identity is correlated positively with democracy.

Additionally, Greece is at a higher level of democratic development than Romania. Greece is considered a consolidated democracy. Therefore, I also tested the effect of religious variables on each component of the procedural democracy index (for instance rejection of communism was not included because of the obvious lack of Soviet communism). Religious variables had a stronger negative effect in the case of preferences for an authoritarian leader and citizens' criticism of the democratic system. Religion has no effect on attitudes regarding the option of having the army rule. On the one hand, religious Orthodox people in Greece have a more authoritarian preference and do not see democracy as the only game in town, when compared to their secularized, nominally Orthodox counterparts. On the other hand, Greek citizens who are proud of their nation are more supportive of democracy, which suggests a secular construction of Greek nationhood. The Greek case suggests that longer periods of democratic politics made the Church more accommodating of democratic values, without completely suppressing its antidemocratic stance. Nonetheless, constructions of nationhood in Greece are secular and, therefore, the question about Romanian uniqueness remains.

Communism in Romania was different than in the other Orthodox countries by not displaying subservience towards the Soviet regime (Verdery, 2003). Ceausescu distanced himself from the USSR and constructed a version of nationalist communism,

---

[1] For more detailed OLS results, please refer to appendix B.

comparable to Tito's Yugoslavia, except that it was based on a more homogenous ethnic composition of the population.

Romania is thus the only Latin Orthodox country, with a dominant autocephalous church, that also had a communist regime emphasizing national identity. National unity and the construction of the nation state have been historical priorities. The Romanian Orthodox Church historically played an important role in both. The church also played an important political role during communism, by ensuring the creation of a religiously homogenous space.

In the next section, I argue that the Romanian Orthodox Church constructed itself as the one true source and sole representative of national identity. This mission was assumed early on in history and it continues to be a critical component of the Romanian post-communist polity.

Christianization, Ethno-genesis and National religion

Here I show how the strong relationship between Orthodoxy and nationhood is an historical construction. I argue that, because of its geographical location, Romania became a battleground for the rivalry between the Orthodox and the Catholic streams of Christianity, while being at the same time a battleground for imperial conquests. Hence, Orthodoxy became one vehicle for protecting "true faith" and national identity against both the Ottoman Empire and the expanding tendencies of the Catholic world. Orthodox national identity accentuates Romania's uniqueness, and glorifies its quest for independence and unity. It is Orthodoxy that legitimizes the need of a Romanian nation state, because Orthodoxy represents at once resistance to Muslim and Slavic invasions and opposition to Catholic proselytism. Repeated incursions of conquering empires are

interpreted not only as acts of political war, but also as religious threats, either Muslim or Catholic.

The societal and political role of the Romanian Orthodox Church is embedded in the history of the Romanian people. Within Christianity, Orthodoxy proclaims itself the true Christian church, the right and only one (Ramet, 1988). Subsequently, Romanian Orthodoxy originated with the "true" church: "Christianity spread to our ancestors from the East, from the place of origin of Christianity itself." (Lupsa, 1992) Orthodox histories accentuate Romanian exceptionalism and self-sufficiency; during history, Romanians had to defend themselves from conquering powers, both religious and secular. This preoccupation with external threats resulted in a strategy of self-sufficiency and rejection of international alliances.

In the following, I present a history of the Romanian people as it is constructed by the Romanian Orthodox Church. This history emphasizes Romanians' ancient Christian origins and their uniqueness from the rest of the people in East Central Europe, as the only Latin Orthodox nation. Although the Orthodox view of history forms the dominant discourse in Romania, there is one contending discourse, namely, the view of history of the Greek-Catholic Church.[2] The Uniate Church contests dominant discourse by emphasizing Romania's similarity with Catholic Western Europe. The Church sees, I argue that the points of contention between the two rival histories are revealing of the two constructions of nationhood that the two churches defend, the indigenous and the cosmopolitan. While I concentrate on the Orthodox history of the Romanian people, I also analyze the Greek-Catholic contestations in order to demonstrate that the dominant

[2] Because the Greek-Catholic Church originated through the process of Uniation, it is also called the Uniate Church. Therefore, the two titles will be used interchangeably.

discourse came under criticism throughout time. In other words, although Orthodox definitions of nationhood have been historically legitimized by successive Romanian political regimes, this was not the only possible outcome, because of the Greek-Catholic contending paradigm. In fact, throughout history, the two constructions of nationhood have been in permanent interaction, and it is the political context that promoted one or the other.

The historical evidence used in this research was published and distributed under church supervision. The publication of these histories by religious publishing houses qualifies them as almost official church documents. They do not just represent the views of their authors, but also the institutional positions of each church. [3]

According to Lupsa (1992) and Savin (1992), the Orthodox Church selects three episodes that it considers fundamental in Romanian history. This selection and their presentation by the Orthodox Church is indicative of the church's construction of the Romanian past, and its self-assumed role in the creation of the Romanian nation. These episodes cover the whole history of the Romanian people, from their formation to the modern days, and they encompass fairly long periods of time.

The first episode consists of the Roman Empire conquering the territories between the Carpathians, the Danube and the Black Sea, during the first two centuries AD. This geographical area marks Romania's contemporary borders. These territories encompass three historical regions: Moldova, Valachia and Transylvania. Romanian ethno-genesis takes place during those times. According to the Orthodox Church, ethno-genesis of the

[3] Stefan Lupsa was an Orthodox priest, theologian and historian of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Ioan Savin was professor of theology and was imprisoned during communism. Both authors published during communism, and were re-published by the Romanian Orthodox Church after 1989 in an attempt to popularize Orthodox readings of Romanian history.

Romanian people coincided with their Christianization. However, there is no precedence of one event over the other: Romanians were simply born Christian.[4] The second episode takes place during the Middle Ages and emphasizes resistance to Ottoman expansion, framed in both secular and religious terms. The third episode consists of the two unifications of the Romanian people (1859 and 1918), and the fight for Romanian independence and self-determination (1877). These episodes cover lengthy periods of time and, in the Orthodox reading of history, their symbolism is more important than the actual covering of historical events. The Romanian Orthodox Church sees each episode as a fundamental building block of Romanian nationhood

The early phase starts with a dilemma. Some historians assert that after the Roman conquest, the entire population in the Romanian territories moved south of the Danube, and only returned in later centuries. The Romanian Orthodox Church opposes this view, and its reading of ancient history is focused on establishing Romanian continuity north of the Danube. Accepting disruptions in inhabitation would mean accepting that Orthodoxy arrived in Romanian territories from Bulgaria, and also agreeing on a foreign Christianizing source for Romanians. By establishing the continuity of Christianity, Romanians prove that "they were there", before any of their neighbours were and also pre-dated their neighbours' Christianization.

A major collection of proofs concerning Romanian-Orthodox continuity is linguistic. Romanian religious terminology preserves Greek terms, while the surrounding Christian peoples use either Latin or, later on, Slavonic terms:

[4] The simultaneity of ethno-genesis and Christianization is metaphorical. Obviously, both processes were rather long, and overlap was possible. The authors' emphasis on this simultaneity however, proves its importance in the Orthodox discourse on national identity.

> some words of our fundamental religious terminology preserve until today their purely Greek version, insignificantly Latinized, while others are the translation of Greek technical terms, but not into those specific to Western Christianity, but rather terms improvised on the spot, in our traditional milieu. (Lupsa, 1992, p. 7)

The very name of Jesus Christ was brought to the Romanian territories in its Greek version: Iisus Hristos, together with religious vocabulary such as: metropolitan, priest, monk, monastery, religious service, and Easter. Lupsa (1992) emphasizes that Romanian Christianity became spread by the work of Oriental/Greek missionaries and not Latin missionaries. For Romanian Orthodoxy, religion has to be performed in the people's language, thus solidifying the liaison between language, people and religion. National Orthodoxy opposes the privilege of a common church language – such as Latin in the Catholic Church, and Slavonic or Greek in the Orthodox Church. According to Savin (1992), privileged languages harm the cause of Christianity, presumably because they weaken the relationship between church and political authority. The Romanian Orthodox Church sees its long history of using Romanian language as another proof of its interest in preserving national identity.

The Romanian Orthodox Church also places the rivalry between Western and Eastern Christianity at the core of ethno-genesis. Western proselytism is a constant fear of Romanian Orthodoxy. The Christianization of the Slavic people on the Eastern borders of Romanian territories was therefore welcome, since it meant a consolidation of Byzantine power, and, at the same time, a barrier to Catholic proselytism. Nonetheless, starting with the Christianization of Hungarians in 1001, Franciscan and Dominican Catholic monks settled in the Romanian territories. Although on a papal mission for converting Romanians to Catholicism, these travelers were not effective in securing

adherents because of two reasons. First, Orthodox Churches eliminated the money tribute that each citizen was supposed to pay to the Catholic Church (dijma). Second, these foreign monks had the disadvantage of not knowing the language and, correlatively, not being able to communicate.

The early episode is thus characterized by the simultaneity of ethno-genesis and Christianization:

> we have ethnicity, language and religion in common [...] in Christian conception, the mission of each nation, and its goals, originates with a power, a higher regulating power of the world and of each nation, a power whose existence, even if hidden in mystery and often times difficult to understand, cannot be contested. (Savin, 1992, pp. 1-7)

Between 1204 and 1556, the Catholic Church staged a large proselytizing campaign in Romanian territories. In response to these strong offensives, the Orthodox Patriarchate in Constantinople created three Romanian Metropolitanates: in Valachia, Moldova and Transylvania, which correspond to the three historic Romanian regions that exist today. The creation of the three Metropolitanates, under the blessing of Constantinople, initiated the transition to the second historical episode, illustrated by Romanian opposition to Ottoman expansion. The course of history started to differ during this episode: while Moldova and Valachia fought Ottoman domination, Transylvania fell under the influence of Catholicism and Habsburg domination.

Moldova's and Valachia's resistance to the Muslim Turkish expansion was characterized by both physical resistance and the quest for recognition of their effort by the rest of Christianity. Savin (1992) asserts that the first mission that the Romanians had was the safeguarding of Christianity, against the Muslim threat. The author illustrates this point by invoking three Romanian political leaders, who defeated the Ottoman Empire at

different times in history. These political figures represent all three historical regions and so they also represent the unity of all Romanians in fighting the Turks. The general argument is that by fighting for Christianity, Romanians also fought for their nationhood.

The first prince, Mircea cel Batran, led Valachia in a fight against the Ottomans, at Rovine in the 14th century, and won. In the 15th century, Stefan cel Mare also defeated the Turks at Podul Inalt, while in the 16th century Mihai Viteazul defeated the Turks while trying to unite the three regions into one. He was killed by Habsburgs who, theoretically, were his allies in the war against the Ottoman Empire.[5] Stefan cel Mare asserted, in 1475, that

> Moldova is the gate of Christianity and if this gate is lost - God forbid - then the entire Christianity will be in great danger [...] and we swear on our Christian faith and with our word that we will stand and fight to death for our Christian faith" (in Savin, 1992: 10). Similarly, Mihai Viteazul made a pledge to Christianity: "all my life from youth to old age, in which I did not spare my effort, nor my blood, not even my life [...] [all of these] I did not because someone asked me to, but only to deserve and receive a place and a name in Christianity. (Savin, 1992, p. 10)

This military defensive was complemented by Orthodox cultural campaigns for the widespread circulation of Orthodox faith in all regions where Romanians lived. For instance, in Moldova, Vasile Lupu collaborated with Orthodox priests in the writing of *Testimony of Orthodox Faith*. Constantin Brancoveanu, in Valachia, in the 17th century, was concerned with the circulation of Orthodox writings across Orthodox territories. He supported Orthodox promotion abroad by ordering the printing of the Orthodox doctrine in Arabic. He ended up being decapitated with his entire family by the Ottomans.

---

[5] Romanian history textbooks emphasize the fight against Ottoman domination in a disproportionate measure. After 1989 such "patriotism" was called into question by the intellectual elite, but the structure of history manuals remained largely intact.

The third episode of Romanian history consists of two major events: the unification of Romanian territories in one state and the winning of its independence. In 1859 Moldova and Valachia united under Cuza, and, in 1918, Transylvania also became part of Romania, as a modern nation state. Also, in 1877, Romania acquired its independence in a war against the Ottoman Empire. Throughout this period of almost 60 years, the Romanian Orthodox Church was a vocal promoter of unification and self-determination. After 1918, the Romanian Orthodox Church began a campaign of strengthening its roots in Transylvania, which was primarily Catholic and previously had been ruled by the Habsburgs. During this period, a part of the Orthodox clergy formed a core of radical nationalist Orthodoxy. This reaction was triggered by the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the new Romanian state, and it eventually led to the formation of a fascist cell within the Romanian Orthodox Church. The peak of Orthodox nationalism in Romania was reached under the dictatorship of Marshall Antonescu, during the last two years of the Second World War (Livezeanu, 1995).

The Orthodox readings of Romanian history thus focus on Christian ethno-genesis and Christianization, the fight against conquering empires and proselytizing religions, and the glorification of the Romanian united and independent nation. This is, in fact, the dominant understanding of history in Romania, perpetuated during communism, and also after 1989. According to the Orthodox Church, Romanian national identity is an exclusively indigenous construction, resulted from opposition to both religious and secular enemies.

Nonetheless, the Greek-Catholic Church also claims to represent nationhood, and it has points of disagreement with the Orthodox reading of history. According to official

Uniate history, both Catholic and Orthodox readings of history concur in affirming the continuity of the Romanized population after the Roman departure in 271-275 under Aurelius. The Greek-Catholics/Uniates argue that "the indigenous population, already Romanized after 170 years [...] will remain there, ensuring continuity, which is so contested by those that demand the return to old and dead times." (Prundus & Plaianu, 1994, pp. 8-9) [6]

After the initial agreement on Romanian continuity after the decline of the Roman Empire, Greek-Catholic history shows evidence of a strong relationship between Romanian Christianity with and the Holy See, through the work of several missionaries sanctified by the Catholic Church. Greek-Catholic history rightfully emphasizes the fact that until 1054, the year of the big schism, there was neither Orthodoxy nor Catholicism. The millennium before 1054, when both churches agree on the Christianity of Romanians, was thus the work of one church, apostolic and having several centers of authority, including both Rome and Constantinople - the new Rome. According to the Uniates, Byzantium never controlled Romanian territory, except for the small southeastern part (Prundus & Plaianu, 1994, p. 9).

In addition to the emphasis on the independence from Byzantium, the Uniates also employ literary evidence, documenting the use of the Latin language in Romanian territories, in both religious and secular matters. Hence, Saint Ioan Cassian informed Rome about the religious situation of the Romanian Christians north of the Danube. According to his works written in Latin, *De incarnatione Domini contra Nestorium Libri VII*, Romanians were hostile to the Greek influence of the Byzantine Empire, whose only

[6] Clemente Plaianu and Silvestru Prundus are both part of the Greek-Catholic clergy, and also historians of the church. They are both vocal in the patrimonial conflict between the Orthodox and the Uniate Churches.

preoccupation was with world domination. Cassian further asserts, in opposition to Orthodox historians, that Byzantium clearly attempted to dominate the territory north of the Danube, and was perceived by the indigenous population, "the last bastion of Latin Christianity", as an illegitimate alien dominating power (Prundus & Plaianu, 1994, p. 10).

With the Christian Hungarian state growing, Transylvania became incorporated in various Hungarian and Hungarian/German empires, a situation that lasted until 1918 and resumed again in 1940 for a short time during the Vienna Diktat.

In 1688, Transylvania officially recognized the patronage of the Habsburg family. At that time, in the region there were 5 denominations: Calvinists, Lutherans, Unitarians, Catholics and Orthodox. The first three religions had a privileged status, while the latter two were discriminated against. After the official incorporation of Transylvania into the Habsburg Empire, Catholicism again became a privileged denomination.

The Uniate issue arose in this context. The 4 principles of a unification between Orthodox and Catholic, enunciated at the Council of Firenze-Ferrara (1438-1445), maintained the Orthodox rite intact, with the exception of the following changes: recognition of the Pope's supreme authority, the existence of Filioque - the Holy Spirit comes both from the Father and the Son, the existence of Purgatory, and the acceptability of azima for the Eucharist (Prundus & Plaianu, 1994). The Romanian bishops, Teofil and Atanasie Anghel, signed the agreement for unification. The major rationale behind accepting unification was the receiving of advantages only available for other religions.

The two Greek-Catholic authors conclude that unification with the Catholic Church was not forced. However, the position from which the Romanians were negotiating was hardly one of equality, because of the privileged status of both the

Catholic Church, and its secular supporter, the Habsburg Empire. The unification was framed in terms of a natural return to the mother church of Rome that implies a Catholic background and origins of Transylvania. In addition, there are writers who argue that the translation bias disoriented Romanian priests during the process of unification. They did not really understand the grandeur of the event - they were lured into making this move.

In summary, the Greek-Catholic Church contests the unique character of the Romanian nation, by emphasizing its traditional relationship with the Holy See and Catholicism (at least in Transylvania). The second point of contestation is represented by the formation of the Uniate Church itself in the 17th century. For the Romanian Orthodox Church, Uniatism represented a forced action of proselytism. For the Greek-Catholic Church, it represented the moment at which Romanian Christians could return to their Catholic roots.

This section presented the reader with the Orthodox reading of Romanian history, and also with the points of disagreement between the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic histories. Both the Orthodox and the Greek-Catholic churches claim to represent Romanian nationhood. Starting from the common point of continuous existence of the Romanian people north of the Danube after the decline of the Roman Empire, the two histories diverge on mostly every other point. While the Orthodox Church sees the Latin language and Catholic missionary expansion as the significant enemy "other" for the construction of Romanian nationhood, the Greek- Catholic Church constructs Latinity and connection with Rome as the essence of Romanian nationhood – a nation in Europe. On the one hand, Orthodox readings of history construct an independent unique Romanian nation, without any allies and surrounded by aggressive empires. On the other

hand, the Greek-Catholic Church constructs a Latin nation, part and parcel of Western Europe. The Orthodox Church portrays an indigenous vision of nationhood, while the Greek-Catholic Church constructs a cosmopolitan one. The Orthodox emphasize exceptionalism and difference, while Greek-Catholics emphasize a natural alliance to Western Europe. On the one hand, Catholic nationhood benefits from a transnational European structure that opposes the Muslim and Orthodox Other. On the other hand, the Orthodox construction of nationhood accentuates the self-sufficient Romanian self, and opposes the Catholic, Muslim, and Russian Other.

The rivalry between these two religious histories of the Romanian people offer two important insights into the relationship between church, state and nation. First, there is the dynamic, long lasting interaction between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. The "Orthodox nation" based on singularity, isolationism and independence, is rivaled by the "Catholic nation" emphasizing European values and the traditional Catholic transnationalism. Second, throughout centuries of interaction between churches, state and society, one can identify two critical junctures that are illustrative for my argument of contextualized path-dependency.

The first juncture takes place in 1698 through the creation of the Uniate Church in Transylvania. Orthodox history portrays it as a tragic occurrence, through which Romanian Orthodox people were forced to convert to Catholicism. Be that as it may, the important piece of evidence is the presence of Orthodox clergy that accept conversion. Orthodox doctrinal unity was then shattered, and the acceptance of a combination of Catholicism and Orthodoxy shows that the Orthodox Church was not a unitary actor and its political strategy was influenced by the local context. The second juncture is the

arrival of communism. According to Byzantine Orthodox tradition, the church should have resisted the communist regime's invitations for collaboration. Nevertheless, a significant part of the Orthodox Church clergy showed eagerness to collaborate with the regime, in order to safeguard its Orthodox identity. I argue that it is the unique nationalist nature of Romanian communism that led to maintaining the privileged status of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Consequently, when, after the collapse of communism, successive Romanian governments preserved the privileged status of the Orthodox Church, they attracted criticism from the part of the Greek-Catholic Church that accused them of promoting communist-type policies.

My analysis shows how the Romanian Orthodox Church became a symbol of national identity. With the arrival of communism, the government silently sanctioned the marriage between Orthodoxy and nationhood. Additionally, I also argue that the Romanian Orthodox Church, while the official carrier of national identity, was often put in positions of re-defining itself and its significant "Other" - which makes it a flexible institution. The next section will exemplify the privileged position that the Romanian Orthodox Church has after the fall of communism, and analyze in what ways these privileges are significant for constructions of nationhood and the church's mission.

Entitling Policies

I analyze two related policies formulated and promulgated by two different Romanian governments: the religious property restitution policy and the law on religious freedom. Both these policies favor the Romanian Orthodox Church and grant it almost a national status (at least a dominant status) within the Romanian religious space.

Both laws were designed in order to create a more equalized pluralistic religious space in Romania, a space in which Romania's Catholic tradition is also recognized, besides its Orthodox inheritance. Nonetheless, both laws grant the Romanian Orthodox Church a position of superiority in comparison to other religions, both in terms of symbolic status and access to pecuniary state support. Furthermore, both laws create entitlements through which Orthodox believers are more "worthy" of state support and recognition. Therefore, I suggest that, while the privileging of the Romanian Orthodox Church is indeed evident, one should also take into consideration the historical role of the Romanian Orthodox Church, and its input in the creation of national identity. In the light of the historical evidence presented in the previous section, not privileging the Romanian Orthodox Church would have been an attack on Romanian nationhood. Moreover, both laws impose regulations regarding religious freedom, pluralism, and private property. These are concepts associated with secular Western Europe, and accepted by the Catholic Church, which is considered by the Orthodox Church to be too flexible.

In this analysis, I ground my arguments in both official legal texts, and their interpretation in national Romanian press. While the laws themselves create a framework of analysis through the information they contain, the commentaries in the press, both secular and religious, is indicative of the society's response to the effects of these two laws. On one hand, the process of religious property restitution was couched in vague legal terms, and the government turned a blind eye to the enforcement of the law -- when one was eventually passed. The result of poor enforcement is a privileging of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The law on religious freedom in Romania, on the other

hand, explicitly constructs the Orthodox Church as more privileged and portrays Orthodoxy as an almost official state religion.

Religious Property Restitution

Restitution of religious property is part and parcel of the privatization and property rights creation in East Central Europe. There are different kinds of property, some of them belonging to individuals, some to institutions. Some kinds of property are represented by land, primarily destined for agriculture, while others are estates that include the land and the buildings on it. However, property restitution in Central and Eastern Europe emerges from the property regime established by the socialist order, and so does not occur from a tabula rasa (Verdery, 2003).

The starting point for understanding the context of property restitution policies is the communist outlawing of private property. After the end of the Second World War, private property was gradually eliminated (Verdery, 2003, Romanian official legislation).

Hardcore nationalization started with law 119 of 1948. This law entitled the state to take the industrial apparatus, banks, insurance companies, and mining and transportation companies as public property. By the decree 176 of 1948, the communist regime confiscated the property of churches, denominations, congregations and other individuals and communities that were fulfilling an educational function (e.g., owners of private schools). The Romanian Orthodox Church was allowed to keep the possession of its church buildings only. More interestingly, the buildings belonging to the Greek-Catholic Church were "given" to the Romanian Orthodox Church, as a consequence of placing the latter in an illegal status.[7] As mentioned in chapter 4, the communist regime

[7] Greek-Catholicism was a forbidden practice, the institution was outlawed, and many priests were imprisoned.

tolerated the Romanian Orthodox Church, with whom it initiated a strategy of collaboration. Roman Catholicism and Protestant denominations were in a way also accepted, but without any support from the state. In contrast, the Greek-Catholic Church was outlawed because of its direct relationship with the Catholic West, the large number of Romanian confidants, and the claim to represent Romanian national identity. In other words, the Greek-Catholic Church in Romania is a casualty of the Cold War, portrayed like a subversive institution, whose effect on the population would work against communism. Consequently, the Romanian state broke relationships with the Holy See.[8]

The communist regime nationalized private property in every sector of the economy. In the 1970s, Ceausescu both relaxed and tightened legislation on private property. Citizens obtained the right to purchase their flats, but each person had the right to own only one residence, and all were required to donate to the state whatever they had "in excess." Ceausescu also forbade the right to sell land in uncollectivized areas. The only legal method of transmitting property was through inheritance.

Communism brought about a situation of religious tolerance, as long as the political regime had the upper hand in regulating religious matters. The Romanian Orthodox Church was granted the position of the only tolerated church, and all Greek-Catholic possessions were turned over to the Orthodox clergy. The communist regime believed that controlling one institution would be easier than several (Tismaneanu, 2007).[9] In much of Eastern Europe, Orthodox clergy were tortured and the church suffered at the hand of secularizing communists. In Romania, the Church became an ally

[8] The breaking of diplomatic agreements between Romania and the Vatican took place on July 17th, 1948. Several Romanian communist leaders denounced the Holy See as promoter of Western Imperialism.

of the state, or, in Tismaneanu's words, "infiltrated" by the political class. In exchange for the communist regime recognizing its dominant status within the Romanian society, the Orthodox Church collaborated with the regime, including hosting political prisoners in their monasteries, on their way to death, or torturing representatives of other religions. The Tismaneanu report shows that a part of the Orthodox clergy became active members of the communist secret police, including the patriarch Teoctist. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church also entertained friendly relations with the Bulgarian political police, on the Soviet model, but after 1989, this became a salient issue that created both a schism within the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and also resulted in a growing number of non-religious people. In Romania, although there has been press coverage detailing the affiliation of some members of the Romanian Orthodox Church with the secret police, the public did not believe it, or chose not to take back the trust they invested in the church, and the Romanian government never mentioned anything along these lines. Maybe also because of Iliescu being a former communist leader, no Romanian government ever criticized the Romanian Orthodox Church. The Romanian Orthodox Church preserved its privileged status throughout communism, and Ceausescu's nationalist regime served its interests very well, because it was focused on asserting Romania's independence from any neighboring empires, and insisted on the construction of national identity. Most Romanian Catholic and Protestant churches remained in the property of the rightful

[9] Vladimir Tismaneanu is a Romanian political scientist and a professor at the University of Maryland. The Romanian government commissioned him to produce a report on the features of Romanian communism and its relationship with various members of civil society.

owners, but the numbers of their confidants were much smaller than those of the Greek-Catholic Church who suddenly saw themselves in the position of having to either abandon their religion, or convert to orthodox faith.

After the fall of communism, a process began to return the land that was collectivized during communism. The main motivation behind this policy was the incapacity of the government to promote state-led agriculture, communist style, due to its lack of profitability. In addition, the internationally led transition to democracy accentuated the need to reestablish private property (Verdery, 2003). Former owners of homes claimed their possessions, and the restitution was done according to case-by-case rulings. Slowly, policies of property restitution were formulated, but it took more than a decade for Romania to formally implement these policies. Therefore, the same case-by-case principle functioned in the property claims formulated by the Greek-Catholic Church. The issue context was thus dominated by a general preoccupation in the early 90s with restitution of property illegally confiscated by the communist regime. Public opinion was favorable to the restitution to some extent (according to Romanian Public Opinion Barometer in the early and mid 1990s) and the fairness of the initiative was saluted by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Union.

When the Greek-Catholic Church voiced demands for restitution, however, the government seemed to be oblivious and did not respond. Early in the 1990s, the government recognized that there might be a conflict between the Orthodox and the Greek-Catholic Churches, but it did not acknowledge responsibility for resolving it. Rather, the government encouraged the two churches to engage in a dialogue to resolve

their litigations (Mediauno, 1993). Without a clear policy, restitution of the Greek-Catholic possessions proceeded in two unsuccessful ways.

First, one of the Romanian Orthodox regional leaders recognized the right of the Greek-Catholic Church to repossess what they owned before communism, and thus agreed to give back some of the churches to the Uniates. Archbishop Corneanu of Timisoara also pledged support for friendly relations (Lazu, 2002). In cities or villages in which there is more than one church, and at least of one them used to be the property of the Greek-Catholic Church, Corneanu generally attempted to give the church back to the Catholics, but was proscribed from doing so by the Orthodox central authority in Bucharest. In situations where only one church existed, Corneanu proposed a principle according to which both denominations worshipped in the same church, but at different times. This principle was also adopted in other areas. However, the use of churches by the Greek-Catholics continues to be perceived as illegitimate by the Orthodox Church, which can stop Greek-Catholic worship at any time (Lazu, 2002).

Second, Greek-Catholics mobilized and took over some of their churches by force, as in the case of Cluj-Napoca or Reghin (Ionescu, 1991). In the former city, the proportion of Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches is roughly equal, but the Orthodox still had full control of both Greek-Catholic and Orthodox churches. The Greek-Catholics held their services in a public square. During the liberal government of 1996-2000, political and religious Greek-Catholic hierarchs collaborated and took over churches by force. In these cases, forceful occupation of one Orthodox Church by Greek-Catholics triggered marches organized by the Orthodox Church to protest against the illegality of the Greek-Catholics. According to the 1992 Romanian Census, the Greek-Catholic

Church had a little over 200,000 believers, or 1% of the country's population. It also had 2 cathedrals and 212 churches, with only a minority being in its use. In proportion to the number of Greek-Catholic confidants, the Orthodox Church argued that they had sufficient places of worship. However, absolute numbers are not as important for the Uniate Church, as the action of restoring property rights.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe asked the Romanian state repeatedly throughout the 1990s to ensure freedom of religion and its exercise in Romania (Lazu, 2002). This external intervention was triggered by both the patrimonial conflict and the harsh reaction of the Romanian Orthodox Church to Protestant proselytism. The latter became widespread in postcommunist Romania, and the Orthodox Church resents the loss of believers.

Given these increasingly contentious conditions, the issue of solving the patrimonial conflict between the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches became a priority of the Romanian government in the late 1990s. The government wanted to demonstrate that democracy works in Romania, and solving patrimonial conflicts became one way to demonstrate the success of democratization to international funders.

Therefore, the 2002 policy classified the patrimonial conflict as a non-issue. The government stated that all the possessions confiscated by the communist regime belonging to churches would be given back to them, except those churches and their possessions that were in use (by the Orthodox Church) at the time when the law passed.

The Romanian Orthodox Church argues that the Greek-Catholic Churches were not confiscated by the Romanian communist state, but rather given directly to the Orthodox Church, so that the claim to restore property rights over previously confiscated

goods does not apply (Candela Moldovei, 1997). Additionally, many of the Greek-Catholic confidants converted to Orthodoxy during communism, and so did some of their priests. According to Orthodox doctrine, the churches do not belong to either the state or the church, but to the community of confidants who are now Orthodox themselves (Candela Moldovei, 1997). However, they ignore the fact that significant numbers of converts to Orthodoxy chose to go back to Greek-Catholicism after 1989. Today, these people see themselves in a position of not having a place to worship (Lazu, 2002).

The Greek-Catholic argument is that the churches were built by the Catholic Church and taken away by the communist regime, so the Catholic Church is entitled to full restoration of its property. The pope made an appeal to the Romanian government to proceed to *restitutio in integrum,* but the Romanian government denied his claim (Catholica, 2001).

The Romanian Government asserted the need to restore property rights but also expressed reluctance about how this could be done. Prime-minister Nastase affirmed in 2001 that the government might draft a law regarding restoration of property rights that would affect both churches and express a neutral point of view (Mediauno, 2002). Nastase also asserted that restoration of property rights is a principle that serves both the Orthodox and the Greek-Catholic Church. However, the Romanian president Ion Iliescu stated that because many Greek-Catholics converted to Orthodoxy, there was no need for a *restitutio in integrum* (Mediauno, 2002) He also cited problematic cases in which there exists one church but two denominations, and stated that the principle of proportionality would be used in these situations.

State support for the Orthodox Church in this patrimonial conflict oscillated from obvious privileging during times when the government was composed of former communist leaders (1989-1996, 2000-2004) to an attempt to *restitutio in integrum* during the liberal government of 1996-2000. However, even during the latter, the parliament did not succeed in passing a law returning Greek-Catholic churches.

Even in the few cases when the courts granted the Greek-Catholic Church full ownership over its places of worship, the state refused to enforce the decision (Mediauno, 2002). Finally, in 2005, the Romanian state started to enforce the law on the restitution of property to the Greek-Catholic Church, and consequently, the latter now has access to most of its former places of worship. Members of the Romanian Orthodox Church, especially Metropolitan Bartolomeu of Cluj, criticized heavily this governmental policy, advocating the need to return property according to the effective number of confidants, and not according to a *restitutio in integrum.*

The religious property restitution law, and the long time that it took to be promulgated and enforced, construct the Romanian Orthodox Church as more deserving of state support. The state deliberately preserved an Orthodox privilege in the matter of property to the detriment of other religions, especially the Greek-Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church and other Protestant denominations, however, managed to claim property from the state. Interestingly, the Roman Catholic Church did not offer to help its Greek-Catholic sister throughout the process of property restitution. At first glance, the privileging of the Romanian Orthodox Church in this patrimonial conflict seems unjust and unwarranted. Nevertheless, as I will argue at the end of this section, a contextualized understanding of the process of property restitution needs to take into consideration both

the historic role of the Orthodox Church and its relationship with the state, and also the Western construction of private property.

The Law on Religious Freedom and the General Regime Governing Religion

The property restitution policy is not the only indicator of the Romanian state's strategy towards privileging the Romanian Orthodox Church. In addition, the Romanian government only recently passed a law defining the regime of religion and church. A brief presentation of this new law strengthens the argument developed in the previous section.

The law on religious freedom and the general regime of religious denominations, number 489/2006, specifies constitutional provisions regarding the status and role of religion and church in post communist Romania. The timing of this law is significant and represents the Romanian government's attempts at delaying it for as long as possible. Although the EU and other international organizations have been pressuring Romania to pass such a law, successive government have failed to do so, because of major disagreements in the two Parliamentary chambers. Until December of 2006 the law governing religion was the initial 1948 communist decree on religions, marginally amended by the 1991 Constitution. In other words, the major principles delineating the relationship between church and state were the same from the beginning of communism, with provisions regarding freedom of religion and the recognition of different religious denominations. Although both chambers of the Parliament passed this law with an overwhelming majority, the whole event has not been popularized through mass-media. Before promulgating this law, president Basescu faced protests from both national and international actors, criticizing it for being essentially anti-democratic. Nationally, every

single religious organization and church, except for the Romanian Orthodox Church, protested against it. Internationally, both the OSCE Helsinki Commission and the Center for Religion and Public Policy in Washington, DC, voiced criticism.

This law does not grant the Romanian Orthodox Church the status of national church, although intensive debates on this possibility have accompanied the law on religion project throughout the years. However the formulation in the promulgated law states that the Romanian state "recognizes the important role of the Romanian Orthodox Church and other religions that are recognized in national history and in Romanian society" (text of law). The special mention of the Romanian Orthodox Church is the first symbolic element through which the legislature recognizes the unequal status of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The law has been criticized on the following accounts: over regulation of the religious space, restrictive legislation for founding religious associations, cults or groups; and too intrusive a relationship between church and state -- too strong for a lay state.

The over regulation of the religious space refers to a set of provisions that stipulate state intervention, in situations that, within the group of western consolidated democracies, the state would not normally intervene. For instance, while each religion is supposed to be financially independent from the state, the latter can also intervene in their financial matters, and supplement funds according to the number of confidants of each religion. The principle of proportionality privileges the Orthodox Church, but it also has a back firing effect on other denominations because of the right of state intervention in their financial matters. The restrictive regulation for founding new religious organizations is probably the most undemocratic part of the law. According to the new law, in order to

be able to create a religious organization one needs 300 members (as opposed to a mere 3 when creating any other type of non governmental organization). Furthermore, the law becomes even more restrictive in terms of new religions that want to be registered in Romania. Basically, a new church must have a starting membership of 0.1% of Romania's 24 million population, all in original signature lists, and the proof of uninterrupted legal functioning as a religious association on Romanian territory for at least 11 years. It is the most restrictive such law in the group of OECD countries, and even Macedonia, a neighbor that Romania often looks down to has a more democratic law on religious freedom. Finally, the tight connection between the state and religion is manifested through an attempt at regulating the religious space and everything related to it, from legislating over the improper use and abuse of religious symbols (which has never happened before in Romania) to religious education and burial rights. Additionally, every single recognized religious group or church needs to re-prove that it has eligible status according to the new law.

The law on religious freedom is in fact non democratic and favors the denominations that are already functioning in Romania, precluding the possibility of having a competitive market of religions. The Romanian Orthodox Church is considered the most important church, it enjoys most of the state support, and, through this law, it is protected against proselytism.

Policy Analysis

The combined effect of both laws on the Romanian religious space is the following: first, the Romanian Orthodox Church is placed in a position of privilege - and, in some respect, above the law – since it is allowed to keep property, which, arguably, it does not

rightfully own. Second, and as a consequence of the first, Romanian Orthodox confidants are more entitled to exercise their religious rights than members of other denominations, because of the sheer support of the state for the Orthodox Church. Third, major religions, such as Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam are recognized by the Romanian state, and benefit from its support, according to a principle of proportionality. Fourth, new religions are discriminated against and have difficulties being recognized or registered in Romania.

From a liberal democratic point of view, heavy regulation of the religious space, intrusive state regulation of the religious market and religious favoritism is undemocratic. Nonetheless, if one contextualizes the position of the Romanian Orthodox Church and its historical symbiotic relationship with state and nation, the image may change. Both private property and free religious space are Western concepts.

In terms of private property, Katherine Verdery explains in which ways it affects Romanian society after 1989; from a nation of workers and peasants, Romania has become a nation of property owners (Verdery, 2003). Property, understood as private property, is a Western concept: "I see property variously as a "western native" category, a symbol, a set of relations and a process." (p. 15) Processes of private property restitution across Central and Eastern Europe are part of a social and cultural strategy, in which a foreign idea is implanted on indigenous soil. Moreover, international monetary organizations and direct financial support from Western countries make progress towards capitalism a prerequisite for deployment of funds to countries undertaking democratic transition (Verdery, 2003).

In Central and Eastern Europe, privatization takes two main forms. First, there is the process of property creation, through the dissolution "of state ownership over good

and objects that had been newly created during the socialist period by socialist means." (Verdery, 2003, p. 5) Second, there is the restitution of property that preceded communism. *Restitutio in integrum* (a return to pre-communist property regimes in a strict fashion) is advocated by the European Union, as a condition for successful integration of candidate countries. But from a temporal perspective, restitution of property rights is problematic. If property is to be restored to the rightful owners, how far back in time should one go? It is obvious that some goods had different owners over time, and hence governmental policy must establish which owner is "rightful."

Church property is also one of such problematic issues. When the government decides who is the rightful owner, the process reflects property construction rather than a return to a "natural" situation. In the case of the church, there is no "natural" time before communism. On the one hand, Greek-Catholic discourse asserts property rights over its possessions at the beginning of communism as a natural time. On the other hand, the Romanian Orthodox Church discourse places the issue in a broader context, and it makes reference to the moment of the creation of the Uniate Church, and how it took away Orthodox property at that point.

Another problematic point is the framing of the discussion in terms of rights. Property as an actual possession over assets is a mere economic state of things; restoring property rights suggests a political process of entitlement.

Laura Jensen (2003) theorizes on entitlements in American social policy and argues that the "law is implicated in people's struggles to define themselves as individuals and as groups [...] [as a result of which] people and things come to be recognized as differentiable, [how] difference is inscribed in and reified by legal categories." (p. 13)

The identities that entitlements suggest are not exclusive and, surely, they are subject to contestation from the underprivileged groups. However because of the powerful legal content of entitlements, they "play a central role in the development and legitimation of nation-states." (Jensen, 2003, p. 15)

A combined reading of both Verdery and Jensen leads to the conclusion that restituting private property is a process constitutive of deservingness and entitlement. More importantly, private property and especially property restitution policy is an application of Western legal concepts. Religious pluralism and a free market of religions is a western democratic concept, and not a trademark of Orthodox countries. It is no coincidence that all countries with a dominant Orthodox Church in the set of 14 have higher levels of government regulations for religion, and, in fact, a protectionist stance towards their Orthodox Churches. In Romania, in particular, I argue that the strong relationship between Orthodoxy and nationhood, coupled with the high levels of religious identification within the population, makes it impossible for any government to open up the religious market and offer the same treatment to every religion without harming national unity. The tight grip that the Romanian Orthodox Church has on society makes it a very efficient mobilizer. As Metropolitan Bartolomeu of Cluj stated with reference to a *restitutio in integrum* of Greek-Catholic Churches: "this measure makes us revisit our neutral strategy in the next elections." (Adevarul de Cluj, 2006) Furthermore, Orthodox Churches, in general, have a critical stance towards Western values, especially secularization and liberalism, and, even procedural democracy has a clear Western stamp (Byrnes, 2006).

The Role of Religion in Post-Communist Romania According to Catholic and Orthodox Clergy

Based on secondary data, I argue that, in Romania, the relationship between church and state is historically embedded, and that the state privileges the Romanian Orthodox Church because of the constructed relationship between Orthodoxy and Romanian nationhood. I showed that the unique role played by the Orthodox Church throughout Romanian history, including the communist period, places it in a dominant position. I also showed that successive post-communist governments have preserved this status, by granting the Orthodox Church an almost state church status. I conclude that the privileged that the Romanian Orthodox Church enjoys are part of a strategy of the state to balance Romania's dual identity, both as a European nation, and a separate nation state. Interviewing members of both the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Greek-Catholic Church is another way of understanding how the two churches construct their role and position in democratic Romania, and their relationship with both the state and their confidants.

I conducted interviews with 10 members of the Orthodox Church and 3 Greek-Catholic clergy, in two cities in Romania, Cluj and Arad. Both these cities are in the northwestern region, where there is more religious pluralism, and overall a more cosmopolitan and liberal attitude. It is also the region where the vast majority of Greek-Catholic believers is concentrated. The geographic concentration of these interviews is also due to the researcher's points of access to respondents. It is noteworthy that the Orthodox clergy was very reticent in accepting to be interviewed. Many attempts at having a conversation with Orthodox priests were met by institutional arguments, invoking the need of approvals from the higher leadership and a lack of transparency

about the church's inner workings. Therefore, in many cases the voice recorder was not permitted. The interviews did not follow a strict interview guide; instead, I preferred to have discussion about the role of the church in society, and its relationship with the state.

The views expressed in these interviews belong to only a few members of the clergy of the Greek-Catholic and Orthodox Churches, and hence are not generalizable. They offer a limited perspective on the roles assumed by religion and church in post 1989 Romania. Nevertheless, these interviews are important in suggesting directions for future research, and in informing the debate on the relationship between religion and democracy in Romania.

I present these interviews along denominational lines. It became apparent to me early on in this data collection effort, that Catholic and Orthodox clergy have different views of both the relationship between church and state, and also about the role of their respective churches in democratic Romania. Therefore, I will first present the data collected form the Greek-Catholic respondents that I then contrast with the results from the Orthodox group of subjects. The presentation of the primary data is followed by my analysis and interpretation of these results, which I then place in the context of the larger research.

The interviews will show that although Orthodox and Catholic clergy have different views on secularization and the role of religion and church in democratic Romania, some similarities still exist. In fact, some of the Orthodox priests that I interviewed expressed very favorable views towards democracy and liberalism, while others remained more critical. I believe that this disagreement within Orthodox clergy is indicative of the church's flexibility towards democracy and its propensity to accept

democratic values, provided that its place in the Romanian religious space is not threatened.

Catholic priests praise their believers for motivation in trying to solve the community's problems. The Greek-Catholic clergy is constantly collaborating with their believers in order to carry on their social mission, or for the organization of religious and cultural events. Greek-Catholic clergy realizes that people need to talk, and need to find spaces where they can talk about their problems, either individual or collective. As one of my informants put it:

> The Greek-Catholic Church is preoccupied with offering its believers, and not only to them, to any interested citizen, a space for discussion; it wants to become an arena for discussion, where people can meet and talk about all sorts of things, not necessarily religious. The Greek-Catholic Church tries to secularize as much as possible from its social services, in order to implement the principle of subsidiarity, which, in the end, will bring people in closer contact with the church, and make them more attached to the values we are preaching.

The solution to declining religious participation is a "rejuvenation" of the church, the introduction of more tolerant principles and more modern topics for discussion. Greek-Catholic priests are often highly educated, and trained in France and Italy. One priest told me that he is constantly trying to understand the problems that teenagers face, by having close communication with them and organizing church group meetings to discuss these problems. Flexibility within the church leadership allows for its transformation into a more attractive option for confidants.

The Greek-Catholic Church sees its social mission as extremely important. In fact, its social mission is embedded in its doctrine. Modeled from the Western European Catholic Church, and the transnational Catholic tradition, the Greek-Catholic Church is

autonomous from Romanian secular power, and it carries its mission without any such support. The Greek-Catholic Church is a skilled entrepreneur. After receiving back from the state a palace surrounding a cathedral (part of the religious property restitution policy), the Church turned the building into a profit earning mechanism by renting it out to local businesses, and to funding church activities.

The Greek-Catholic Church also has a different view on politics than the Orthodox Church. In the Catholic Church "we do not discuss politics, like the Orthodox do. When there are elections, we just kindly remind people not to forget about their voting duty, but the discussion ends there."

Overall, the Greek-Catholic clergy that I interviewed agree on the need of re-inventing their churches in order to respond better to both the confidants' needs and to become an institution anchored in the contemporary social reality. One sees a fair amount of consistency between these views and the European wide strategy of the Catholic Church after Vatican II. The emphasis is on the need for shifting gears toward a more pragmatic and down to earth approach to religion, in fact a more "secular" approach. It is precisely in reference to this approach that the Orthodox Church constructs its criticism of Catholicism.

Most of the Orthodox clergy believe that their mission is to be an administrator of their church, but they also include the need to be responsive to people's spiritual needs, and even "to defend the values of Orthodoxy." One priest believes in the freedom extant within the Orthodox Church "The Romanian Orthodox Church offers freedom, it does not constrain, it does not assert that it is the best, and it teaches Christians to defend their

faith. There is no mass-spread proselytism as Jehova's Witness." Another priest perceives himself as a role model

> The leaders of the Romanian Orthodox Church are well educated, cultured people, true life models to be followed by younger priests. Spirituality however is not one of the priorities of today's people. People are more preoccupied with mundane/earthly concerns, and not heavenly concerns; today, people are concerned about tomorrow, and so God exits the equations. During the 24 hours of one day, every person can/should talk to God a few minutes.

They see themselves as helping to build a healthy character for their confidants, as social missionaries, going as far as to say that the priest "is the light of the world that helps people arrive at identification with God."

The Orthodox Church does not have a traditional social mission, but rather punctual interventions when it is needed. Whenever natural catastrophes hit, the church is there to help. The church does not collaborate with any other organizations: "the Romanian Orthodox Church is very hierarchical, and so we do what we are told from the Patriarchy." One of the most important goals is the building of new churches, under the assumption that people are not participating in as large as expected numbers to the service because there is not enough church space. Therefore, the Orthodox Church gathers money from the City Hall, the Patriarchy, and the Ministry of Culture and Religions in order to build more such edifices: "we would like that at least one member from each family comes to the Sunday service every week." So it is the Orthodox Church's belief that decreasing attendance at services is due only to the lack of proper spatial accommodation, which does not seem to be the case, given that the Orthodox Church has the most churches in the country. This preoccupation also illustrates the

Orthodox Church's interest in the resolution of the patrimonial conflicts between itself and the Greek-Orthodox Churches.

Although most of the Orthodox respondents tried to avoid any question referring directly to the ongoing conflict with the Greek-Catholic Church, when they did answer, all of them believed that the illegal occupation of Greek-Catholic Churches by the Romanian Orthodox Church should continue, because most believers are Orthodox or because the number of Orthodox believers is much higher than that of any other denomination. When asked whether the state should return property to the pre-communist owners, in terms of religious property, the respondents either said no, or agreed, but only "after a careful evaluations of the number of confidants of each denomination."

Most of the Orthodox clergy that I interviewed believe that the Romanian people are fairly religious, but they are alarmed by the increasing rates of secularization. Most villages preserve "the inheritance people had from the ancestors", but even there "there are question marks." The priests placed this situation on the maleficent influence of the European Union, democratization and intense contact with the western world especially through massive seasonal work migration in Romania. European integration is viewed with skepticism, the EU being identified as a detractor of the church, through its emphasis on the legalization of homosexuality and of abortion: "Romania's entry in the EU has desacralizing consequences, tradition is not important any longer, the EU tells you what and how to do, and a person that has respect/faith in itself should never give up their ancestral inheritance." On the other hand, the same priest believes that "it is good that borders are opening, you can exploit what was not available before, new horizons have opened, new thinking systems. The Romanian Orthodox Church should not be

worried because the gates of hell will not conquer it." Secularization is also blamed on EU integration and pressures for democratization

> There is an agenda now focused against abortion, gay and lesbians – they are expressing themselves nowadays and this is not good, and this did not happen before. Now you have the freedom of being Orthodox. In the old days there were martyrdoms and, as a result, more people were converting to faith. Now it is freedom, but there are not that many confidants.

Surprisingly, when asked whether the Romanian Orthodox Church should have a special status in relationship with the other denominations, answers were mixed. About half of the respondents believed that the Orthodox Church should have a privileged status because of its size and role in history, while the rest believed that it should just be a church among others.

However, when asked how the state should support the Romanian Orthodox Church, all of the respondents believed that either the state is not supporting it at all or, that the support is insufficient. Some priests argued that the state should grant the Romanian Orthodox Church national status, and "it should be more involved in solving the status of the priest in the society." The last assertion was qualified later in the interview, and it refers to the fact that priests should play a more important political role, and should be highly visible in any social or political problem. A minority of the respondents believed that priests should not be involved directly in politics, while the majority said believed that "religious leaders should be members of the Parliament, or at least the higher echelon." The majority also said that "they should be politically involved because it is not good for politics to develop along parallel lines with religion and not take into account morality," and "at present the Romanian Orthodox Church is not

represented in the Parliament and its rights are not advocated properly." In addition, one informant said:

> priests should participate in some political debates, because many laws are passed without taking into account certain principles, and they lead to moral degradation. The God fearing priests should have this agenda. The priest does not make political propaganda in the Church, but says 'you should go vote for the well being of the whole country'.

In general, Orthodox priests rarely have any contacts with other churches, preferring to act within their own church, and with the support of the state in all their missions. When such collaborations did occur, they were with Protestant Churches and never with the Catholic Church.

Finally, in order to test the relationship between Orthodox faith and nationhood, priests were asked whether they believe that there is a relationship between the Orthodox religion and national identity, and they responded unanimously in the affirmative, along the lines of "because the Romanian people were born Orthodox." I also asked what is the role of ROC in Romanian history, and this was the one question that yielded the most interesting answers. Every single respondent believed that the most important role of the ROC in history was to ensure national unity. The assertion varied from "national unity and preservation of cultural unity," or "an important role in the formation and development of the Romanian nation, faith, language, since they are also prevalent today," to more dramatic statements such as "keeping alive the national identity feeling, and the religious feeling, and tradition, and everything that means the Romanian people's tradition as a nation that was born Christian," "Apostle Andrew promoted Orthodox faith in Romania, we have been Orthodox from the beginning, and today is the same as always."

The interviews with Catholic and Orthodox clergy suggest several denominational differences in terms of the role of the church and the priest in democratic Romania. While the Catholic clergy believe that secularization should be counteracted by the church becoming more attractive for believers, the Orthodox clergy believe that the solution is the construction of more places of worship. Moreover, the European Union, and democratization in general are constructed as responsible for the loss of morals and social values in Romanian society. Even if most clergy consider that the European Union has some negative effects on Romanian society, most of them also believe that democracy and integration are desirable. While the Catholic Church tries to mobilize communities of believers in exercising their charitable social mission, hence having a pro-active approach, the Orthodox Church has a reactive approach, tending to problems as they arise. The Greek-Catholic Church does not count on the Romanian state as a source of their financial well-being and tries to exploit its own assets, while the Romanian Orthodox Church sees its partnership with the state as natural in all their missions. Catholic clergy argue that the priest should not be involved in politics, while the Orthodox clergy believes in a strong moralizing role for the priest in the society, going in so far as to claim church representation in the Parliament. Additionally, the Orthodox clergy believes that the state is not offering sufficient support to the Orthodox Church and that it should be more supportive of it because of the traditional role played during history.

The Romanian Orthodox Church's mission is unanimously considered to be the preservation of Romanian identity and national unity. This last finding is fascinating because it illustrates the heavy emphasis that the church places on its political role,

although Romanian identity has not been threatened in decades. The influence of historically constructed threats seems to have long lasting effects.

Conclusion and Discussion

The three types of evidence above concur in affirming that the relationship between the state and the Romanian Orthodox Church is indeed strong. The Orthodox construction of nationhood is widely present in historical discourse, and, even at the level of Orthodox clergy, the idea of national identity and unity designates the most important role of the Orthodox Church in past, present and future, as that of protecting Romanian identity from outside threats of religious and secular invasion. In the conclusion, I discuss constructions of nationhood in Romania, and explain the role played by religious discourse in shaping these constructions.

The concept of nationhood penetrated discourse very early in history and soon became the filter for many political and social issues. Verdery (1991) believes that the discourse on nation actually overcame the Marxist discourse of communism: "a discourse about unity and continuity - the nation - overwhelmed one about differentiation and change – Marxism." (p. 12) The nation is present as a concept in many spheres of the social and the political. Verdery (1991) argues that the discourse on nation has structuring properties over other competing discourses.

Fear of invasion by any of the three neighboring empires (Russian, Ottoman, and Austrian) caused Romanians to react by claiming their own nation. Verdery (1991) affirms that "at the very beginning [...] Romanian identity was to be linked with historical truth as a site of representations for pursuing the truth about the Nation (cf. Foucault 1977, p. 143), understood as a question of origins."(p. 153)

The cosmopolitan Romanian nation is the one that is part of Europe and the Latin language is the ultimate argument in this discussion. During history, Romanian princes solicited assistance from Western powers in order to stop one or other imperial invasions, and they based their claims on the common noble Latin origin.

Partly triggered by the refusal of Western powers to help, but also by western constructions of Romanianness that equaled backwardness and inferiority (Todorova, 1997), a new version of national identity occured, namely the indigenous one, that refuses contact with Western Europe and prefers to emphasize Romanian uniqueness. It is not by accident that the supporters of this view of the nation emphasize Dacian origin.

Several other major discourses had to be structured along these two conflictual lines of conceptualizing the nation (Verdery, 1991). The cosmopolitan version associates itself with ideas of progress, democracy, individual rights, and a bourgeois system of classes. By contrast, the indigenous view emphasizes Romanians' attachment to their land, and portrays the Romanians as happy traditionalist peasants who dislike the intrusion of foreignness. The open cosmopolitanism was opposed by the patriarchal indigenousness. Orthodoxy was one idea often used to support the indigenous view of national identity.

It is obvious that different political regimes promoted one view or the other. For instance, in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the German monarchy and liberal values entering the Romanian space there is a push towards more cosmopolitan views. Indigenous reactions are still present, especially through the communicational channels of Orthodoxy and class structure. A second example is the construction of national identity as indigenous during the Ceausescu regime. Romanian uniqueness was

promoted by the communist regime up to an unreasonable level, through the so-called intellectual protochronist current. The homonym movement asserted that Romanians were the first to discover all the important political and social changes that took place in Western Europe, including the modern trends in the arts and literature. A revolt of the peasantry in the late eighteenth century was thus interpreted as the antecessor of the French Revolution. Nevertheless, even in communist Romania, the elite was split between the two views on nationhood, the cosmopolitans sometimes paying dearly for expressing a disgraced point of view.

Democratization and integration in European structures requires the embracing of European values. According to Mungiu (2001), Romania has completed transition since there is no actor on the political stage that would question the rules of the democratic game. Nation as a structuring principle of the discourse is thus minimized by the broader concept of democratization. If nation was able to dominate Marxist ideology, it is not capable of doing the same with democracy and capitalism. A cosmopolitan view of nation is forced upon Romanians by the program of democratization orchestrated from outside. In addition, rejecting the cosmopolitan view of nation, the one that connects Romania to Europe, would have been reason for the West to accentuate its discourse on the negative nationalism of Eastern Europe. Recalling Connolly's approach to the globalization of contingency, the Romanian government has diminished control over its citizens and national issues, because of the West's interference in national political, social and cultural arenas. Anti-progressist and anti-globalization attitudes are eliminated a priori if Romania wants to become part of the European Union. In this context,

privileging the Orthodox Church is just a way of preserving the other view of nation, the indigenous model.

However, this legitimation of true Romanianness through Orthodoxy does not necessarily imply a radical nationalist stance. Indigenous and cosmopolitan views of nation carry the meanings of change and continuity respectively. Propensity for change and necessity for continuity force the actors involved in formulating the discourse on national identity to continously reconsider their position.

According to Ramet (2006), all churches are conservative, but Orthodox Churches are most resistant to change. Ramet argues that there are several reasons for this aversion to transformation: the absence of Rennaisance and Englightenment as fundamentally transformative processes in Western Europe, the availability of Slavophilia as an alternative paradigm, late urbanization and lower educational attainment, and the periods of communism. Because of all these reasons, Orthodox Churches maintain a tighter grip on the society and are able to maintain their attachment to an idyllic past.

Although Ramet herself believes that "no institution – and that means also no Church – can be understood outside its historical context," the reasons that she mentioned are reifying in and of themselves. In the case of Romania, Rennaisance and Englightenment are present, although delayed, and Slavofilia has no appeal, because of the Latin inheritance (Ramet, 2006, p. 149). Also, communism was not conducive to the Romanian Orthodox Church's aversion to change, since in the period immediately preceding communism, the Church had a very important status (through its participation in the far right movement). Therefore, even if she agrees that context matters, her explanation for the never changing position of the Orthodox Churches is not complete. I

argue that because structure and agency are mutually constitutive, context is not generalizable at any time. The Romanian state is fairly new, and had to adapt in less than 100 years from a foreign imposed enlightened monarchy, to a repressive communist totalitarian regime, and to a new liberal democracy. The Romanian Orthodox Church had to change from the only religion in the country, to a period of intense secularization, and to a situation of increasing religious pluralism. The Romanian people had to change from illiterate farmers, to proletarian workers, to property owners and voters in a democratic country. In a history dominated by change, national identity is the only symbol of continuity and stability.

The general conclusion of this case study is that democratization can take different forms, and that modernization does not necessarily imply privatization of religion. In the case of Romania, the Orthodox Church is the "official" preserver of national identity, but this does not make it a promoter of radical nationalism. The strong relationship between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian state is constructed throughout history, and the transition to democracy, with an emphasis on religious freedom and pluralism, threatens the position of the Orthodox Church. Although its construction of nationhood accentuates uniqueness and fear of foreign invasion, the alternative construction of identity, more cosmopolitan, and promoted by the Greek-Catholic Church is also part of the Romanian political discourse – through the country's adoption of the acquis communautaire and European Union integration.

Chapter 7

Concluding Remarks – Where to Go from Here?

In this research I explored the ways in which religion affects the formation of attitudes towards democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The starting point was Huntington's denominational hypothesis according to which democracy is more compatible with Western Christianity, and, correlatively, unsuitable for societies with other religious traditions. However, my goals have been more ambitious: I was not satisfied with testing the denominational hypothesis, since a mere confirmation or disconfirmation would not advance the knowledge of the subject in any way. Therefore, I argued that religion, and its institutionalized form – the church – are in a permanent dynamic relationship with the state, and through this interaction, religion, church and state re-invent themselves in order to adapt to different political contexts. This relationship influences the effect that religion and church have on support for democracy.

In East Central Europe, democratization brings about an unprecedented change that affects not only the political context, but also the economy and the value system in the society. I further qualified my argument by arguing that not only religion changes its role in society, but also that the church redefines its identity in order to adjust to the new democratic systems. Furthermore, these changes are conditioned by the historical relationship between church and state, and by the traditional meanings and roles that religion had in society. The influence of historical patterns of evolution is not path-dependent, and, in the case study on Romania, I pointed out several critical junctures that affected the relationship between state and church. These critical junctures represent

points of contestations, when the Orthodox dominant discourse on nationhood was challenged by rival discourses. The result of these contestations is a change in the dominant Orthodox discourse, suggesting the impossibility of reifying religion as a unitary concept that consists of an unchangeable set of precepts.

Transition to democracy in East Central Europe means both "more" and "less" than merely giving up communism for democracy. It means "more" because procedural democracy is only one component of a pre-packaged set of reforms, that also include market economy, liberalism, and even the structuring of international alliances – as is the case with democratization within the European Union framework. It also means "less" because new democracies do not have too much choice in crafting their democratic systems. Instead, they need to choose from different institutional arrangements, all belonging to the liberal market economy democratic family. In other words, socialist economic models or systems of limited liberal values have not been made available by international promoters of democracy.

Therefore, the effect of religion on attitudes towards democracy was analyzed according to different objects of support, including procedural democracy, specific government, privatization and tolerance. Even if democratization consists of capitalist liberal democracy, there is no reason to assume that people will hold consistent beliefs across different object of support. For example, Inglehart and Norris (2000) have found support for procedural democracy but not for liberal values in the Islamic world. Even within the group of consolidated democracies, support for the functioning system is not necessarily accompanied by widespread tolerance for minorities.

Part and parcel of the pre-packaged democratization kit is also an implicit (and sometimes explicit) understanding of the role of religion in society, and of the relationship between church and state. The process of democratization includes liberalization, which, in turn, includes the opening up of the religious space, and the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Additionally, clear separations between church and state are also advocated in transitions to democracy. This construction of the role of religion in society originates in two theoretical arguments that have been discussed in chapter 2. The first is the popular thesis of secularization of the 1980s, according to which religion is becoming obsolete in the face of modernization and it will slowly but surely vanish. These theories have been disconfirmed since, but the privatization of religion originated in them. The privatized religion is a spiritual belief, a personal identification or another structure that the post-materialist individual can join if he so chooses. Religious privatization is a result of modernization. Following Jose Casanova's idea of democratic development in religious states, I argued that, in countries that have a dominant Orthodox Church, separation between church and state is not only unfeasible, but also historically unprecedented. Accordingly, privatization of religion is also not a preferred option in countries that witnessed the intensive shock secularization of religion by communism, and which expect democracy to restore the importance of the religious in the. Taking these observations into consideration, I argued that the effect of religion on the formation of a democratic political culture needs to be understood from the perspective of churches as embedded institutions.

I tried to capture the contextualized relationship between church and state by categorizing various institutional arrangements existing between churches and state. I

asserted that most religions proved to be sufficiently flexible in order to accommodate democratic tenets. Religious pluralism, secularization, the transnational or autocephalous church, state funding of religion, and the dominant position of a church in society – all play a part in influencing the ability and willingness of a church to support democracy.

Quantitative data analysis showed that there is not consistent denominational effect through which religion influences the formation of politic attitudes. In other words, Bulgarian Muslims or Orthodox Moldovans are no less supportive of democracy than Polish Catholics or Hungarian Protestants. Nonetheless, the effect of religion on the formation of political attitudes is stronger in countries in which secularization is low. The data also showed that democracy as a principle enjoys widespread support across East Central Europe, even in countries that are considered non-democratic, such as Belarus or Albania. In most countries I also found that pride in one's nation is generally associated with higher support for democracy.

The five contextual features describing the relationship between church and state have only found partial applicability. The explanation for this partial applicability of the contextual hypotheses resides in the dynamic relationship between these features of context themselves. For instance, transnational churches affect their relationship with the state by not being financially dependent on it. Correlatively, autocephalous Orthodox Churches are historically dependent on the state, and they also tend to show opposition to religious pluralism. The case study on Romania showed how these contextual features feed off each other, and lead to particular outcomes, while transforming each other along the way. Furthermore, the autocephalous status of some Orthodox Churches seems to play a part in the process of nation building and state independence, as I pointed out in

my discussion of the Ukrainian and Belarussian Orthodox Churches. The relationship between church and state is thus historically constructed, and influenced by the political context.

I concluded that the relationship between church and state, and the way religion is constructed in the society influence the formation of political attitudes. But how this influence takes place is contingent on the historical interaction between church and state, which, in turn consists of multiple elements in situation of dynamic mutual constitution. Each national context contains a specific formula according to which church and state influence each other, and which renders generalizations difficult.

This has been the case with the relationship between religion and national identity, and their effect on political attitudes in many Orthodox Eastern European countries. The data showed that national identity and Orthodox faith go hand in hand in Romania, and both of them have a negative impact on support for democracy. I argued in the previous chapter that, in Romania, the Orthodox Church constructs itself as the unique preserver of national identity, thus causing other religious discourses to loose ground (for instance the Greek-Catholic discourse). Throughout history the Romanian state privileged the Orthodox Church, and recognized its role in the preservation of national identity. In Ukraine and Belarus, national identity has a more complicated relationship with Orthodoxy, because of the transnational structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, the two countries' history of Sovietization.

More generally, I argue that any analysis of nationalism based on religion should be nuanced, and understood contextually. For instance, although Orthodoxy is usually perceived as a fundamental base for ethnic constructions of nationhood in Central and

Eastern Europe, my research shows that this is not the case in all the countries under my lens. Because of the Soviet past of Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus, national identity and Orthodoxy have opposite effect on support for democracy, thus suggesting that nationhood is not constructed along the same lines. Additionally, the rivalry between the Russian Orthodox Church and autocephalous churches in this countries creates a schism within Orthodoxy, thus depriving it of the unifying power that it has for instance in Romania.

Therefore, I raise the point of a contextualized analysis of the relationship between religion and democracy. Reifying and essentializing religion is not productive in explaining the influence that religion will have on the success of democratization. Instead, accepting that religions are multi-vocal, and have different meanings in different societies, and also that churches are socially embedded institutions, leads to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between religion and democracy.

In this context, I want to raise the point of multiple modernities. Multiple modernities provide a lens of analyzing the world based on constructivist notions of contextuality, mutual constitution of structure and agency and accounts for the temporal dimension of change. In Katzenstein's words " multiple modernities disspoint those searching for one dominant narrative, such as the growth of secularism or the inescapability of civilizational clashes. They are expressed in a variety of cultural programs that reinvent themselves continuously in history. These programs adapt themselves (and also modify) large-scale historical processes such as modernization secularization, industrialization and democratization." (Katzenstein, 2006, pp. 4-5) In the context of this research, multiple modernities allow for a flexible relationship between

church and state. They also allow for a multiplicity of narratives. In the previous case study, I presented the interaction of dominant and contesting religious discourses on Romanian identity. I also showed that even within the Orthodox Church, different members hold different views of the church's mission and role in democratic Romania. Parallel and contending narratives are critical in trying to capture the reality in any situation. Multiple modernities allow for more maneuvering of the ways in which modernization and democratization on one hand, interact with tradition and local culture, on the other hand. The emphasis on democratic development following the principles of liberalism and free market economy does not mean that traditions, and by traditions I imply mostly religion, necessarily have to retreat in obscurity. Instead, I argue that it is possible to successfully democratize and keep religion alive, and, some authors have already commented on the benefits on building democracy in the context of religious states. Therefore, in the last part of this conclusion, I explore the ways in which this shift of focus, from reification of religion to understanding religion as a historical and social construct affects the research agenda.

From a theoretical point of view, contextualizing the relationship between religion and politics requires deeper knowledge of religious systems and their historical evolution. It is not sufficient to analyze religious dogma or correlate religious denomination with political attitudes and behaviors. If religion and church are to be understood as agents and structures in a particular political context, then one needs to delve into the history of the church, and, more specifically, into the historical roles that religion and church played throughout centuries. In so doing, one also needs to look for parallel narratives and points of critical juncture in the relationship between church and state, in order to unravel the

meanings that societies attributed to this relationship and to religion per se, and understand how these meanings have been created. Taking into consideration parallel narratives also allows the researcher to explore how dominant discourse acquired its status, and what the points of contestations between competing discourses were. In another vein, one also needs to explore the concept of democracy more fully.

This contextualized approach also challenges the ways in which non-Christian religions are constructed. Approaching religion as monolithic unchangeable sets of principles is both historically inaccurate and tainted by the perils of Orientalism.[1] Analyzing religion and church as social constructions allows for a more dynamic and historically situated investigation in the evolution of religious beliefs and their institutionalization through the church. Therefore, religion will be understood as the result of many different transformations throughout time, democratization being only the most recent one. Contextualizing religion will also lead to less formulations such as "compatibility between religion and democracy" or "Asian values", and focus on the historical evolution of pre-democratic values systems and their interaction with the new democratic political culture. In other words, no culture is more or less compatible with democracy, but each set of values has a history of their formation, that influences their flexibility and capacity to change.

From a methodological perspective, the contextualization of the relationship between religion and democracy requires understanding of the limitations of quantitative data, and, most importantly, the complementary use of quantitative and qualitative data. The limitations of quantitative research become apparent when one attempts to finds out the different meanings that religion has in different societies, and where a standardized

[1] The term Orientalism is to be understood through the definition that Edward Said formulated.

instrument may not be very useful. Nevertheless, quantitative data remains important because it can offer highly generalizable results, and offer a general view of societal attitudes. It also has an important role in the ways in which it can inform qualitative research. Qualitative data is important because of the incredible variety in the ways in which religion and democracy interact. Furthermore, historical analysis also becomes critical through the need to go back in history in order to capture how understandings of religion changed throughout time, and perhaps predict what the trend will be.

This change of focus in how research is to be conducted also transforms the position of the researcher. If history plays an important part in the interaction between religion and politics, if the relationship between church and state is influenced by political context and cultural meanings, then the researcher becomes a subject in his own research. Acknowledging one's motivation for conducting research in this sub-field will also show the researcher's political, cultural and social norms too, and will make it harder for her to control bias. Nonetheless, subjectivity does not necessarily harm research result, if levels of information are high, and if subjectivity also means first hand experience with a particular topic, and a contextualized understanding.

In conclusion, I believe that properly understanding the relationship between religion and democracy requires complementing quantitative data with qualitative evidence. It also requires an approach in which neither religion nor democracy are fixed entities, but one in which religion and politics have a history of interaction, that pre-dates democracy, and that informs the debate on what is religion's role in democratic politics.

Bibliography:

Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1980). *The Civic Culture Revisited: an Analytic study*. Boston, MA: Little Brown.

Almond, G., &Verba, S. (1963). *The Civic Culture; Political Culture and Attitudes in 5 Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Anderson, C. J., & Guillory, C. A. (1997). Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems. *The American Political Science Review*, 99(1), 66-81.

Anderson, J (ed.). (2005). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York: Routledge.

Anderson, J. (2006). Does God Matter, and If So Whose God? Religion and Democratization. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 192-217.

Anderson, J. (2006). Introduction: Religion, Democracy and Democratization. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 1-2.

Andreescu, G. (1998). International Relations and Orthodoxy in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. *International Studies*, 4, 1-32, Galati: Dominus.

Arato, A., & Cohen, J.-L. (1994). *Civil Society and Political Theory. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.

Asad, T. (1993). *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Balcerowicz, L. (2002). Understanding Postcommunist Transitions. In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 63-77.

Barnes, S. H., McDonough, P., & Lopez Pina, A. (1985). The Development of Partisanship in New Democracies: The Case of Spain. *American Journal of Political Science* 29(4), 695-720.

Barnes, S., H. (2001). The Contribution of Democracy to Rebuilding Postconflict Societies. *The American Journal of International Law*, 95(1), 86-101.

Berger, P. L. (1993). Marx, Schumpeter and the East Asian experience. In L. Diamond & M. F. Plattner (eds.) *Capitalism, socialism and democracy revisited*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Berger, P. L. (2001). Reflections on the Sociology of Religion Today. *Sociology of Religion*, 62(4), 443-454.

Bollen, K. A., & Jackman, R.W. (1995). Income Inequality and Democratization Revisited: Comment on Muller. *American Sociological Review*, 60(6), 983-989.

Bria, I. (1981). "Teologie romana ortodoxa," in *Dictionar de teologie romana ortodoxa*. EIBMBOR: 366-379. (Dictionary of Romanian Orthodox Theology).

Brubaker, R. & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond Identity. *Theory and Society* 29, 1-47.

Brubaker, Rogers. (1999). *Nationalism Reframed. Nationalism and The National Question in The New Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Bruce, S. (2006). Did Protestantism Create Democracy? In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 3-20.

Bunce, V. (2002). Comparing East and South. In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 18-32.

Burgess, A. (1997). *Divided Europe. The New Domination of the East*. London: Pluto Press.

Carothers, T. (1999). *Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Casanova, J. (1994). *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Clague, C., Gleason, S., & Knack, S. (2001). Determinants of Lasting Democracy in Poor Countries: Culture, Development and Institutions. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 573(1), 16-41.

Coman, I. G. 1979. Scriitori teologi in Scythia Minor. In *De la Dunare la mare*.Editura Arhiepiscopiei Tomisului si a Dunarii de Jos. Galati, 63-84. (Romanian Thelogoians in Scythia Minor in *From the Danube* to the Black Sea).

Connolly, W. E. (1991). *Identity\Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Davie, G. (1994). *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Diamond, L. (ed.). (1993). *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing.

Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.). (2001). *The Global Divergence of Democracies*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L., Linz, J. J., & Lipset, S. M. (1995). *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publisher.

Duch, R. M. (1993). Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union. *The American Political Science Review* 87(3), 590-608.

Duch, R.M., & Stevenson, R. (2005). Context and Economic Vote: A Multilevel Analysis. *Political Analyst*, 13(4), 387-409.

Easton, D. (1965). *A Framework for Political Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ehteshami, A. (2006). Islam, Muslim Politics and Democracy. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 90-110.

Eke, A. M., & Kuzio, T. (2000). Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52(3), 523-647.

Ekiert, G. (1991). Democratization Processes in East Central Europe: A Theoretical Reconsideration. *British Journal of Political Science* 21(3), 285-313.

Ekiert, G. (1996). *The State Against Society: Political Crises and Their Aftermath in East Central Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Enyedi, Z., & O'Mahony, J. (2006). Churches and the Consolidation of Democratic Culture: Difference and Convergence in the Czech Republic and Hungary. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 171-191.

Filali, Ansary, A. (2001). Muslims and Democracy. In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F., *The Global Divergence of Democracies*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 37-51.

Filali-Ansary, A. (2005). The Challenge of Secularization. In L. Diamond et al. (eds.), *World Religions and Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Finifter, A. W. (1996). Attitudes toward Individual Responsibility and Political Reform in the Former Soviet Union. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(1): 138-152.

Finifter, A. W. , & Mickiewicz, E. (1992). Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change. *The American Political Science Review*, 86(4), 857-874.

Finke, R., & Iannaccone, L. (1993). Supply-Side Explanations for Religious Change. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 527, 27-39.

Finke, R., & Stark, R. (1998). Religious Choice and Competition. *American Sociological Review*, 63(5), 761-766.

Fishbein, B., &Ajzen, I. (1980). *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Fleron, F. J. Jr. (1996). Post-Soviet Political Culture in Russia: An Assessment of Recent Empirical Investigations. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48(2); 225-260.

Fleron, F. J. Jr., & Ahl, R. (1998). Does the Public Matter?: What We Have Learned from "Third Wave" Transitions and Public Opinion Surveys. In Eckstein, H. et al. (eds.)*Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia*?. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of The Prison*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Freston, P. (2006) Evangelical Protestantism and Democratization in Contemporary latin America and Asia. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 21-41.

Froese, P. (2001). Hungary for Religion: a Supply-Side Interpretation of the Hungarian Religious Revival. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 40(2), 251-268.

Gautier, M. L. (1997). Church Attendance and Religious Beliefs in Postcommunist Societies. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36(2), 289-296.

Gautier, M. L. (1998). Church Elites and the Restoration of Civil Society in The Communist Societies of Central Europe. *Journal of Church and State* 40(2), 289-318.

Gibson, J. L. (1996). Political and Economic Markets: Changes in the Connections Between Attitudes Toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of Russia and Ukraine. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(4), 954-984.

Gibson, J. L., & Duch, R. (1993). Political Intolerance in The USSR: The Distribution and Etiology of Mass Opinion. *Comparative Political Studies*, 26, 286-329.

Gill, A. (2006). Weber in Latin America:Is Protestant Growth Enabling the Consolidation of Democratic Capitalism? In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 42-65.

Gill, A. J. (1995). Rendering Unto Caesar? Religious Competition and Catholic Political Strategy in Latin America. *American Journal of Political Science* 38(2), 403-425.

Grabbe, H. (2006). *The EU's Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York, NY: Palgrave, Macmillan.
Greenfield, L. (1992). *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Grim, B. J., & Finke, R. (2006). International Religion Indexes: Government Regulation, Government Favoritism and Social Regulation of Religion. *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* 2, article 1.
Harmel, R., & Robertson, J. D. (1986). Government Stability and Regime Support: A Cross-National Analysis. *The Journal of Politics*, 48(4), 1029-1040.
Haynes, J. (2006). Religion and Democratization in Africa. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 66-89.
Hefner, R. (2001). Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization. *Sociology of Religion*, 62(4), 491-514.
Heritschi, C. (2006). The Islamist Discourse of the FIS and the Democratic Experiment in Algeria. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 111-132.
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, Voice and Loyalty; Responses to Decline in Organizations and Firms*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Huntington, S. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture in Advanced Industrial Society*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Cultural Values. *American Sociological Review* 65(1), 19-51.
Ionescu, D. (1991). *The Orthodox/Uniate Conflict*. RFL/RL Research Institute, Report on Eastern Europe, 2(31), 29-34.
Jensen, L. (2003). *Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Juergensmeyer, M. (1995). The New Religious State. *Comparative Politics* 27(4), 379-391.
Kaldor, M., & Vejvoda, I. (1997). Democratization in Central and Eastern European Countries. *International Affairs* 73(1), 59-82.
Keane, J. (1994). Nations, Nationalism and Citizens in Europe. *International Social Science Journal*, 140, 169-184.
Klingemann, H.- D. (1998). *Mapping Political Support in The 1990s: A Global Analysis*. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung gGmbh (WZB), FS III 98-202.
Klingemann, H.-D. (1995). "Party Positions and Voter Orientations," in H.-D. Klingemann & D. Fuchs (eds.), *Citizens and the State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (183-205)
Klotz, A., & Lynch, C. (2007). *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Kullberg, J.S., & Zimmermann, W. (1999). Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy. *World Politics*, 51(3), 323-358.

Kuzio, T. (2001). 'Nationalising States" or Nation Building? A Critical Review of The Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence. *Nations and Nationalism*, 7(2), 135-154.

Larason Schneider, A. & Ingram, H. (1997). *Policy Design for Democracy*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas.

Lazu, R. (2002). Interculturalitate si interconfesionalitate: o alta perspectiva. In Interculturalitate. (*Inter-culturalism and inter-confesionalism: another perspective* in Inter-culturalism - the summary of a book).

Lepetit, B. (ed.). (1995). *Les formes de l'experience. Une autre histoire sociale*. Paris: Albin Michel.

Lijphart, A, (1996). *Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1984). *Democracies; patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries*. New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A., & Waisman, C. H. (eds.). (1996). *Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Lindberg, L.N., & Scheingold, S. A. (1970). *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Lipset, S.M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53. 69-105.

Livezeanu, I. (1995). *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lupsa, S. (1992). Crestinismul romanesc a fost de la inceput ortodox. In Ortodoxia Romaneasca, Bucuresti: 67-84. ("*Romanian Christianity has been Orthodox from the very beginning,*" in Romanian Ortodoxy).

Mainwarring, S., & Shugart, M. S. (1997). *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwarring, S., O'Donnell, G., & Valenzuela, J. S. (1992). *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. Notre Dame, IA: Notre Dame University Press.

March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2005). *Elaborating the "New Institutionalism"*. Arena Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Working paper no. 11, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/papers/wp05_11.pdf, 1-28.

McCargo, D. (2006). Buddhism, Democracy and Identity in Thailand. In, Anderson, J. (ed.). *Religion, Democracy and Democratization*. New York, NY: Routledge, 155-170.

McIntosh, M. E., et al. (1994). Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1991-1993. *Slavic Review*, 53(2), 483-512.

Meyendorff, J. (1982). *The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church*. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press.

Miller, A. H. , Miller, A. H., Reisinger, W. M., & Hesli, V. T.. (1996). Understanding Political Change in Post-Soviet Societies: A Further Commentary on Finifter and Mickiewicz. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(1): 153-166.

Miller, A. H., & Listhaug, O. (1990). Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, 20(3), 357-386.

Miller, A. H., Miller, A. H., Reisinger, W. M., & Hesli, V. T.. (eds.). (1994). *Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Miller, A. H., Miller, A. H., Reisinger, W. M., & Hesli, V. T.. (1995). *New Soviet Citizen Survey 1991: Monitoring Institutional Change*. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1997). Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies. *The Journal of Politics*, 59(2), 418-451.

Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2002). Comparing Regime Support in Non-democratic and Democratic Countries. *Democratization*, 9(2), 1-20.

Muller, E. (1995a). Economic Determinants of Democracy. *American Sociological Review*, 60(6), 966-982.

Muller, E. (1995b). Income Inequality and Democratization: Reply to Bollen and Jackman. *American Sociological Review*, 60 (6), 990-996.

Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1994). "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationship. *The American Political Science Review* 88(3), 635-652.

Munck, G. L. , & Leff, C. S. (1997). Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 29(3), 343-362.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2001). *Politica romaneasca dupa communism*. Bucuresti: Humanitas. (*Romanian politics after communism*)

Neumann, I. B. (1999). *Uses of The Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Niedermeyer, O., & Sinnott, R. (1995). *Public Opinion and Internationalized Government*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Nielsen, N. C. (1991*). Revolution in Eastern Europe: the Religious Roots*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Nodia, G. (2002). How Different are Postcommunist Transitions? In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-17.

Norris, P. (ed.). (1999). *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P.C., & Whitehead, L. (eds.). (1986). *Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (1994). Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New' Institutionalism. In Dood, L., & Jillson, C. (eds.) *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretation*, Boulder, CO: Westview.

Orren, K., & Skowronek, S. (2004). *The Search for American Political Development*. New Yock, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Peffley, M., & Rohrschneider, R. (2003). Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56(3), 243-257.

Pierson, P., & Skocpol, T. (2007). *Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science*. http://polisci.berkeley.edu/faculty/bio/permanent/Pierson.P/Discipline.pdf.

Popescu, E. (1992). Crestinismul pe teritoriul Romaniei pana in secolul al VII-lea, in lumina noilor dercetari. In Ortodoxia Romaneasca, Bucuresti, 85-99. (*Christianity on Romanian territory until the seventh century, in the light of new research*, Romanian Orthodoxy).

Pridham, G., Herring, E., & Sanford, G. (eds.). (1994). *Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Prundus, S. A., & Plaianu, C. (1994). *Catolicism si ortodoxie romaneasca. Scurt istoric al bisericii romane unite*. Cluj Napoca: Viata Crestina (*Catholicism and Romanian Orthodoxy. A Short History of the Romanian Uniate Church*).

Przeworksi, A. (1991). *Democracy and The Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000). *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in The World 1950 1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Putnam, R., Leonardi, R., &and Nanetti, R. Y. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ramet, S. P. (2006). Thy will be done: the Catholic Church and politics in Poland since 1989. In Byrnes, T. A. & Katzenstein (eds.), P. J. *Religion in an Expanded Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 117-147.

Reisinger, W. M. (1997). Choices facing the Builders of a Liberal Democracy. In R. D. Grey (ed.) *Democratic Theory and Post-Communist Change*. Prentice Hall.

Reus-Smit, C. (2002). Imagining Society: Constructivism and The English School. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 4(3), 487-509.

Rohrschneider, R. (1996). Institututional Learning Versus Value Diffusion: The Evolution of Democratic Values Among Parliamentarians in Eastern and Western Germany. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(2), 422-446.

Rose, R. (2002). A Diverging Europe. In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 147-160.

Rose, R. (2002). Europe Transformed. In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 109-114.

Rose, R., & Haerpfer, C. (1994). Mass Response to Transformation in Post-communist Societies. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 46(1), 3-28.

Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E.H., & Stephens, J.D. (1992). *Capitalist development and democracy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Rupnik, J. (2002). The International Context. In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 132-146.

Rupnik, J. (2002). The Postcommunist Divide. In Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (eds.), *Democracy after Communism*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 103-108.

Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics*, 2(3), 337-363.

Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Savin, I. G. (1992). Crestinismul in trecutul nostru istoric. Ortodoxie Romaneasca, Bucuresti, 52-66. (*Christianity in Our Historical Past*).

Schimmelfennig, F., Engert, S., & Knobel, H. (2006). *International Socialization in Europe. European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., & Longstreth, F. (1992). *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Stepan, A. C. (2000). Religion, Democracy and the "Twin Tolerations". *Journal of Democracy*, 11(4), 37-57.

Sullivan, J. L., Shamir, M., Roberts, N. S., & Walsh, P. (1984). Political Intolerance and the Structure of Mass Attitudes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 17(3), 319-344.

Sullivan, J. L., Pierson, J., & Marcus, G.E. (1982). *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Taagepera, R., & Shugart, M. (1989). *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Thelen, K. (1999). Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 369-404.

Todorov, T. (1984). *The Conquest of America: The Question of The Other*. New York, NY: Harper and Row.

Todorova, M. N. (1997). *Imagining the Balkans*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Tucker, J. A. (2002). The First Decade of Post-Communist Elections and Voting: What Have We Studied, and how Have We Studied It?. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5, 271-304.

Verba, S., Nie, N. H., & Kim, J. (1978). *Participation and Political Equality. A Seven-Nation Comparison*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and Equality, Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Verdery, K. (1991). *National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Verdery, K. (2003). *The Vanishing Hectare. Property and Value in Postsocialist Transylvania*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Vulpe, R. (1979). Romanitate si crestinism. Coordonate ale etnogenezei romanilor. In De la Dunare la mare, Editura Arhiepiscopiei Tomisului si a Dunarii de Jos. Galati, 16-22. (Roman character and Christianity. Traits of Romanian Ethnogenesis, in *From the Danube to the Black Sea*).

Walters, P. (2002). Notes on Autocephaly and Phyletism. *Religion, State and Society*, 30(4), 357-363.

Weatherford, M. S. (1991). Mapping the Ties that Bind: Legitimacy, Representation and Alienation. *The Western Political Quarterly*, 44, 251-276.
Weil, F. D. (1989). The Sources and Structure of Legitimation in Western Democracies: A Consolidated Model Tested with Time-Series Data in Six Countries since World War II. *American Sociological Review*, 54, 682-706.
Weil, F. D. (1993). The Development of Democratic Attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany in a Comparative Perspective. *Research on Democracy and Society* 1, 195-225.
Weiss, H. (2003). A Cross-National Comparison of Nationalism in Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland. *Political Pshychology*, 24(2), 377-401.
Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *The American Political Science Review*, 88(2), 384-396.
Westle, B. (1987). *Legitimacy Beliefs and Welfare Expectations.* Manheim: Universitat Manheim.
Wood, R. L. (1999). Religious Culture and Political Action. *Sociological Theory* 17(3), 307-332.

Web sources:

Romanian Orthodox Church Official websites and publications:
http://www.crestinism-ortodox.ro/html
http://www.patriarhia.ro
http://www.arhiepiscopia-ort-cluj.org/cultural/revista/revista/news.php

Romanian Greek-Catholic Official websites and publications:
http://www.bru.ro
http://www.greco-catolic.ro

Romanian mass-media:
www.adevarul.ro
www.mediauno.ro
www.kappa.ro

Appendix A

Dependent variables – index construction

Specific support

1. Diffuse (initial E111 – rate political system for governing the country – scale 1-10, from very bad to very good). Now 0-9, o means very bad, 9 very good.
2. Satisf -(initial E110 – satisfaction with the way democracy develops, 4 categories, from 1 very satisfied, to 4 not at all satisfied). Now 0-3, 0 means not at all satisfied, 3 means very satisfied.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Support for procedural democracy

1. Communism (initial E112 – rate political system as it was before – communism – scale 1-10, form very bad to very good). Now 0-9, 0 means very good, 9 very bad.
2. Leader (initial E114 – political system – having a strong leader, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad). Now 0-3, 0 means it is very good to have a strong leader, 3 it is very bad.
3. Techno (initial E115 – political system – having experts make decisions, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad). Now 0-3, 0 means very bad, 3 means very good.
4. Army (initial E116 – political system – having the army rule, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad). Now 0-3, 0 means very good, 3 means very bad.
5. Dem_sys (initial E117 – political system – having a democratic political system, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 very good, 4 very bad. Now 0-3, 0 means very bad, 3 means very good.
6. Dem_inde (initial E121 – democracies are too indecisive and have too much squabbling – 4 categories, 1-4, 1 agree strongly, 4 strongly disagree). Now 0-3, 0 means agree strongly, 3 means strongly disagree.
7. Dem_ord (initial E122 – democracies are not good at maintaining order - 4 categories, 1-4, 1 agree strongly, 4 strongly disagree). Now 0-3, 0 means agree strongly, 3 means strongly disagree.
8. Dem_bet (initial E123 – democracy may have problems but it is better than any other forms of government, 4 categories, 1-4, 1 agree strongly, 4 strongly disagree). Now 0-3, 0 means strongly disagree, 3 means agree strongly.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Support for market economy

1. Pr_own (initial E036 – private vs. state ownership of business – scale from 1-10, where 1 means private ownership should be increased and 10 government ownership should be increased). Now 0-9, where 0 means government ownership should be increased, and 9 means private ownership should be increased.
2. Ind_res (initial E037 – government responsibility – scale from 1-10, where 1 means people should take more responsibility, and 10 the government should take more responsibility). Now 0-9, where 0 means more government responsibility, and 9 means more individual responsibility.

3. Compet (initial E039 – competition good or harmful – scale form 1-10, where 1 means economic competition is good, and 10 competition is harmful). Now 0-9, where 0 means competition harmful, and 9 competition good.
4. Firm_fr (initial E042 – firms and freedom – scale form 1-10, where 1 means state should give more freedom to firms, and 10 state should control firms more effectively). Now 0-9 where 0 means more state control, and 9 means more firm freedom.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Tolerance (initial F075 – whether Rroma individuals would not be desirable as neighbors). Dichotomous 0 not tolerant, 1 tolerant.

Independent variables – index construction

Religious participation

1. Ch_att (initial F028 – church attendance, 8 categories, 1 means more than 1/week, 2 means 1/week, 3 means 1/month, 4 means special days, Christmas, Easter, 5 meand other specific holidays, 6 means 1/year, 7 means less often, 8 means never, practically never). Now 8 becomes 0, 1 becomes 7. Recode: 7 becomes 100, 6 becomes 50, 5 becomes 12, 4 and 3 become 5, 2 and 1 become 1, 0 becomes 0.
2. Ch_time (initial A060 – spend time with people at church/mosque – 4 categories, 1 means weekly, 2 means 1-2/month, 3 means only a few times/year, 4 means not at all). Now 0-3, 3 means often, 0 means rarely. Recode: 3 becomes 50, 2 becomes 20, 1 becomes 5, 0 becomes 0.
3. Vol_ch (initial A082 – unpaid work at religious/church organization, dichotomous). O means not mentiond, 1 means belong.
4. Assoc_ch (initial A065 – belong to religious organization, dichotomous). 0 means not mentioned, 1 means belong.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Religiosity

1. Rlgsity (initial F034 – subjective evaluation of being a religious person – 4 categories , 1 means a religious person, 2 not a religious person, 3 a convinced atheist, 4 other answer). Now 0-2, since 4 was eliminated, 0 means non religious, 2 religious. Recode: 2 becomes 100, 1 becomes 20, 0 becomes 0.
2. Pray (initial F067 – pray to God outside of religious service – 5 categories, 1 means often, 2 sometimes, 3 hardly ever, 4 only in times of crisis, 5 never). Now 0-4, o means never, and 4 often. Recode: 4 becomes 100, 3 becomes 30, 2 becomes 10, 1 becomes 5, o becomes 0.
3. Medit (initial F065 – moments of prayer, meditation – dichotomous). 0 means no, 1 means yes.
4. Rel_imp2 (religion important in life – 4 categories, 1 very important, 2 rather important, 3 not very important, 4 not at all important). Now, 0-3, 0 not at all important, 3 very important.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Demographics

1. Sex (initial X001), 1 male, 0 female.
2. Age_rec1 (initial X003r, ordinal). Now 4 categories 0-3, 3 means 15-34, 2 means 35-54, 1 means 55-64, 0 means 65 and older.
3. Edu_rec (initial x025, education, ordinal). Now 4 categories, 0-3, 0 means up to complete elementary, 1 means up to complete secondary, 2 means high school, 3 some university or university degree.
4. Income (initial X047, scale of income, ordinal, World Value Surveys coded for every country in national currency). Now 10 categories, 0-9, 0 low, 9 high.
5. Resid (initial X049, size of town, ordinal). Now 5 categories, 0 means smaller than 10000, 1 means between 10000-50000, 2 means 50000-100000, 3 means 100000-500000, 4 means more than 500000.

Political interest

1. Pol_dis (initial A062, political discussion, ordinal, 3 values, 1 frequently, 2 occasionally, 3 never). Now, 3 categories, 2 means frequently, and 0 never.
2. Pol_news (initial E150, how often following politics in the news, ordinal, 5 categories, 1 every day, 2 several times/week, 3 1-2/week, less often, 5 never). Now 5 categories, 0-4, o means never, 4 means every day.
3. Pol_int (initial E023, interest in politics, ordinal, 4 categories, 1 very interested, 2 somewhat interested, 3 not very interested, 4 not at all interested). Now 4 categories, 0-3, 0 means not at all, 3 means very interested.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Secularization

Individual secularization

1. Ch_mor (initial F035, church gives answers to moral problems, dichotomous). 0 no, 1 yes.
2. Ch_fam (initial F036, church gives answers to problems of family, dichotomous). 0 no, 1 yes.
3. Ch_spir (initial F037, church gives answers to people's spiritual needs, dichotomous). 0 no, 1 yes.
4. Ch_soc (initial F038, church gives answers to social problems, dichotomous). 0 no, 1 yes.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Church secularization

5. Rel_vot (initial F 103, religious leaders should not influence how people vote, ordinal, 1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree, 5 strongly disagree). Now 5 categories, 0 agree strongly, 4 disagree strongly.
6. Rel_gov (initial F105, religious leaders should not influence government, ordinal, 1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree, 5 strongly disagree). Now 5 categories, 0 agree strongly, 4 disagree strongly.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Political secularization

7. Rel_off (initial F104, better if more people with strong beliefs in public office, ordinal, 1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree, 5 strongly disagree). Now 5 categories, 0 disagree strongly, 4 strongly agree.
8. Rel_pol (initial F102, politicians who don't believe in God are unfit for public office, ordinal, 1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree, 5 strongly disagree). Now 5 categories, 0 disagree strongly, 4 strongly agree.

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

National identity

1. Nation (initial G006, how proud of nationality, ordinal, 1 very proud, 2 quite proud, 3 not very proud, 4 not at all proud). Now, 4 categories, 0 not at all proud, 3 very proud.

Civic engagement

Membership in associations (except religious), dichotomous, 0 not mentioned, 1 belong

1. Assoc_ed (initial A066)
2. Labourun (initial A067)
3. Pol_part (initial A068)
4. Profasso (initial A072)
5. Sports (initial A074)
6. Youth (initial A073)
7. Women (initial A074)
8. Other_gr (initial A079)
9. None (initial A080)

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Political engagement

Voluntary work – unpaid time (except religious), dichotomous, 0 not mentioned, 1 belong

1. Volun_ed (initial A083)
2. Vol_unio (initial A084)
3. Vol_par (initial A085)
4. Vol_prof (initial A089)
5. Vol_yout (initial A090)
6. Vol_spor (initial A091)
7. Vol_wom (initial A092)
8. Vol_oth (initial A096)
9. Vol_none (initial A097)

The components of the factor have been added up with equal weights.

Government Regulation of religion Index (GRI) (Grim and Finke, 2006): Scale 0-10, low is less regulation
Does the Government interfere with an individual's right to worship? (Grim and Finke 2006)
How is freedom of religion described? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Does the government generally respect the right to freedom of religion in practice? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Does the government policy contribute to the generally free practice of religion? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Are foreign and other missionaries allowed to operate? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Is proselytizing, public preaching, or conversion limited or restricted? (Grim and Finke 2006)

Government favoritism of religion index (GFI) (Grim and Finke, 2006): Scale 0-10, low is less regulation
Does the government fund some things related to religion? (Grim and Finke 2006)
To what extent is there a favored (or established) religious brand? (Grim and Finke 2006)
How does the government subsidize (incl. in-kind) religion? (Grim and Finke 2006)
What is the nature of government funding to the religious sector? (Grim and Finke 2006)
[fundex.s] Government Funding of Religion Index (0-12: schools, buildings, clergy, media, charity, religious work) (Grim and Finke 2006): Scale 0-12, low is less funding
Does the government fund religious education? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Does the government fund religious buildings? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Does the government fund clergy salary or benefits? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Does the government fund religious print or broadcast media? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Does the government fund religious charity or public service work? (Grim and Finke 2006)
Does the government fund religious practice or mission work? (Grim and Finke 2006)

Freedom House Democratization Score – average score on the following dimensions

National Democratic Governance. Considers the democratic character and stability of the governmental system; the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of legislative and executive branches; and the democratic oversight of military and security services.

Electoral Process. Examines national executive and legislative elections, electoral processes, the development of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process.

Civil Society. Assesses the growth of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in the policy process.

Independent Media. Addresses the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, editorial independence, the emergence of a financially viable private press, and Internet access for private citizens.

Local Democratic Governance. Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities.

Judicial Framework and Independence. Highlights constitutional reform, human rights protections, criminal code reform, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions.

Corruption. Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policy makers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives.

Democratization Score

1-2 Consolidated Democracy

3 Semi-consolidated Democracy

4 Transitional Government or Hybrid Regime

5 Semi-consolidated Authoritarian Regime

6-7 Consolidated Authoritarian Regime

Appendix B

World Values Survey Data Analysis for Greece

The effect of religious participation on support for procedural democracy within the group of Orthodox believers (N= 723, Rsq.= .055)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	10.485	.434		24.186	.000
	interest	.223	.081	.100	2.746	.006
	nation	.293	.099	.110	2.975	.003
	rel_part	-.079	.034	-.087	-2.339	.020
	Scale of incomes	.056	.034	.062	1.636	.102
	Education level (recodec	.358	.113	.121	3.166	.002

a. Dependent Variable: procedural

The effect of religiosity on support for procedural democracy within the group of Orthodox believers (N= 826, Rsq.= .056)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	10.723	.445		24.089	.000
	interest	.178	.078	.079	2.287	.022
	nation	.343	.094	.129	3.659	.000
	Scale of incomes	.044	.032	.048	1.364	.173
	Education level (recodec	.392	.108	.130	3.628	.000
	rlgsity	-.395	.141	-.101	-2.799	.005

a. Dependent Variable: procedural

The effects of both religiosity and church attendance on support for procedural democracy within the group of Orthodox believers (N= 821, Rsq.= .058)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	10.610	.461		23.019	.000
	interest	.179	.078	.079	2.297	.022
	nation	.345	.094	.130	3.658	.000
	Scale of incomes	.047	.032	.052	1.457	.146
	Education level (recodec	.398	.108	.133	3.676	.000
	ch_att	.036	.053	.026	.669	.503
	rlgsity	-.434	.154	-.111	-2.822	.005

a. Dependent Variable: procedural

The effects of both religiosity and church attendance on the preference for a strong leader within the group of Orthodox believers (N= 866, Rsq.= .029)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.526	.163		15.456	.000
	interest	.007	.028	.009	.253	.800
	nation	.080	.034	.084	2.384	.017
	Scale of incomes	-.011	.012	-.033	-.932	.352
	Education level (recodec	.115	.039	.105	2.944	.003
	ch_att	-.008	.019	-.015	-.400	.689
	rlgsity	-.154	.054	-.111	-2.850	.004

a. Dependent Variable: leader

The effects of both religiosity and church attendance on the preference for having the army rule within the group of Orthodox believers (N= 858, Rsq.= .017)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.383	.178		13.401	.000
	interest	.052	.030	.059	1.707	.088
	nation	.023	.037	.023	.643	.521
	Scale of incomes	.001	.013	.003	.077	.939
	Education level (recoded	.107	.042	.091	2.519	.012
	ch_att	.002	.021	.004	.108	.914
	rlgsity	-.075	.059	-.050	-1.274	.203

a. Dependent Variable: army

The effects of both religiosity and church attendance on the indecisiveness of democratic regimes within the group of Orthodox believers (N = 845, Rsq.= .062)

Coefficients[a]

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.202	.163		7.384	.000
	interest	.063	.028	.077	2.278	.023
	nation	.070	.033	.073	2.096	.036
	Scale of incomes	.031	.012	.094	2.678	.008
	Education level (recode	.100	.039	.092	2.596	.010
	ch_att	.007	.019	.015	.396	.692
	rlgsity	-.225	.054	-.160	-4.158	.000

a. Dependent Variable: dem_inde